Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Barbara Bobo's husband, who worked for the TVA for more than 22 years, was diagnosed with asbestos-induced lung cancer and in 1997 died from a heart attack. Mrs. Bobo was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma in 2011 and died from mesothelioma in 2013. Before her death, Mrs. Bobo filed suit claiming that the TVA's negligence resulted in her being exposed to "take-home" asbestos when she washed her husband's work clothes over the years. The district court entered judgment against the TVA. The court concluded that, assuming that the district court erred in considering the state court deposition testimony of Mr. Bobo to support its finding that he had been exposed to asbestos while employed by TVA, the error was harmless because there was plenty of other evidence proving the same fact; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of plaintiff's expert; under Alabama law, TVA owed a duty to Mrs. Bobo to prevent take-home asbestos exposure and TVA violated that duty; the court rejected TVA's argument that the district court applied the wrong exposure standard, concluding that which standard applies does not matter because the evidence of exposure was enough to satisfy either tests at issue; and TVA is not shielded from liability under the discretionary function exception. The court affirmed as to these issues. The court vacated the award of damages, remanding to the district court for it to recalculate the damages award in order to exclude from it any amounts that were written off by Mrs. Bobo's providers and to correct any other errors that may appear to the court when the parties have a chance to focus exclusively on the medical expenses component of the damages award. View "Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five sex-related crimes involving minors. When defense counsel returned a few minutes late from a lunch break on the third day of defendant's six-day trial, he missed a small part of the testimony of the 12th of 13 government witnesses. Counsel had missed 7 minutes of a trial that lasted 31.4 hours. In this case, the parties agreed that it was Sixth Amendment error for inculpatory testimony to be taken in the absence of defense counsel. The court held that the harmless error rule was applicable to this brief absence of counsel from the courtroom. The court explained that the error that occurred when the trial resumed before counsel returned from lunch was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because overwhelming evidence offered while counsel was present went to and proved the charges in Counts 2–5, which were the only counts relevant to the testimony given during counsel's absence; the same questions were repeated and not objected-to after counsel returned to the courtroom; and there was no reasonable doubt that counsel's brief absence was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 666 of embezzlement from an organization receiving federal funds. In this case, defendant, a professor in the College of Business, was embezzling from Florida State University (FSU). Defendant was also a director and officer of the Student Investment Fund (SIF), a non-profit corporation established by FSU for charitable and educational purposes, and had signatory authority over the SIF's bank account. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that any embezzlement was not from FSU and that the Government did not prove that the victimized organization under the statute was a recipient of federal benefits. The court concluded that its decision in United States v. McLean was dispositive. The court reasoned that the SIF received no federal funding, directly or indirectly. Therefore, there were no federal funds owned by, or under the care, custody, or control of the SIF. The court explained that defendant was a director and officer and thus an agent of the SIF, and his employment as a professor at FSU was irrelevant inasmuch as he did not embezzle any FSU funds. Therefore, because the Government failed to prove that the relevant local organization, the SIF, received any federal benefits, the court reversed the judgment and directed the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Doran" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of violating the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721(a), 2725(3), because she provided email addresses of residents in Mobile County from a License Commission database. Defendant, the former License Commissioner, provided the emails to a mayoral campaign. The court held that the term "personal information" in the Act, includes email addresses, and that the government presented sufficient evidence in this case for the jury to find that the License Commissioner was an "officer, employee, or contractor" of a "State department of motor vehicles." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hastie" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm; witness tampering; and obstruction of justice. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. Defendant raised numerous pretrial and trial challenges. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court court erred when it concluded that the witness tampering and obstruction of justice charges were not multiplicitous and vindictive, and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him under either charge. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the district court abused its discretion or otherwise erred when it denied his motion for a bill of particulars; denied him a continuance before trial; denied his motion to strike the venire panel; overruled his objection to Juror 14; and excluded the letter from his ex-girlfriend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant filed suit against his former employer under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, alleging that the employer interfered with the exercise of his FMLA rights and later retaliated against him for asserting those rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. Because plaintiff likely waived his FMLA right to reinstatement by taking an additional 30 days of medical leave, because he failed to submit a fitness-for-duty certification by the end of his FMLA leave, and because the record was devoid of proof challenging the employer's contention that its fitness-for-duty certification policy was implemented in a uniform fashion, plaintiff lost the right to be reinstated after failing to comply with this policy. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that he was denied a benefit to which he was entitled under the FMLA, and the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the interference claim. The court affirmed as to this claim. The court held that temporal proximity, for the purpose of establishing the causation prong of a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, should be measured from the last day of an employee's FMLA leave until the adverse employment action at issue occurs. In this case, plaintiff has met his burden of raising a genuine dispute as to whether his taking of FMLA leave and his termination were casually related. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment as to the retaliation claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law

ADT filed suit against Vision Security for violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). The parties agreed to an injunction prohibiting Vision Security from using certain sales tactics. NorthStar Alarm then acquired customer accounts, rental leases, and other assets from Vision Security and hired four senior officers and some of the sales team from Vision Security. ADT moved to hold NorthStar in contempt of the injunction when NorthStar allegedly used sales tactics prohibited by the injunction. The court concluded that NorthStar cannot be bound by the injunction when it is not in privity with Vision Security and in the absence of any evidence that it had notice of the injunction. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment holding otherwise. View "ADT LLC v. Northstar Alarm Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Kenneth and Kimberly Horner, owners and operators of Topcat Towing, were convicted of assisting in the preparation of a fraudulent corporate tax return and filing a false individual income tax return. The court rejected defendants' claim of prosecutorial misconduct and concluded that no Giglio violation occurred in this case; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' two requested jury instructions regarding good faith reliance and due diligence obligations of tax preparers; and the court rejected defendants' evidentiary challenges, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence of structuring cash deposits and false tax returns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Horner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Prestige, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). The parties agreed that plaintiff worked an average of sixty hours per week during his employment, but they disagreed about the number of hours he worked in any individual week. The court concluded that the district court erred when it allocated commissions earned in one month across weeks worked in other months. The court explained that each commission payment that plaintiff received reflected "commissions that were earned" within a single month. Under 29 C.F.R. 778.120, the district court could allocate commissions earned in January, for example, across weeks worked in January, but not across weeks worked from February through December. Because the district court may allocate commissions across only the weeks in the period (in this case, the month) in which the commissions were earned, the court concluded that this case presented a genuine dispute about a material fact. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Freixa v. Prestige Cruise Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of production of child pornography, one count of distribution of child pornography, and one count of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order. The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, 18 U.S.C. 2259, mandates that a district court order restitution for crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children. The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the victim, defendant's one-year-old daughter, had suffered a loss or in awarding her restitution for future counseling expenses needed to address that loss. The court explained that, given the facts here, it seems that the need for future therapy was not just likely, but a virtual certainty. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Osman" on Justia Law