Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and City's efforts to build a new bridge across the North Fork St. Lucie River. Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303(c), allows the Secretary of Transportation to approve projects that use section 4(f) lands only if the agency first determines that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to using that land. Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the FHWA abused its discretion in not selecting their proffered alternative that, when built with a spliced-beam construction, would avoid all use of section 4(f) lands. The FHWA concluded that the spliced-beam construction would be "imprudent" because it would cause significantly greater harm to non–section 4(f) wetland areas, as well as "severe social impacts." The court concluded that FHWA was thorough and careful in its analysis and thoughtful in its determination, and the court could discern neither an arbitrary or capricious action nor an abuse of discretion. In this case, the FHWA made its calculus carefully, giving thoughtful consideration to a wide variety of factors, and it worked with many agencies, even those that once opposed the project, to develop remediation plans that mitigate harms to the affected areas. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conservation Alliance of St. Lucie County v. U.S. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 600 month sentence after pleading guilty to one count of production of child pornography and one count of receipt of child pornography. The court concluded that the district court did not err by applying a four-level enhancement under USSG 2G2.1(b)(4) for an offense that involves sadistic or masochistic conduct. The court explained that defendant's offense involved such conduct regardless of whether the conduct (among other things, whipping and bondage) was directed at him or the minor victim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Scheels" on Justia Law

After a jury found CSX solely liable for injuries suffered by an employee of General Mills and awarded the employee damages, CSX filed this action for indemnification from General Mills. The district court dismissed on the ground that the contract between the parties barred indemnification for damages arising from CSX's sole negligence. In reaching this result, the district court applied a federal rule of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the relative fault of General Mills for the injury suffered by its employee. The court held, however, that federal common law adopts the state rule of collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court that exercised diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether collateral estoppel bars the complaint of CSX for indemnification. The court declined to decide the dispute regarding one element of collateral estoppel as defined by Georgia law: the earlier litigation must have been between identical parties. The court also declined to decide the alternative argument raised by CSX, whether the Sidetrack Agreement requires indemnification assuming CSX was solely at fault. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

Debtor filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed the assets in her health savings account (HSA) as property exempt from the bankruptcy estate. On appeal, the court certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia: 1. Does a debtor’s health savings account constitute a right to receive a “disability, illness, or unemployment benefit” for the purposes of O.C.G.A. 44–13–100(a)(2)(C)? 2. Does a debtor’s health savings account constitute a right to receive a “payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract” for the purposes of O.C.G.A. 44–13–100(a)(2)(E)? Because the Supreme Court of Georgia answered both questions in the negative, debtor's arguments on appeal are foreclosed. The court concluded that, under Georgia law, debtor was not entitled to claim the assets in her HSA as property exempt from the bankruptcy estate. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Mooney v. Webster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force, assault, and battery. The district court granted law enforcement officers summary judgment based on qualified and official immunity. Officer Deaton threw a diversionary device, known as a “flashbang,” into a dark room occupied by plaintiff and her boyfriend, who were asleep, without first visually inspecting the room. The court concluded that Deaton used excessive force, but he is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that his conduct violated the Constitution. The court also concluded that Deaton is entitled to official immunity because plaintiff failed to prove that Deaton intended to injure plaintiff. Finally, Deaton's supervisor is also entitled to qualified immunity from the complaint against his subordinate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dukes v. Deaton" on Justia Law

The parties filed cross-complaints after Christopher Carmicle was terminated from Brown Jordan. After the district court entered judgment for Brown Jordan, Carmicle appealed. Carmicle raised issues regarding the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701, wrongful discharge, and breach of an employment agreement. The court concluded that Carmicle’s CFAA arguments fail because Brown Jordan suffered “loss” as defined in the CFAA; Carmicle waived his unopened-versus-opened-email argument under the SCA because he did not fairly present it to the district court, and Brown Jordan showed Carmicle exceeded his authorization in accessing the emails of other Brown Jordan employees; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Carmicle’s wrongful discharge claim or in concluding that Carmicle was terminated for cause as defined by the Employment Agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown Jordan International, Inc. v. Carmicle" on Justia Law

Defendant contends that a Florida conviction for aggravated assault, Fla. Stat. 784.021, does not constitute a “crime of violence” under USSG. 2K2.1(a)(2) cmt. n.1. The court concluded, however, that defendant's argument is foreclosed by Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, where Turner addressed the elements of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and that clause is identical to the elements clause of section 4B1.2(a)(1). Because Turner is binding, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Golden" on Justia Law

Defendant, an attorney, appealed his conviction and sentence after being convicted of mail, wire, and securities fraud. The convictions were based on evidence that he fabricated press releases and purchase orders to inflate the stock price of his client Signalife, a publicly-traded manufacturer of medical devices. The court rejected defendant's Brady v. Maryland claim, finding that defendant identified only one potential Brady document, which contained no information favorable to him and was accessible through reasonable diligence before trial. Furthermore, defendant failed to identify any suppressed material or any materially false testimony on which the government relied, purportedly in violation of Giglio v. United States. In regard to defendant's sentence, the court concluded that the district court erred in calculating an actual loss figure based on the losses of all investors under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 3663A, and failed to determine whether intervening events caused the Signalife stock price to drop and, if so, whether these events were unforeseeable such that their effects should be subtracted from the actual loss figure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded with instructions. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

Lee Tillett, Inc. developed and registered a trademark for a line of cosmetics products known as Kroma cosmetics. Tillett entered into an agreement with Kroma EU to give it exclusive rights to sell and distribute Kroma products. Kimberly, Kourtney, and Khloe Kardashian entered into a licensing agreement with Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc. to create a Kardashian makeup line called “Khroma.” After Tillett, Boldface, and the Kardashians settled a cosmetics trademark infringement suit, Tillett refused to share any of its settlement recovery with Kroma EU. Kroma EU subsequently filed this suit alleging trademark infringement and tortious interference claims against Boldface, vicarious liability for trademark infringement claims against the Kardashians, and a promissory estoppel claim against Tillett. The district court granted Tillett’s motion to compel Kroma EU to arbitrate, but denied the Kardashians’ motion to compel Kroma EU to arbitrate its claims against them. In this case, while the Kardashians are not signatories to the agreement between Kroma EU and Tillett, they contend that they can compel arbitration of Kroma EU’s claims against them by using Florida’s doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court held, however, that Florida’s doctrine of equitable estoppel permits a nonsignatory to an agreement to avail herself of an arbitration clause only when the claims asserted against her fall within the scope of the clause that the signatories had agreed upon. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court correctly denied the Kardashians’ motion to compel arbitration. View "Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Kardashian" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and others filed a putative class action in state court on behalf of members of CAEC, alleging that CAEC wrongfully had refused to pay out “excess revenues” in cash to its members. After removal to federal court, the district court granted CAEC's motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that when CAEC’s revenues exceed its operating costs and other expenses, CAEC does credit each members’ capital account with the cooperative, and the district court's holding that CAEC’s distribution of excess revenues to its members by making credits to their capital accounts, as opposed to making cash payments, complied with Alabama state law. View "Caver v. Central Alabama Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law