Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Frantz, Terry, and Chris appealed their convictions and sentences for charges related to their participation in a scheme in which they established a sham tax preparation business. The court concluded that the district court properly denied Frantz’s and Terry’s motions to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop, and evidence seized from the Parkland residence; there was sufficient evidence to support Terry and Chris’s convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy and use of unauthorized access devices to defraud, and aggravated identity theft; the district court did not plainly err in admitting testimony from a SWAT team officer executing a search warrant on the Parkland residence; the district court properly applied the two-level vulnerable victims enhancement pursuant to USSG 3A1.1(b)(1); the district court did not err in denying Terry a minor role sentencing reduction; the district court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement because defendants' offenses involved the production or trafficking of unauthorized access devices; and the evidence supports the district court’s loss amount calculation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pierre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed with IBEX as a computer software and hardware engineer for almost ten years. He filed suit against the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., asserting minimum wage and overtime claims. IBEX admitted that it had withheld plaintiff's final three weeks of pay as a result of an audit and its belief that he had improperly collected $147,230 in per diem payments. IBEX raised as an affirmative defense that plaintiff was an exempt employee under the FLSA. The court held that an hourly computer employee who is otherwise exempt under section 213(a)(17) does not become “non-exempt” during his last three weeks of work if the employer withholds his final paycheck. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FLSA claim. The court held, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff on his state-law counterclaim for unjust enrichment. In this case, the district court acknowledged (and plaintiff conceded) that IBEX presented evidence that plaintiff improperly collected $147,230 in per diem payments by misleading IBEX for a number of years about the location of his permanent residence. The court concluded that this evidence would likely have been sufficient to get the unjust enrichment claim to a jury. View "Pioch v. IBEX Engineering Services, Inc." on Justia Law

After the IRS assessed Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (“TFRP”) taxes against Ashley Scott for quarters covering a certain period, she filed suit seeking a refund of the $300 she paid for taxes owed and seeking an adjudication that she was not responsible or if she were deemed the responsible person, contribution from other responsible persons. Scott worked for her father’s business beginning shortly after her graduation from high school in 1995 until its closing in 2008. Within the company, Scott’s role was very limited. She did not make financial decisions or authorize the payment of any bills to vendors or creditors; she did not open or close bank accounts, or otherwise perform banking functions; she did not guarantee or co-sign loans; and she did not hire or fire employees. She wrote checks when directed to by her father, to buy office supplies, or to give herself advances on her salary. Principally at issue on appeal is whether Scott is a “responsible person” under 26 U.S.C. 6672. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the Government, holding that Scott was a responsible person. The court held that this case is too close to be decided on summary judgment where there are genuine issues of material fact relevant to whether Scott was a responsible person under section 6672. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded as to this issue. The court rejected Scott's arguments as to the willfulness issue and affirmed as to this issue. View "Scott v. US Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's ruling that she is deportable because she pleaded guilty to “theft by taking” in violation of Georgia Code 16-8-2. Petitioner argued that this crime is not “a theft offense” as that term is used in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), list of grounds for deportation. The BIA initially held that Georgia “theft by taking” doesn’t require property to be taken “without consent,” as is required for generic theft, and ruled that petitioner's violation was not "a theft offense. After this initial ruling, a BIA official granted a motion to reconsider and then ruled the second time around that the crime is generic theft. The court granted the petition and concluded that the BIA determined years ago in a published opinion that theft based on taking property through fraudulently obtained consent is not “without consent.” View "Vassell v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Petitioner wishes to raise a claim based on a new rule of constitutional law announced in Johnson v. United States in his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) would be valid even if Johnson renders the "crime of violence" definition in section 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional. Therefore, the court denied the application for leave to file a second or successive motion because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed claim meets the statutory criteria. View "In Re: Charles Hines" on Justia Law

The Board affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that Gaylord committed unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), (1). The Board petitioned for enforcement of its order and Gaylord cross-petitioned for review of the Board's order. The court concluded that the evidence in the record supports the Board’s conclusion that Gaylord had a bargaining relationship with the USW that pre-dated the move to Tuscaloosa, that Gaylord’s operation in Tuscaloosa was a continuation of its operation in Bogalusa, and therefore that Gaylord had an obligation to bargain with the USW concerning its Tuscaloosa employees; the record supports the Board's conclusion that a Gaylord VP interrogated an employee about his union sympathies in violation of the NLRA; and therefore, the court granted the Board's petition to enforce its order and denied Gaylord's cross-petition for review. View "NLRB v. Gaylord Chem. Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Petitioner claims that the statute is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States. Given the similarity between section 924(c) and section 924(e), other Courts of Appeals have authorized successive section 2255 petitions based on Johnson in section 924(c) cases. Although this court has not decided if Johnson applies to section 924(c)(3)(B), petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his motion contains a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court granted the application. View "In Re: Ricardo Pinder, Jr." on Justia Law

The SEC waited more than five years to commence an action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and disgorgement against defendants, who allegedly violated federal securities law by selling unregistered securities. Defendants raised the five-year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in their motions for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. 2462. Section 2462, with few exceptions, bars the government from bringing suit to enforce “any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture” after five years from when the claim first accrued. The court concluded that the SEC is time-barred from proceeding with its claims for declaratory relief and disgorgement because, under the plain meaning of section 2462, these remedies are a penalty and a forfeiture, respectively. But, because an injunction is not a penalty under section 2462, the court remanded for further proceedings on that remedy. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "SEC v. Graham" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. The court concluded that petitioner has not made a prima facie showing that he has satisfied the criteria of section 2255(h)(2) where his claim that Descamps v. United States is a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review is unavailing. The court also concluded that petitioner's claim under Johnson v. United States fails to establish the required prima facie showing because, even though Johnson is a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactive, the applicability of petitioner's armed career criminal enhancement does not turn on the validity of the residual clause. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In Re: Edward Thomas" on Justia Law

In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the court held that a debt collector violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, when it files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case on a debt that it knows to be time-barred. The district court in these cases interpreted the Crawford ruling as having placed the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code in irreconcilable conflict. The court concluded that, although the Code allows all creditors to file proofs of claim in bankruptcy cases, the Code does not at the same time protect those creditors from all liability. A particular subset of creditors - debt collectors - may be liable under the FDCPA for bankruptcy filings they know to be time-barred. Therefore, the court found no irreconcilable conflict between the FDCPA and the Code. The court reversed and remanded. View "Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC" on Justia Law