Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 18-month sentence and life term of supervised release, imposed for violating the terms of supervised release that were part of his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender. In this case, defendant chose to violate the terms of supervised release in order to live with and take care of his wife's four minor children. The court concluded that, given the totality of the circumstances, considered in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the life term of supervised release was not unreasonable. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life term of supervised release, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Trailer" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that (1) the state violated petitioner’s due process rights by knowingly presenting false evidence at his sentencing proceeding; (2) the state violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment by presenting differing theories about his culpability at his sentencing proceeding and at his co-defendant’s trial; (3) trial counsel provided unconstitutionally ineffective assistance by opening the door to the admission of the co-defendant’s tape-recorded confession; and (4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by inadequately preparing a mental health expert who testified in mitigation at petitioner's penalty phase trial. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that petitioner had to show that the state knowingly presented false evidence was fully consonant with Supreme Court precedent; the Florida Supreme Court acted reasonably in rejecting petitioner's inconsistent-theories claim; and the court rejected the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s denials of petitioner's claims were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Raleigh v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

Flo & Eddie, a California corporation, filed suit against Sirius, a satellite and internet radio provider, claiming that Sirius violated Flo & Eddie’s rights as owner of sound recordings of musical performances that were fixed before February 15, 1972. Because the issues in this case have not been addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida, the court certified the following questions to that state court: 1. Whether Florida recognizes common law copyright in sound recordings and, if so, whether that copyright includes the exclusive right of reproduction and/or the exclusive right of public performance? 2. To the extent that Florida recognizes common law copyright in sound recordings, whether the sale and distribution of phonorecords to the public or the public performance thereof constitutes a “publication” for the purpose of divesting the common law copyright protections in sound recordings embedded in the phonorecord and, if so whether the divestment terminates either or both of the exclusive right of public performance and the exclusive right of reproduction? 3. To the extent that Florida recognizes a common law copyright including a right of exclusive reproduction in sound recordings, whether Sirius’s back-up or buffer copies infringe Flo & Eddie’s common law copyright exclusive right of reproduction? 4. To the extent that Florida does not recognize a common law copyright in sound recordings, or to the extent that such a copyright was terminated by publication, whether Flo & Eddie nevertheless has a cause of action for common law unfair competition/misappropriation, common law conversion, or statutory civil theft under FLA. STAT. 772.11 and FLA. STAT. 812.014? View "Flo & Eddie v. Sirius SM Radio" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, seeks to invalidate his sentence on the ground that he no longer qualifies for a mandatory sentencing enhancement. Petitioner filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, seeking to obtain the benefit of revised New York sentencing laws, enacted in 2004 and 2009, which had the effect of retroactively lowering the penalties for certain drug offenders. See the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004, 2004 N.Y. Laws ch. 738, and the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act , N.Y. Crim. Proc. 440.46. The district court determined that petitioner lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because petitioner admits that he is not eligible for resentencing under the revised New York sentencing laws. View "Cortes-Morales v. Hastings" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, citing Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. Petitioner argued that his conviction for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence because of Johnson, and thus, his 18 U.S.C. 924(c) sentence cannot stand. The court held that petitioner's companion conviction for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery, which was charged in the same indictment as, and makes up the basis for, petitioner's section 924(c) count, clearly qualifies as a crime of violence under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, petitioner's section 924(c) sentence would be valid even if Johnson makes the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutional. Because petitioner has not made a prima facie showing that his proposed Johnson residual-clause claim meets the statutory criteria, the court denied this applications. View "In Re: Edgar Colon, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, citing Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. In this case, petitioner was convicted by a jury in 2008 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 2 (Count 2); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) (Count 3). Defendant was sentenced as a career offender based on a 1989 conviction on three counts of armed robbery with a deadly weapon and a 2004 Florida conviction for aggravated assault. The court concluded that, to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson to invalidate his mandatory life sentence for Count 1 under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), his claim fails because the record shows he was not sentenced under section 3559(c); to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson to invalidate his sentence enhancement under the career-offender guidelines, his claim also fails; and, as for his claim that his enhanced sentence on his conviction for Count 3 is invalid in light of Johnson, petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he meets the statutory criteria, but the court nevertheless denied his application. Because petitioner has not demonstrated that he will benefit from Johnson, the court denied his applications for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. View "In Re: Dennis Williams" on Justia Law

Ranbaxy, a pharmaceutical company, seeks money damages and injunctive relief for alleged misrepresentations made by FDB, a company that publishes a drug information database for use by pharmacies across the United States. Ranbaxy alleges that FDB’s database, MedKnowledge, falsely represents that Ranbaxy’s acne drug Absorica is non-unique. The district court granted summary judgment to FDB. The court affirmed the order and judgment, concluding that Ranbaxy has not raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to falsity. The court concluded that, because FDB provides ample explanation of the information and terms in its database, no reasonable reader would conclude that Absorica was therapeutically equivalent to or substitutable for other drugs. View "Ranbaxy Labs. Inc. v. First Databank, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a pro se application for permission to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States. Because binding precedent does not dictate that petitioner has three Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), predicates despite Johnson, the court concluded that petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his application contains a Johnson claim. The court also concluded that the fact that petitioner's motion will be filed after the one-year deadline does not require the court to deny him permission to file the motion. The court concluded that whether a section 2255 motion will be timely is not relevant to whether the applicant can obtain permission to bring a second or successive section 2255 motion, in cases where the parties have not had fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions on the limitations bar. Neither the government nor petitioner has presented a position about a limitations defense in this case. Accordingly, the court granted the application to file a new section 2255 motion and leave questions about the timeliness of that motion to the district court to decide in the first instance. View "In re: Steven Jackson" on Justia Law

O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 is a new Georgia statute governing settlement offers for personal injury and death claims arising from motor vehicle accidents. This case arises from an automobile accident involving the Dempseys and the Woodards, in which Thomas Dempsey was at fault. The court found it necessary to certify questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of section 9-11-67.1. The court certified the following questions: 1) Under Georgia law and the facts of this case, did the parties enter a binding settlement agreement when Insurer Grange accepted the Woodards' offer in writing? 2) Under Georgia law, does O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 permit unilateral contracts whereby offererors may demand acceptance in the form of performance before there is a binding, enforceable settlement contract? 3) Under Georgia law and the facts of the case, did O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 permit the Woodards to demand timely payment as a condition of accepting their offer? 4) Under Georgia law and the facts of this case, if there was a binding settlement agreement, did Insurer Grange breach that agreement as to payment, and what is the remedy under Georgia law? View "Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Allstate filed suit against multiple defendants, alleging claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Defendants are medical clinics that appointed Dr. Sara Vizcay as their medical director. Allstate’s central allegation is that Dr. Vizcay failed to systematically review billings as required by Florida’s Health Care Clinic Act, Fla. Stat. 400.990 et seq., which caused the clinics to submit unlawful or fraudulent insurance claims to Allstate. A jury found the clinics liable and awarded damages to Allstate. The clinics challenge the jury’s verdict, and the district court’s denial of their dispositive motions, on numerous grounds. The court held that, under Florida law, there is judicial remedy for a licensed clinic’s violation of the Clinic Act; a licensed clinic can be held responsible for its medical director’s failure to comply with the duties enumerated in the Clinic Act; the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Dr. Vizcay failed to substantially comply with those duties; Allstate's fraud claims are not barred by Florida's statute of limitations; and the district court did not err in denying defendants' motions to bifurcate the trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vizcay" on Justia Law