Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of its earlier order denying on futility grounds plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint. Plaintiff asserted in his motion that he had developed facts in discovery which showed that (1) a Bank employee knew that Charles Gordon, the chief executive officer of OPT Title and Escrow, Inc., had assisted Gordon in opening a bank account called an “escrow account” into which funds were to be wired by third parties with the expectation that the funds would be held in escrow by OPT Title; (2) the Bank employee knew that Gordon was stealing from the account; (3) the Bank employee assisted Gordon in committing the fraud; and (4) the Bank received at least a short-term financial benefit from allowing Gordon to use OPT Title’s account as a vehicle for his fraud. The court held that the district court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on the basis that even considering his new allegations set forth in his motion for reconsideration, he failed to state claims for relief. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hsi Chang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States for unpaid federal income taxes, late penalties, and interest accrued, arguing that the district court erred because her affidavit created a genuine factual dispute about whether she had paid the taxes and penalties owed. Reviewing de novo, the court concluded that the district court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of the United States where the United States submitted copies of defendant's federal tax returns, transcripts of her accounts for tax years 1996 and 1999 through 2002, and an affidavit from an IRS officer that established defendant had outstanding tax assessments. In this case, the evidence created a presumption that the assessments were proper and shifted the burden to defendant to rebut the presumption with evidence that the assessments were erroneous. The court concluded that defendant's affidavit failed to create a genuine factual dispute about the validity of the assessments, and defendant's general and self-serving assertions that she paid the taxes owed and related late penalties for tax years 1996 and 1999 through 2002 failed to rebut the presumption established by the assessments. The court vacated the part of the judgment addressing the amount of defendant's assessments and remanded for the district court to credit her payment and to recalculate her assessment for tax year 1996. The court affirmed the entry of summary judgment regarding defendant's liability. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

After defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession, he filed a motion to dismiss his indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq. The district court reasoned that the nine-day period between April 21, 2014—when pretrial services and the government filed their petition seeking a warrant for defendant’s arrest—and April 29, 2014, was excludable as pretrial-motion delay and as advisement delay under 28 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(D), (H). The district court held that a six-day period from April 24 to 29 was automatically excludable as pretrial-motion delay. The court found that the nonexcludable event does not affect the timeout from the Speedy Trial Act clock required by the excludable event and denied defendant's challenge on this basis. The court likewise found no merit to defendant's other arguments on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death after being convicted of murdering his wife's daughters. At issue is whether, for purposes of federal habeas law, a Florida postconviction petition properly filed by a death-row prisoner claiming incompetency remains pending through the final resolution of the postconviction proceedings despite the state court’s having found the prisoner competent before the end of those proceedings. The court held that it does and concluded that the prisoner’s federal habeas petition was timely filed. In this case, petitioner's properly filed application was pending from March 13, 2006, through December 2, 2013, tolling the deadline during this period for petitioner to file his federal habeas petition. As a result, petitioner's federal petition, filed on January 21, 2014, was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hernandez-Alberto v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a marine salvor, filed this action in rem against the Blacksheep, seeking a salvage award for services he provided to the yacht. The district court entered judgment against plaintiff, finding that he failed to show that his services were necessary to the rescue of the Blacksheep. The court concluded, however, that a claim for a salvage award does not require such a showing. In this case, the district court's findings and some facts from the record could support the conclusion that plaintiff's action contributed to saving the Blacksheep where he deployed his high-capacity dewatering pump; dove below the ship where he successfully pushed the propeller shaft twelve inches closer to its intended position; and applied packing material to prevent further flooding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Girard v. M/V "Blacksheep"" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Major Michael Skelton in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff of Cobb County, seeking declaratory relief, damages, fees, and costs for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. The court reversed the district court's denial of Major Skelton's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff's claims for damages, concluding that the sovereign immunity of Georgia extends to a deputy sheriff who denies a dietary request of an inmate in a county jail. Accordingly, the court remanded with an instruction to enter judgment for Major Skelton on those claims. View "Lake v. Skelton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging Alabama’s use of midazolam in its lethal injection protocol. The district court denied relief. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the district court’s fact findings and, thus, plaintiff has shown no clear error in them. The court also concluded that plaintiff has shown no error in the district court’s conclusions of law, inter alia, that: (1) plaintiff failed to carry his burden to show compounded pentobarbital is a feasible, readily implemented, and available drug to the Alabama Department of Corrections for use in executions; (2) Alabama’s consciousness assessment protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) plaintiff's belated firing-squad claim lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Arthur v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of four counts related to the murder of Erik Comesana, six counts related to a firearm trafficking scheme, and two counts related to possessing a firearm or ammunition while a fugitive from justice. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant conspired with at least one other person to kill Erik; that he killed Erik to prevent Erik from communicating with law enforcement officers regarding defendant's firearm trafficking scheme; and that defendant carried, used, and discharged a firearm, thereby causing Erik’s death. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the the firearm trafficking offenses. Furthermore, the court concluded that any error in permitting lay opinion evidence does not warrant a new trial where defendant cannot show that correcting the error would have affected the jury's verdict. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not commit an error under the Double Jeopardy clause. The court declined to review defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Campo" on Justia Law

This reverse-confusion trademark dispute involves Wreal and Amazon over the mark "FyreTV." Wreal describes its own FyreTV service as the “Netflix of Porn.” Amazon Fire TV is a hardware device used for streaming “mainstream” “general interest” video via Amazon’s own streaming service, “Instant Video,” or third-party streaming services such as Netflix. In this interlocutory appeal, Wreal challenges the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Wreal’s unexplained five month delay in seeking a preliminary injunction, by itself, fatally undermined any showing of irreparable injury. Because Wreal cannot establish reversible error with respect to the injury prong, the court need not consider whether the district court correctly analyzed the likelihood of success, the balance of harms, or the public interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of being a convicted felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, and one count of possessing a stolen firearm. The district court sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his six prior Florida armed robbery convictions, each of which qualified as a predicate “violent felony” under the ACCA. The court concluded that the district court did not err in giving the aiding and abetting instruction; the evidence was more than sufficient to allow the jury to draw the reasonable inference that defendant intended to aid Nigel Butler in possessing stolen firearms; even assuming arguendo that Rosemond v. United States somehow applies to aiding and abetting a 18 U.S.C. 922(j) crime, this is enough evidence to warrant the aiding and abetting instruction in defendant's particular case; the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant aided and abetted Butler in the section 922(g) crime and thus the district court's instruction was not reversible error; and the court rejected defendant's remaining claims of error regarding the aiding and abetting instruction. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. Finally, the court concluded that court precedent applies to defendant's prior Florida convictions and the court affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Seabrooks" on Justia Law