Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal and ordering removal. The court held that petitioner's narcotics conviction did not disqualify her from cancellation of removal, because the Florida statute under which she was convicted did not qualify as an aggravated felony where it was indivisible and categorically overbroad. The court remanded for the BIA to reconsider petitioner's application. View "Cintron v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal and ordering removal. The court held that petitioner's narcotics conviction did not disqualify her from cancellation of removal, because the Florida statute under which she was convicted did not qualify as an aggravated felony where it was indivisible and categorically overbroad. The court remanded for the BIA to reconsider petitioner's application. View "Cintron v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's application of a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and 924(e)(2)(B), to defendant's sentence. The court held that defendant's argument that aggravated assault under Fla. Stat. 784.021 and resisting an officer with violence under Fla. Stat. 843.01 were not violent felonies was foreclosed by circuit precedent. The court also held that a conviction for sexual battery with a deadly weapon under Fla. Stat. 794.011(3) was a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause. Therefore, defendant had the three qualifying prior felony convictions under the ACCA. View "United States v. Deshazior" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's application of a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and 924(e)(2)(B), to defendant's sentence. The court held that defendant's argument that aggravated assault under Fla. Stat. 784.021 and resisting an officer with violence under Fla. Stat. 843.01 were not violent felonies was foreclosed by circuit precedent. The court also held that a conviction for sexual battery with a deadly weapon under Fla. Stat. 794.011(3) was a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause. Therefore, defendant had the three qualifying prior felony convictions under the ACCA. View "United States v. Deshazior" on Justia Law

After transporters damaged cargo, Lloyds filed suit seeking to recover from the transporters the damages that Lloyds paid to its insured. The Eleventh Circuit explained that, because the transporters damaged one part of a machine that could not operate without the damaged part, the extent of the transporters' liability depended on whether the Montreal Convention or the waybill controlled. The court held that the district court erred in ruling that the Montreal Convention governed the transporters' liability, but rather, the waybill governed the transporters' liability. Because the waybill was ambiguous about the weight that should be used to calculate liability, the court remanded the case for the district court to address the issue in the first instance. View "Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Cover Note B0753PC1308275000 v. Expeditors Korea Ltd." on Justia Law

A taxpayer that contracts to sell property used in its trade or business is not entitled to treat as capital gain an advance deposit that it rightfully retains when its would-be buyer defaults and cancels the deal. In this partnership tax case, CRI-Leslie filed a petition for readjustment in the tax court, asserting that the Internal Revenue Code was meant to prescribe the same tax treatment for gains related to the disposition of "trade or business" property regardless of whether the property was successfully sold or the sale agreement was canceled. The Eleventh Circuit held that I.R.C. 1234A provides for capital-gains treatment of income resulting from canceled sales only where the underlying property constitutes a "capital asset," and I.R.C. 1221 defines "capital asset" in a way that all agree excludes the property at issue here. Therefore, CRI-Leslie was not entitled to treat its $9.7 million deposit as capital gain. View "Cri-Leslie, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of RBC's motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff held a checking account with RBC and filed suit alleging that RBC failed to properly warn him of possible overdrafts at points of sale when he used his debit card and impermissibly rearranged the order of debit-card transactions so as to process larger transactions before smaller transactions. The court found it unnecessary to address the questions of waiver or the district court's alternative holding. Rather, the court held that PNC failed to demonstrate the requisite meeting of the minds to support a finding that the parties agreed through the February 2013 amendment to arbitrate their then-pending litigation. View "Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA)" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of RBC's motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff held a checking account with RBC and filed suit alleging that RBC failed to properly warn him of possible overdrafts at points of sale when he used his debit card and impermissibly rearranged the order of debit-card transactions so as to process larger transactions before smaller transactions. The court found it unnecessary to address the questions of waiver or the district court's alternative holding. Rather, the court held that PNC failed to demonstrate the requisite meeting of the minds to support a finding that the parties agreed through the February 2013 amendment to arbitrate their then-pending litigation. View "Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA)" on Justia Law

In this school desegregation case, black schoolchildren opposed a motion filed by the Gardendale City Board of Education to permit it to operate a municipal school system. The district court devised and permitted a partial secession that neither party requested. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that the Board moved to secede for a racially discriminatory purpose; the district court did not not clearly err when it found, in the alternative, that the secession would impede the desegregation efforts of the Jefferson County Board; but the district court abused its discretion when it sua sponte permitted the partial secession of the Board. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to deny the motion to secede. View "Stout v. Gardendale City Board of Education" on Justia Law

In this school desegregation case, black schoolchildren opposed a motion filed by the Gardendale City Board of Education to permit it to operate a municipal school system. The district court devised and permitted a partial secession that neither party requested. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that the Board moved to secede for a racially discriminatory purpose; the district court did not not clearly err when it found, in the alternative, that the secession would impede the desegregation efforts of the Jefferson County Board; but the district court abused its discretion when it sua sponte permitted the partial secession of the Board. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to deny the motion to secede. View "Stout v. Gardendale City Board of Education" on Justia Law