Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 84 month sentence after being convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of distribution of methamphetamine. Defendant argued that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1. The court concluded that defendant's convictions under section 893.13 of the Florida Statutes, for sale or delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, qualify as predicate "controlled substance offenses" for purposes of the career offender enhancement, and that the Commission did not exceed its statutory authority in defining "controlled substance offense" in a way that includes offenses lacking an element of mens rea regarding the illicit nature of the controlled substance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's application of the career offender enhancement and defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Pridgeon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 120 month sentence after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court rejected defendant's claim that he was entitled to a minor-role reduction because he merely acted as a low-level courier for methamphetamine, concluding that he had facilitated the flow of drugs in the country, he had control over which banks the proceeds from the sale went to, and he was held responsible only for his conduct in the conspiracy; the district court did not err by assessing three criminal history points for his 2001 Nevada felony drug-possession conviction; and, even if the district court erred in calculating defendant's concealing-identity conviction in the computation of his criminal history category, the error was harmless. View "United States v. Monzo" on Justia Law

USSG G1.3(b) requires the district court to "adjust" a defendant's sentence to credit him for time served in state custody on relevant conduct covered by his federal sentence—but only when the defendant has undischarged time remaining on his state sentence. Meanwhile, USSG 5K2.23 allows a district court to exercise discretion to "depart" from a guidelines sentence to reflect credit for time served in state custody on relevant conduct covered by his federal sentence when the related state sentence is completely discharged at the time of federal sentencing. In this case, the court found it unclear whether defendant's state sentence of imprisonment was entirely discharged or whether, instead, defendant had additional state time remaining to be completed. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to resolve that question and, if appropriate, to modify defendant's reduced sentence accordingly. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Murillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged CIS's denial of her petition, Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, seeking an immigrant visa for her alien father. The court concluded that CIS's decision denying plaintiff's 2012 petition was not arbitrary and capricious or otherwise contrary to law and that substantial evidence supported the decision. In this case, the evidence regarding her father's marriage was sufficient to support CIS's doubts about the marriage's validity and was also sufficient to support denial of the visa petition for failure to prove the father's ultimate eligibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mendoza v. Secretary, DHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Broward Deputy Sheriff Nick DeGiovanni, alleging claims of false arrest and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to the sheriff. The court concluded that the district judge correctly granted summary judgment to Deputy DeGiovanni on the false arrest claim where plaintiff's nolo contendere plea established probable cause for his arrest. The court concluded that the injuries plaintiff sustained during his arrest for failing to have a driver's license was not deminimis. Rather, the record demonstrated that plaintiff sustained medically documented severe, permanent injuries from Deputy DeGiovanni's unprovoked and completely unnecessary frontal-body blows to plaintiff's chest and throwing him against the car-door jamb in the course of arresting him. In this case, plaintiff was cooperating with officers and not resisting whatsoever, not even raising his voice. Applying the obvious-clarity method analysis, the court concluded that no particularized preexisting case law was necessary for it to be clearly established that what Deputy DeGiovanni did violated plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from the excessive use of force in his arrest. Therefore, the court vacated as to that claim and also vacated the district judge's dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff's state law assault and battery claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephens v. DeGiovanni" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action in state court against insurance companies, alleging a variety of state law violations including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, negligence, and bad faith. The insurance companies subsequently sought permission to appeal the district court's order remanding plaintiffs' class action to state court. The court concluded that there was no minimal diversity supporting federal jurisdiction because all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants were citizens of Georgia. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Life of the South Insurance Co. v. Carzell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American, filed suit against defendants after her application to lease a space for her hair salon was denied. Plaintiff alleged that the denial infringed her right to freedom from racial discrimination in the making of a contract. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court affirmed the district court's alternative conclusion that plaintiff failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons defendants proffered for denying her lease application. Defendants' reasons included: odors emanating from the salon would disturb the residential tenants on the upper floors; plaintiff's business would not survive given the number of other salons in the area; a salon would not generate cross-shopping with other commercial tenants; plaintiff's credit score was too low; and defendants would not break even given the high cost of building out the unit. View "Flournoy v. CML-GA WB, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Bergman, a licensed physician's assistant employed by ATC, was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud and conspiracy to make false statements relating to health care matters. Defendant Santaya, also employed by ATC, was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud, conspiracy to pay and receive bribes and kickbacks in connection with a federal health care benefit program, and receipt of bribes and kickbacks in connection with a federal health care benefit program. The court concluded that the district court did not err by letting the jury decide whether Bergman withdrew from the conspiracy and in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; the evidence was sufficient to convict Santaya of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and his motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied; it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court or the magistrate judge to deny Santaya's request to strike the entire panel; the court rejected Bergman's evidentiary claims; the court rejected Santaya's claims of prosecutorial misconduct; Bergman's sentence of 180 months in prison and Santaya's sentence of 150 months in prison were reasonable; and the court rejected defendants' remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bergman" on Justia Law

This case concerned the first of over 500 cases regarding the Wright Medical Conserve "metal-on-metal" hip replacement device designed and manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff filed a products liability suit alleging, among other things, that defendant was liable for design defect based on strict liability and negligence. On appeal, defendant challenged the entry of a $2,100,000 judgment. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred in ordering the jury to continue deliberations after the jury had already begun to deliver its verdict. In this case, upon recognizing the inconsistency in the jury verdict, the district court immediately halted publication of the verdict and instructed the jury that an error had been made; the district court acted in a neutral and non-biased manner in acknowledging and addressing the inconsistent verdict; and the district court also recharged the jury. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred in its instructions on Utah's products liability law with regard to the unavoidably unsafe product defense in Comment k of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court explained that any categorical bar to liability for an unavoidably unsafe product was not available to defendant and thus the district court did not err in failing to give such an instruction to the jury. Furthermore, any error by the district court in instructing the jury on the unavoidably unsafe defense did not affect the result in this case because the jury found that defendant had not proven the defense. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court's error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Christiansen v. Wright Medical Technology Inc." on Justia Law

The Creamery filed suit against the State, contending that the State's refusal to allow it to call its product "skim milk" amounted to censorship in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the State, determining that the State's refusal to allow the Creamery to use the term "skim milk" withstood scrutiny under the threshold inquiry of the Central Hudson test for commercial speech regulations. The court held that the State's actions prohibiting the Creamery's truthful use of the term "skim milk" violated the First Amendment. Under the threshold question of Central Hudson, the court concluded that the speech at issue neither concerned unlawful activity nor was inherently misleading. Therefore, the speech merits First Amendment protection and the State's restriction was subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. The court concluded that the State's mandate was clearly more extensive than necessary to serve its interest in preventing deception and ensuring adequate nutritional standards. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam" on Justia Law