Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the SEC initiated the Nadel action following the collapse of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Arthur Nadel. In 2010, the district court entered an order establishing a claims administration process by which potential claimants could file proof of their claims against the receivership. Wells Fargo submitted a Proof of Claim as to its loan that secured one receivership property within the set claim bar date, but did not submit a Proof of Claim detailing its secured interest in the other two receivership properties. In 2012, Wells Fargo submitted a motion seeking a determination that the filing of Proofs of Claim was unnecessary to preserve its security interests in, and claims against, collateral in the Receiver's possession. In the alternative, Wells Fargo sought leave to file belated claims. The district court granted the Receiver's motion seeking a determination that Wells Fargo's failure to submit Proofs of Claim for the loans secured by two properties extinguished its interests in those properties, and the release of the proceeds from the sale of one of the properties for which Wells Fargo did not file a Proof of Claim. Determining that Wells Fargo's appeal was timely, the court concluded that the district court erred when it terminated Wells Fargo's security interest in the properties at issue. The court found bankruptcy law was both analogous and instructive here. The court reasoned that, in the bankruptcy context, a secured creditor’s lien remains intact through the bankruptcy, regardless of whether the creditor files a proof of claim. In this case, the court concluded that Wells Fargo's security interests remained intact as to the two properties for which it did not file a Proof of Claim in the district court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "SEC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Georgia state prisoner, filed suit alleging that the grooming policy enforced in Georgia state prisons violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the GDOC substantially burdened his exercise of a sincerely held religious belief that Islam requires him to grow an uncut beard. The district court granted summary judgment for the GDOC. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's opinion in Holt v. Hobbs rendered the district court's analysis inadequate. The court vacated and remanded for further consideration because the district court never analyzed the substantial burden, compelling interest, or least restrictive means of plaintiff's case, and because the GDOC has revised its grooming policy since the district court rendered its decision. View "Smith v. Owens" on Justia Law

This case concerns certain provisions of Florida's Firearms Owners' Privacy Act (FOPA), Fla. Stat. 790.338, 456.072, 395.1055, & 381.026. The district court held that FOPA's record-keeping, inquiry, anti-discrimination, and anti-harassment provisions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Exercising plenary review and applying heightened scrutiny as articulated in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the court agreed with the district court that FOPA's content-based restrictions—the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment provisions—violate the First Amendment as it applies to the states. The court explained that, because these three provisions do not survive heightened scrutiny under Sorrell, the court need not address whether strict scrutiny should apply to them. The court concluded, however, that FOPA's anti-discrimination provision—as construed to apply to certain conduct by doctors and medical professionals—is not unconstitutional. Finally, the court concurred with the district court's assessment that the unconstitutional provisions of FOPA can be severed from the rest of the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded so that the judgment and permanent injunction can be amended in accordance with this opinion. View "Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The district court found that the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the drugs was not an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that, under state law, the officer had a duty not to allow the driver or defendant, who were unlicensed, to drive the vehicle at issue; preventing them from driving off without a license is lawful enforcement of the law, not unlawful detention; and what prolonged the stop was not the officer's desire to search the vehicle but the fact that both occupants of it could not lawfully drive it away. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Vargas" on Justia Law

After Process Technologies obtained a judgment in state court against debtor for violations of state securities laws, debtor filed for bankruptcy. Process Technologies then filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19)(A) barred debtor from discharging the debt. The court concluded that debtor cannot discharge his debt because the bankruptcy court made a finding of fact that debtor violated securities laws and, in the alternative, section 523(a)(19)(A) applies irrespective of whether debtor violated securities laws. The court also concluded that debtor is not entitled to leave to amend his complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order that excepted the debt from discharge and denied leave to amend. View "Lunsford, Sr. v. Process Technologies Services" on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute between two doctors regarding the medical viability of a novel use for a particular drug. The Tobinick Appellants filed suit against the Novella Appellees, and Yale, challenging Dr. Novella's article criticizing Dr. Tobinick's novel treatments. The Tobinick Appellants then filed an amended complaint to add allegations relating to Dr. Novella's second article that was published just nine days prior. The court concluded that, because the Tobinick Appellants have not demonstrated a probability of success on the actual malice issue, the district court did not err in granting Dr. Novella's special motion to strike the state law claims pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16(a); even though Dr. Novella had not yet filed his answer, the district court did not abuse its discretion in twice denying the Tobinick Appellants' motion for leave to amend the operative complaint because it properly sought to prevent an undue delay caused by the Tobinick Appellants' last-minute attempts to amend their complaint; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying each of the Tobinick Appellants' discovery-related requests for relief; and the court rejected the Tobinick Appellants' Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in all respects. View "Edward Lewis Tobinick, MD v. Novella" on Justia Law

Debtor made false oral statements to his lawyers, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP, that he expected a large tax refund that he would use to pay his debt to the firm. Debtor filed for bankruptcy after Lamar obtained a judgment for the debt. Lamar then initiated an adversary proceeding to have the debt ruled nondischargeable. The bankruptcy court and the district court determined that the debt could not be discharged under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) because it was incurred by fraud. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that debtor's debt to Lamar can be discharged in bankruptcy. In this case, because a statement about a single asset can be a "statement respecting the debtor's . . . financial condition," and because debtor's statements were not in writing, his debt can be discharged under section 523(a)(2)(B). View "Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendants Votrobek and Castellanos were convicted of conspiring to distribute drugs; conspiring to launder money; and substantive charges of money laundering and maintaining a place for unlawful drug distribution. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in a "pill mill" business. The court rejected Votrobek's argument that his conspiracy charges in the Northern District of Georgia arose from the same conspiracy for which he was acquitted in the Middle District of Florida and thus are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Rather, based on (1) the absence of temporal overlap, (2) the lack of any common co-conspirators, (3) the additional substances distributed in Georgia, (4) the different overt acts, and (5) the entirely separate locations of the clinics, the court concluded the government has established the existence of two separate conspiracies. Therefore, Votrobek's conviction was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court rejected Castellanos' claims of error based on the district court's denial of his request for a Franks v. Delaware hearing where Castellanos failed to make a substantial showing that the agent's statements were knowingly and intentionally false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, and failed to show that the affidavit lacked probable cause absent the challenged material. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castellanos' request to instruct the jury on the entrapment-by-estoppel defense where that issue was not properly before the jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Votrobek" on Justia Law

After Ulysses Anderson was involved in a car accident with an intoxicated driver who was driving a company vehicle with his employer's permission, a jury found the driver liable and awarded Anderson one million dollars. Great American, the employer's insurance company, filed suit for a declaration that the driver was not a permissive user – and thus not covered under the applicable insurance policies – because he broke internal company policies. The district court found that the driver was not an insured at the time of the accident, and that Great American owed no duty to cover the damages awarded at the trial of the underlying action. After the Georgia Supreme Court held that inquires into permissive use should extend only to whether a vehicle is used for an approved purpose in Strickland v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a company's internal rules can govern the scope of permissive use, and that violations thereof can negate an individual's status as an insured. In this case, the court found that the district court erred because it followed Barfield, and thus narrowed the scope of permissive use beyond what was permitted by Strickland. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Anderson v. Great American Alliance Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After Darcia Dominguez died in an automobile accident with a Hillsborough County employee, her personal representative, Jorge Dominguez, filed a wrongful death suit against the County in state court, which is still pending. This instant action involves an insurance dispute between the County, Mr. Dominguez, and the County's excess carrier, Star Insurance. The court addressed an issue of first impression under Florida law - the interplay between the limited waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in Fla. Stat. 768.28(5) and the language of the self-insured retention limit (SIRL) contained in an endorsement to the excess liability policy issued to the County by Star. The district court granted Mr. Dominguez's motion for entry of judgment. The court affirmed the portions of the summary judgment order and final judgment which (a) declared that the County cannot unilaterally settle Mr. Dominguez's claim within policy limits without Star’s consent, and (b) explained that other issues related to the proposed settlement are unripe for resolution on the current record; vacated the portion of the summary judgment order and the final judgment which declares that the $350,000 SIRL can be satisfied without the passage of a special claims bill; concluded that, on this record, the district court's reliance on the frustration of purpose doctrine was misplaced, and the court has no basis to address the interplay between section 768.28(5) and the policy's SIRL because the proposed settlement between the County and Mr. Dominguez anticipates the need for, and passage of, a special claims bill; and affirmed the district court's denial of Star's belated motion for discovery. View "Hillsborough County v. Star Insurance Co." on Justia Law