Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, including two deputies, after he was arrested for violating an injunction prohibiting his possession of firearms. The deputies were escorting plaintiff's former lover into plaintiff's residence in order to retrieve her personal belongings when they saw the firearms in plain view. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of unlawful entry where the law was not sufficiently clearly established at the time of the alleged violation to give Deputies Harrison and Loucks fair warning that their entry into plaintiff's sunroom under the circumstances of this case would violate his Fourth Amendment rights; Harrison and Loucks are also entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim for unlawful entry into his home from the sunroom where plaintiff consented to the deputies' entry; the district court correctly found that Harrison and Loucks did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights when they seized firearms within his home, because the firearms were in plain view; and the district court correctly found that defendants had at least arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fish v. Brown" on Justia Law

MBUSI seeks review of the Board's order modifying and adopting as modified the recommended order of the ALJ, finding that MBUSI violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The Board found that MBUSI violated the Act by (1) maintaining an overly broad solicitation and distribution rule that employees would reasonably understand to prohibit solicitation in work areas by employees not on working time of other employees not on working time; (2) prohibiting an employee not on working time from distributing union literature in one of MBUSI’s team centers, which are mixed-use areas; and (3) prohibiting employees not on working time from distributing union literature in the MBUSI atrium, which is a mixed-use area. The court enforced the order with the exception of the last four words of paragraph 1(b) and the words “team centers and” in the Appendix. The court remanded to the Board with instructions to consider whether MBUSI’s team centers are converted mixed-use areas during the pre-shift period. If so, the Board should either narrow the scope of the Order to Gilbert’s team center or conduct additional factfinding regarding special circumstances at the 18 team centers the ALJ did not consider. View "Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int'l v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a bad-faith diversity case against GEICO for failure to settle her claim when it could and should have done so. GEICO moved for partial summary judgment and sought a determination that the jury's $900,000 verdict in the underlying state uninsured motorist (UM) case was not binding as a measure of the damages in the federal bad-faith case. The district court denied GEICO's motion, but subsequently granted GEICO’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. At issue on appeal is whether judgment as a matter of law correctly was entered for GEICO, when plaintiff failed to establish permanent injury under Fla. Stat. 627.727(7) for noneconomic damages within the cure period. Under the clear language of Florida law regarding noneconomic damages in an insurance bad-faith case, the court concluded that the district judge was correct to conclude that the jury had no evidence from which it reasonably could have found GEICO had acted in bad faith. In this case, there was no evidence of permanency during the cure period, which is required under Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Cadle v. GEICO General Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The firm filed suit against a consumer-debtor, Bryson Ray, in state court. After obtaining a judgment against Ray, the firm initiated a garnishment proceeding against Ray's bank to collect on the judgment. In response to the garnishment action, Ray filed suit alleging that the firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. i(a)(2), by bringing the garnishment action in a judicial district other than the one in which Ray resided or signed the underlying contract. The district court granted the firm's motion to dismiss. The court joined the First and Eighth Circuits and held that the FDCP's venue provision applies only to legal actions "against any consumer." In this case, the FDCPA’s venue provision does not apply to post-judgment garnishment proceedings under Georgia law where the process is fundamentally an action against the garnishee, not the consumer. The court rejected Ray's claims to the contrary and affirmed the judgment. View "Ray v. McCullough Payne & Haan, LLC" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to illegal reentry after being deported, the district court applied a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) based on defendant's prior Florida conviction for felony battery. The court held that felony battery under Fla. Stat. 784.041 does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under section 2L1.2 when it is committed by mere touching. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Vail-Bailon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Sheriff of Lee County, Florida, alleging wage and overtime claims. At issue is whether employees may maintain a collective action against their employer under section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., at the same time as a class action brought based on state law and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The district court found that, under LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., these two types of actions are “mutually exclusive and irreconcilable.” However, the court joined the D.C., Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and held that an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) state-law class action may be maintained in the same proceeding. Therefore, the court reversed the district court only with respect to its contrary conclusion on this point. On remand, the district court must consider whether plaintiffs' putative class action meets the Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements, as well as whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the class action under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). View "Calderone v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2010, Alabama made changes to its election law that impacted the ADC’s ability to raise and spend money in state elections. The ADC filed suit challenging Alabama Code 17-5-15(b) (the PAC-to-PAC transfer ban), which limited the ADC's fundraising abilities. On appeal, the ADC challenges the district court's final judgment in favor of the State, arguing that the PAC-to-PAC transfer ban is unconstitutional as applied because the ban violates the ADC’s First Amendment right to make independent expenditures. The court concluded that the State’s proffered interest in transparency ties into its interest in preventing corruption to justify regulating transfers between PACs. The court also concluded that the PAC-to-PAC transfer ban as applied to the ADC is sufficiently closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. The ban had met the less rigorous "closely drawn" standard by being narrowly tailored to achieve Alabama's desired objective in preventing quid pro quo corruption (or its appearance) as applied to the ADC in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's finding on the merits that the ban is constitutional as applied to ADC. View "The Alabama Democratic Conference v. Attorney General, State of Alabama" on Justia Law

FN filed a trademark infringement action against Clyde Armory over the use of the marks "SCAR" and "SCAR-Stock" in the firearms industry. On appeal, Clyde Armory challenges the district court's partial grant of summary judgment for FN, its grant of FN's motion to strike Clyde Armory’s jury demand, its denial of Clyde Armory’s motion to amend the proposed pretrial order, and its entry of judgment against Clyde Armory following a bench trial. The court rejected Clyde Armory's contention that the district court erred by: (1) finding that FN used SCAR as a mark in commerce before Clyde Armory began using SCAR-Stock; (2) finding that FN’s SCAR mark acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning before Clyde Armory began using SCAR-Stock; and (3) finding that Clyde Armory used the SCAR-Stock mark in bad faith to take advantage of the popularity of FN’s SCAR mark, thus divesting it of any rights in the mark that it otherwise might have obtained. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court on all issues raised on appeal. View "FN Herstal SA v. Clyde Armory Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, the County adopted the Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, Fla., Code of Ordinances ch. 21, art. XVII, which imposes a residency restriction on “sexual offenders” and “sexual predators.” The Ordinance prohibits a person who has been convicted of any one of several enumerated sexual offenses involving a victim under sixteen years of age from “resid[ing] within 2,500 feet of any school.” Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the County’s residency restriction. The district court dismissed the ex post facto challenge. Plaintiffs argue that they pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim that the residency restriction is so punitive in effect as to violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Florida Constitutions. The court concluded that Doe #1 and Doe #3 have alleged plausible ex post facto challenges to the residency restriction where they alleged that they are homeless and that their homelessness resulted directly from the County’s residency restriction “severely restricting available, affordable housing options.” Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "John Doe #1 v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order finding him ineligible for relief from removal based on his criminal conviction for abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult under Florida Statute 825.102(1). The court concluded that a conviction for abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult pursuant to the Florida statute is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the petition for review under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) and the petition is dismissed. View "Gelin v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law