Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the República Bolivariana de Venezuela and Petroquimica de Venezuela, S.A., alleging unlawful expropriation of their property in violation of international law. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied their motion for leave nunc pro tunc to file an amended complaint. While the case was pending, the Supreme Court issued Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, et al. v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312 (2017), which detailed the showing that plaintiffs such as the ones in this case must make in order to have jurisdiction over a foreign state in United States courts under the expropriation (i.e., takings) exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3). The court remanded for the district court to permit plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and, after defendants have responded, to address whether the domestic takings rule applied and whether jurisdiction existed under the FSIA's expropriation exception. View "Comparelli v. Republica Bolivariana De Venezuela" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B) by threatening to assault an immigration judge with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with that judge while she was engaged in the performance of official duties. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that an immigration judge was a "United States judge" within the meaning of section 115(a)(1)(B). The court reasoned that an immigration judge was a "judicial officer of the United States" and thus a "United States judge." View "United States v. McLean" on Justia Law

Meridor arrived in the U.S. about 25 years ago as a political refugee from Haiti and applied for political asylum. He withdrew his application after it lingered for many years. In 2013, DHS notified Meridor that he was subject to removal as a foreign national without a valid visa or passport, and because he had convictions for a crime of moral turpitude and controlled-substance offenses. Meridor applied for asylum and for withholding of removal. An IJ agreed that Meridor was removable and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Meridor moved for reconsideration, but before the IJ ruled, Meridor applied to USCIS for a U visa (available to certain crime victims). The IJ terminated his removal proceedings, and, acting as the Attorney General’s delegate, stated that she had jurisdiction over the waiver application. Before the IJ could issue a written opinion, USCIS denied Meridor’s applications for a U visa and waiver of inadmissibility. Three weeks later, the IJ granted the waiver, citing “extraordinary circumstances.” The BIA reversed the IJ’s decision, holding that only DHS can grant waivers of inadmissibility for U visa applications and that Meridor did not merit such a waiver. The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The plain language of 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A) gives IJs authority to grant waivers of inadmissibility and the BIA committed legal error in reaching its alternative holding on the merits. View "Meridor v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit had interlocutory jurisdiction in this appeal from the denial of a warrant in rem for the arrest of a vessel. In this case, plaintiff filed a complaint against the vessel and others, alleging that he was entitled to enforce a maritime lien for damages arising from a maritime tort. The court held that plaintiff's claim for a maritime tort against the vessel fell within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court and plaintiff was entitled to a warrant in rem. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to direct the clerk to issue a warrant in rem for the arrest of the vessel. View "Minott v. M/Y Brunello" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to export defense articles without a license or written approval in violation of the Arms Control Export Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778. The court held that sufficient evidence established that defendant conspired willfully to violate the Act and that the evidence entitled the jury to reject defendant's defense of entrapment; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the conspirators' communications; defendant's 50 month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable; and no plain error occurred when the government failed to disclose an email referenced in a conversation between defendant and an undercover agent. View "United States v. Man" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated a cease and desist order issued by the FTC against LabMD. The FTC brought an enforcement action against LabMD, alleging that LabMD's data-security program was inadequate and thus constituted an "unfair act or practice" under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). The court agreed with LabMD that the order was not enforceable because it did not direct LabMD to cease committing an unfair act or practice within the meaning of Section 5(a). Assuming arguendo that LabMD's negligent failure to design and maintain a reasonable data-security program invaded consumers' right of privacy and thus constituted an unfair act or practice, the court held nonetheless that the cease and desist order was not enforceable where it contained no prohibitions, but rather commanded LabMD to overhaul and replace its data-security program to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonableness. View "LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for police officers in an action alleging excessive force and malicious prosecution. The court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff where he ran a stop sign and did not violate clearly established constitutional law during his arrest by using reasonable force. Therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the civil rights claims. Furthermore, a finding of probable cause barred plaintiff's claim for false arrest under state common law. View "Manners v. Cannella" on Justia Law

Petitioner contended that the district court erred in dismissing his 2016 petition as an unauthorized second or successive petition because, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 124 S. Ct. 786 (2003), his 1988 petition did not count as a first petition. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing his 2016 petition because his 1988 petition was recharacterized without the required notice and warning. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ponton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a joint stipulation with NHMA purporting to voluntarily dismiss a 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) and then moved the district court to enter final judgment on her remaining employment-related claims. The district court denied the motion because it no longer had jurisdiction over the action after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her lone remaining claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal was invalid where Rule 41(a)(1) permitted voluntary dismissals only of entire actions, not claims. Therefore, the court held that the invalid joint stipulation did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the case. View "Pamela M. Perry, M.D. v. The Schumacher Group of Louisiana" on Justia Law

The Miccosukee Indian Tribe and one of its members raised an affirmative defense that revenue distributions from gaming activities were exempt from taxation as Indian general welfare benefits under the Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act (GWEA), 26 U.S.C. 139E. The Eleventh Circuit held that the distribution payments could not qualify as Indian general welfare benefits under GWEA because Congress specifically subjected such distributions to federal taxation in the Indian Gaming Revenue Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.; the member waived any arguments as to penalties or the amount assessed against her, and the tribe lacked a legal interest in those issues; and the district court did not err in entering judgment against the tribe because the tribe intervened as of right and the Government sought to establish its obligation to withhold taxes on the distributions. View "United States v. Jim" on Justia Law