Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed defendant's motion requesting a judicial recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for placement in a residential re-entry center (RRC) 12 months prior to the end of his sentence. Defendant contended that a prolonged placement at an RRC would help aid his re-integration into society. The court held that the denial of a request for a judicial recommendation was not a final order subject to appellate review. Moreover, the relief requested, if granted, would violate the prohibition on federal courts issuing non-binding advisory opinions. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

The City challenged the district court's order granting Retailers' renewed motion for a preliminary injunction, and denying the City's motions for clarification and for reconsideration. The preliminary injunction enjoined the enforcement of two City ordinances that restrict commercial solicitation and handbilling in sections of five streets in the Historic Art Deco District. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding that Retailers were likely to succeed on the merits with respect to Section 74-1, the anti-solicitation ordinance, because the record suggested that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored–specifically that the City failed to consider numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that Retailers showed a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that Section 46-92, the anti-handbilling ordinance, was overbroad. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction. View "FF Cosmetics FL, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 et seq., permits a consumer to partially revoke her consent to be called by means of an automatic telephone dialing system. The Eleventh Circuit thought it logical that a consumer's power under the TCPA to completely withdraw consent and thereby stop all future automated calls encompasses the power to partially withdraw consent and stop calls during certain times. In this case, the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff partially revoked her consent to be called in "the morning" and "during the workday" on the October 13 phone call with a Comenity employee. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Schweitzer v. Comenity Bank" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims under state law and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, as well as the grant of summary judgment for the City as to claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court held that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient on their face to state a plausible claim for a violation of the FLSA; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's state law claims based on his failure to comply with Ala. Code 11–47–23; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the City as to plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims where plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that the City unlawfully failed to accommodate him or that he suffered an adverse employment action, plaintiff did not meet his burden of identifying a reasonable accommodation, and he did not show that he was constructively discharged. View "Boyle v. City of Pell City" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in denying Waffle House's motion to compel arbitration in a case where plaintiff claimed that Waffle House and others violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act. In this case, the arbitration agreement contained a broad, valid, and enforceable delegation provision that expressed the parties' clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate gateway questions of arbitrability, including questions concerning the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation of the agreement. The court rejected plaintiff's claims that the arbitration agreement improperly interfered with the district court's managerial authority over class actions or that the agreement amounted to an improper ex parte communication with a represented party. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to stay the case pending arbitration. View "Jones v. Waffle House, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's determination that petitioner was liable as a transferee under 26 U.S.C. 6901 for his former employer's unpaid taxes. Because the state substantive law in this case does not require exhaustion for liability to exist, the court held that the Commissioner was not required to exhaust remedies against the company before proceeding against petitioner as a transferee. In this case, applying Florida law, the court held that petitioner could not definitively prove that the Dividend Payments were a part of his employment with FECP and because he did not raise any other argument for why FECP might have received reasonably equivalent value even if the dividends were not compensation, the court must conclude that they were dividends for which FECP did not receive reasonably equivalent value. As such, the court affirmed the Tax Court's determination that the reasonable-value element of constructive fraud under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was satisfied for all of the Dividend Payments. When considered together, those dividend payments were substantial enough for the Tax Court to conclude that they led to the insolvency of FECP. View "Kardash v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of defendant's renewed motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), holding that the district court had authority to entertain defendant's renewed motion but did not err in denying it. In this case, the district court found that defendant's life sentence was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to address the 18 U.S.C 3553(a) factors. The district court clearly and thoroughly explained that life imprisonment remained an appropriate sentence based on the serious and heinous nature of defendant's crimes, the need for adequate deterrence, and the need to protect the public from future crimes. View "United States v. Caraballo-Martinez" on Justia Law

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), the Supreme Court reversed the certification of a nationwide class of female Wal-Mart employees claiming gender discrimination. The unnamed plaintiffs in Dukes then filed new actions seeking certifications of regional classes. A group of would-be class members of one of these regional class actions, appealed the district court's dismissal of the class claims and the denial of appellants' motion to intervene. The Eleventh Circuit held that the appeal from the order dismissing the class claims was untimely filed, and was therefore jurisdictionally barred, and the appeal from the order denying appellants' motion to intervene was moot. View "Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least five kilograms of a substance containing cocaine while on board a covered vessel, and possession with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of a substance containing cocaine. Defendant Williams was also convicted of failure to heave to and the remaining defendants were convicted of aiding and abetting Williams' failure to heave to. The Eighth Circuit affirmed each defendant's drug convictions and Williams's failure-to-heave-to conviction. However, the court reversed the remaining defendants' aiding and abetting failure-to-heave-to convictions for lack of evidence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which criminalizes an individual's possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance while on board a covered vessel. The court held that defendants' ship fit within the MDLEA's broad definition of a "vessel without nationality" because a designee of the U.S. Secretary of State has certified, and thereby "proved conclusively," that Guatemala had not "affirmatively and unequivocally" asserted that the ship was of Guatemalan nationality. The court explained that, under the clear terms of the MDLEA, that certification put the crime within the territorial coverage of the statutory prohibition, and the executive branch thereby effectively assumed responsibility for any diplomatic consequences of the criminal prosecution. The court held that defendant's remaining arguments were without merit. View "United States v. Lopez Hernandez" on Justia Law