Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Between June 15, 2012, and November 15, 2012, the District Court entered a series of orders granting summary judgment and assessing attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of Crum & Forster in a suit about the scope of an insurance policy under Florida law brought by Hartford. Hartford appealed and the court ordered the parties to take part in a mediation conference. After mediation failed to resolve Hartford's appeal, a second mediation resulted in a conditional settlement agreement. The court granted the parties’ joint motion to stay Hartford’s initial appeal, so the parties could file their motion to vacate those orders in the district court pursuant to Rule 60(b). The district court, invoking the Supreme Court’s U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Company v. Bonner Mall Partnership decision, concluded that there are no “exceptional circumstances” warranting vacatur of the contested orders. The court followed the approach taken by the First and Second Circuits, which embraces the equitable nature of the Supreme Court’s Bancorp inquiry. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion where it misapplied Bancorp because of the exceptional circumstances in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated. View "Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins." on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of several counts, including multiple counts of wire fraud and money laundering. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to give defendants' proposed jury instruction that the jurors could convict only if they found that defendants had schemed to lie about the quality or price of the goods sold to the victims. The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. 1343 de novo and concluded that it requires the jury to make just such a finding before convicting a defendant of wire fraud. Thus, the proposed instruction was a correct statement of the law, and the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give that instruction. The court reversed on all counts where the error was not harmless, except for Counts 21 and 38, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Takhalov" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Midland, alleging claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. Plaintiff claims that Midland erroneously attributed debts to her, reported the debts to Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion credit reporting agencies (the CRAs), and failed to properly verify the debts when plaintiff disputed their validity. The district court held that no reasonable jury could find that Midland violated the FCRA or the FDCPA with respect to plaintiff. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Midland willfully violated section 1681s-2(b) when it reported the GE/Meijer and T-Mobile accounts as “verified” without obtaining sufficient documentation that the debts in fact belonged to plaintiff. The court reversed as to this claim and affirmed as to all other claims. View "Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt." on Justia Law

The Secretary determined that Bayou Shores was not in substantial compliance with the Medicare program participation requirements, and that conditions in its facility constituted an immediate jeopardy to residents’ health and safety. The bankruptcy court assumed authority over Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements as part of the debtor’s estate, enjoined the Secretary from terminating the provider agreements, determined for itself that Bayou Shores was qualified to participate in the provider agreements, required the Secretary to maintain the stream of monetary benefit under the agreements, reorganized the debtor’s estate, and finally issued its Confirmation Order. The district court upheld the Secretary’s jurisdictional challenge and reversed the Confirmation Order with respect to the assumption of the debtor’s Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements. The court concluded that the statutory revision in this case does not demonstrate Congress's clear intention to vest the bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction over Medicare claims. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that the bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law when it exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the provider agreements in this case. The bankruptcy court was without 28 U.S.C. 1334 jurisdiction under the 42 U.S.C. 405(h) bar to issue orders enjoining the termination of the provider agreements and to further order the assumption of the provider agreements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Florida Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argued that his claim is based on the rule announced in Johnson v. United States and made retroactive in Welch v. United States. Specifically, petitioner argued that his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), is invalid under Johnson because the sentence arose under the residual clause. The court's decision in In re Rogers held that when the record does not make clear that the sentencing court relied solely on the ACCA’s still-valid provisions to classify each predicate offense and binding precedent does not otherwise demonstrate that only valid ACCA clauses are implicated, the court applies Descamps v. United States. In this case, petitioner was sentenced under the ACCA based on two 1982 Florida convictions for aggravated assault and a 1983 Florida conviction for burglary of a dwelling. Under Rogers, petitioner has shown that his burglary conviction may be a residual-clause predicate. Because petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he has raised a claim that meets the statutory criteria set forth in section 2255, the court granted his application for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. View "In re: Leslie A. Parker" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argues, pursuant to Johnson v. United States, that the mandatory career offender enhancement applied to his sentence, imposed in January 2003, is unconstitutional. In In re Griffin, the court held that its reasoning in United States v. Matchett applied with equal force to the residual clause of the career-offender guideline in the context of the mandatory Guidelines. While the court respectfully disagreed with the holding of Griffin, the court nonetheless was bound by that decision. Consequently, petitioner has not satisfied the statutory criteria for filing a successive section 2255 motion. First, even though the Supreme Court has held in Welch v. United States that Johnson applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, the court's binding precedent holds that Welch does not make Johnson retroactive for purposes of filing a successive section 2255 motion raising a Johnson-based challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines. Furthermore, petitioner cannot make a prima facie showing that Johnson applies to him in light of the court's holding in Griffin that the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines cannot be unconstitutionally vague. Because petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of the existence of either of the grounds set forth in section 2255(h), the court denied his application for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In re: Leonard Sapp" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Specifically, petitioner asserts that his 60-month consecutive sentence for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), must be set aside in light of Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. The court concluded that petitioner's section 924(c) sentence would be valid even if Johnson makes the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutional. The court held that a companion Hobbs Act robbery conviction, such as petitioner's, qualifies as a crime of violence under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A) without regard to the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause. Because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed claim meets the statutory criteria, the court denied his applications for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In re: Darren Demeatrie Gordon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against JSC for an alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court concluded that plaintiff's claim was outside the scope of the arbitration clause and denied JSC's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiff failed to establish the existence of any agreement between plaintiff and FBD, the issuer of the credit card, beyond the agreement to pay whatever charges plaintiff incurred by using the credit card. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment on different grounds. View "Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital Sys." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of South Korea, petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying her motion to sua sponte reopen her removal proceedings. Because petitioner has not raised any constitutional claims, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of her motion for sua sponte reopening. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's arguments and granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the petition for review. View "Bukta v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and other crimes, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court found sua sponte that petitioner was procedurally barred from bringing this Sixth Amendment confrontation clause claim because he had not exhausted available state court remedies. The court concluded that the state expressly waived exhaustion where the state was aware of the exhaustion arguments and communicated to the court its intention not to pursue them. Further, in considering the exhaustion issue sua sponte, the district court did not point to any “important federal interest” or Thompson factors that required a rejection of the state’s waiver. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in rejecting the state's express waiver and dismissing the petition. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vazquez v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law