Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose from the Broward County (Florida) Sheriff’s potential liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for failing to rehire a former deputy allegedly due to his political loyalties and in violation of his First Amendment rights. Broward County has expressly designated its sheriff as its chief correctional officer (CCO); thus, at issue in this case was the basic question whether a Florida county sheriff, acting in his capacity as chief correctional officer in the hiring and firing of his deputies, was an arm of the state entitled to the benefit of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. After careful review, and having the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a Florida sheriff was not an arm of the state when acting in this capacity. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Sheriff and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Stanley v. Broward County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants James and Karen Feggestad appealed the district court’s order dismissing their complaint against defendants-appellees, Kerzner International Bahamas Limited, Kerzner International Limited, Island Hotel Company Limited, Paradise Island Limited, and Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (collectively, "Kerzner"), on the basis of a valid forum selection clause. The Feggestads made reservations at the Atlantis Resort on Paradise Island, Bahamas (Atlantis) and received a reservation confirmation via their email address. The confirmation contained a section titled "Terms and Conditions" and included a hyperlink advising guests to view the other terms and conditions. This link provided advance notification that any dispute between the guest and the hotel or any affiliated company must be litigated exclusively in the Bahamas and that upon arrival at the Atlantis, the guest would be required to sign a registration form that included a Bahamian forum selection clause. When the Feggestads checked into the hotel, the resort asked them to sign a registration card, which also included an "acknowledgement, agreement and release," which also listed the clause at issue here. Several days after their arrival at the Atlantis, Mr. Feggestad slipped and fell on a wet sidewalk and sustained severe personal injuries. He later sued, and the forum-selection clause became an issue. After reviewing the record, reading the parties briefs and having the benefit of oral argument, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Feggestad v. Kerzner International Bahamas Limited, et al." on Justia Law

Leokadia Bryk, a disabled nurse, sought a reasonable accommodation in the form of a job reassignment to another unit at St. Joseph’s Hospital because she required the use of a cane, which posed a safety hazard in the psychiatric ward where she worked. After Bryk did not obtain another Hospital position, the Hospital terminated her employment. The EEOC filed suit on her behalf against the Hospital. Based on the framework in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., did not require job reassignment without competition as a reasonable accommodation. The court also agreed with the district court’s summary judgment rulings finding that Bryk was a “disabled qualified individual” under the ADA and that the Hospital’s 30-day allowance to apply for alternate jobs was reasonable as a matter of law. However, the court disagreed with the district court’s order granting in part the EEOC’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for alteration of the judgment. The court explained that, except in rare circumstances not present here, motions under Rule 59(e) may not be used to raise new legal theories or arguments, much less in this case where the movant under Rule 59(e), the EEOC, was seeking to contravene language in the jury instructions and verdict form that the EEOC had previously proposed. Therefore, the EEOC failed to meet the Rule 59(e) standard and the district court erred in altering the judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "EEOC v. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

After a teacher at Carver Middle School submitted an application for the approval of the Carver Gay-Straight Alliance, the superintendent denied the application on the ground that the application failed to identify an allowed purpose for the club. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. 4071-72. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their complaint alleging that the Board violated the Act. The court concluded that the complaint is ripe because the Board made a final decision when it rejected the application of the Alliance to form a club, and the complaint is not moot because the district court can still fashion relief for a violation of the Act. The court also concluded that the Act applies to Carver Middle School because it provides courses for high school credit and, under Florida law, these courses constitute “secondary education.” Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board of Lake County, Florida" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court concluded that the district court properly denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal where the jury could reasonably find constructive possession; the district court should have granted defendant’s request to redact the indictment to remove any reference to “crimes” (plural), given that defendant had stipulated to having a prior felony conviction, but such error was harmless; for purposes of FRE 404(b), FRE 803(22) precludes use of the 2006 nolo conviction here to prove that defendant actually possessed ammunition in 2006; there was insufficient evidence for the jury to be able to conclude that defendant actually committed the prior act at issue; there was ample evidence, independent of the Rule 404(b) conviction, to support a conclusion that defendant was guilty of possessing the firearm and ammunition at issue and thus the admission of the 2006 conviction was harmless; and the district court did not err by sentencing defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 324-month sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant raised numerous issues on appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in regard to the loss determination, calculation of the number of victims, and the amount of restitution; the district court did not plainly err by imposing a two-level enhancement for the production of an unauthorized access device under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i); and defendant waived any challenge to the armed-career-criminal enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Cobb, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. On appeal, defendant challenges his convictions and total sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant argues that the district court erred by failing to dismiss his indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161–3174. The court concluded that, given the Supreme Court's controlling decision in Zedner v. United States, in granting a one-year continuance, the district court failed to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. The Supreme Court found in Zedner that “the Act requires express findings,” and “without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion” of time past the 70-day requirement because the Speedy Trial Act, with “procedural strictness,” “demands on-the-record [ends-of-justice] findings.” Accordingly, the court concluded that the indictment must be dismissed. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. View "United States v. Ammar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Major Wheeler and others, alleging, inter alia, a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his First Amendment rights and a claim under Georgia law for defamation. After plaintiff reported constitutional violations by his fellow officers, Major Wheeler issued a county-wide alert to all law-enforcement officers, picturing plaintiff, warning that he was a “loose cannon” who presented a “danger to any [law-enforcement officer] in Douglas County,” and directing officers to “act accordingly.” The district court denied Wheeler's motion for qualified immunity and official immunity on the defamation claim. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations allow for the reasonable inferences that the Police Department communicated with the Sheriff’s Department about plaintiff's complaints prior to Wheeler’s issuance of the be-on-the-lookout advisory (BOLO), that the Sheriff’s Office and Wheeler knew about the termination-appeal hearing, and that Wheeler issued the BOLO at least in part in retaliation for plaintiff's complaints. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Wheeler violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights when he issued the BOLO and the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. The court also concluded that plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from retaliation that imperiled his life was clearly established at the time that Wheeler issued the BOLO. The allegations satisfy the showing of a deliberate intention to do wrong—that is, actual malice. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of official immunity. View "Bailey v. Major Tommy Wheeler" on Justia Law

The government appeals the bankruptcy court's decision regarding the interest due from defendant for the taxable year 1998. In this case, the tax court never reached the issue of defendant's interest owed on the 1998 tax deficiency. Therefore, the bankruptcy court erred in deferring to the tax court for its calculation of the interest on defendant's underpayment for 1998. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Beane" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms and was sentenced to 288 months in prison. The district court determined that defendant was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), because he had at least three prior Georgia burglary convictions, each of which qualified as a predicate “violent felony” under the enumerated crimes provision of the ACCA. The court concluded that defendant's state court indictments make clear that defendant's Georgia burglary convictions involved these three elements: (1) an unlawful entry (2) into a dwelling house or building (3) with intent to commit a crime therein. The court explained that these elements substantially conform to the generic definition of burglary. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's prior Georgia burglary convictions qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA’s enumerated crimes clause. Because the district court did not err in sentencing defendant as an armed career criminal, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gundy" on Justia Law