Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion because it complied with the two-part procedure for analyzing defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion by determining that he was eligible for a sentence reduction, but the reduction was not warranted based on its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court declined to reassign defendant's case to a different district court judge because there is no need for a remand and reassignment is unnecessary to preserve the appearance of justice and would require undue duplication of effort. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Christine C. Peterson and Roger V. Peterson challenged the tax court's determination that deferred compensation payments under corporate plans made after Christine's retirement from Mary Kay, Inc. in tax year 2009 were derived from her former Mary Kay association, making them subject to self-employment tax. The court held that the percentage commissions received by Christine, a retired National Sales Director, under the Family Program and Futures Program are subject to self-employment tax, because they are classified specifically as deferred compensation, derived from her prior association with Mary Kay. Because the Petersons did not pay the self-employment tax Christine owed for her 2009 commission payments from two post-retirement, deferred-compensation programs, the Family Program and Futures Program, “the tax court did not err in upholding the additional tax imposed by the IRS,” including interest and penalties. Therefore, the appeal from the decision of the tax court upholding Christine’s self-employment tax for 2009, Appeal No. 14-15774, is affirmed. The consolidated appeal from the decision of the Tax Court relating to tax years 2006 and 2007, Appeal No. 14-15773, is dismissed as improperly filed. View "Peterson v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 federal habeas petition because it was time-barred. The district court concluded that the state habeas proceedings became complete once the Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause and the period for seeking reconsideration of that denial lapsed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). The court held that, for purposes of section 2244(d)(2), when the Georgia Supreme Court denies a state habeas petitioner’s application for a certificate of probable cause, the petitioner’s proceedings remain “pending” until the court issues the remittitur for the denial. Applying this holding to petitioner, his section 2254 petition was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dolphy v. Warden, Central State Prison" on Justia Law

After defendant admitted to violating his conditions of supervised release, the district court sentenced defendant to the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months in prison. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2) applied to defendant's sentencing hearing and reviewed the claim de novo under the general United States v. Vandergrift rule. The court held that the district court failed to comply with section 3553(c)(2) because the district court failed to give sufficiently specific reasons for his non-guideline sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against Miami-Dade under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721–2725, the district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their claims were not barred and the district court erred by not applying the discovery rule to 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). In regard to this issue of first impression, the court adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the Eighth Circuit in McDonough v. Anoka Cnty and concluded that a DPPA claim accrues under section 1658(b) when the violation occurs. In this case, the only alleged DPPA violations that implicate Miami-Dade occurred on January 10, 2008 and May 26, 2005. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against Miami-Dade on March 7, 2014, well beyond the four-year statute of limitations for DPPA claims. Because the district court properly applied the occurrence rule to section 1658(a), the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

General Motors challenged the district court's order granting in part a motion for class certification in an action brought by plaintiffs under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. 501.201 et seq. The district court certified a class consisting of all Florida purchasers and lessees of 2014 Cadillac CTS sedans. In this case, the district court found the predominance requirement to be satisfied by an essential question common to each class member: whether the inaccurate Monroney sticker provided by General Motors constituted a misrepresentation prohibited by FDUTPA. The court concluded that, by inaccurately communicating that the 2014 Cadillac CTS had attained three perfect safety ratings, General Motors plainly obtained enhanced negotiating leverage that allowed it to command a price premium. The size of that premium represents the damages attributable to that theory of liability. Because that theory is consistent for all class members, the predominance requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is satisfied. This consistency is also sufficient to establish the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a)(2). Because common questions of law and fact predominate, class-wide adjudication appropriately conserves judicial resources and advances society’s interests in judicial efficiency. Finally, the court rejected General Motor's contention that plaintiff failed to prove that she can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carriuolo v. General Motors Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Alabama death row inmate, challenged the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. The district court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel was ineffective during petitioner's trial at both the penalty and guilt phase. The court concluded that petitioner's second amended Rule 32 petition pleaded more than sufficient specific facts about trial counsel’s acts and omissions to show their penalty phase investigation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Here, trial counsel’s failure to conduct any timely and meaningful mitigation interviews with petitioner and his family was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.The court vacated the district court's order denying petitioner's penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim and its order denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this claim; the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on petitioner's guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and remanded. View "Daniel v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law

After Lear filed suit against a former employee in state court for defamation and intentional interference with business relations, the district court granted the Secretary's motion for injunctive relief under the whistleblower protection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 660(c). The injunction enjoined Lear from, inter alia, suing any current or former employee. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the Secretary’s request for injunctive relief. However, the district court erred by enjoining Lear from pursuing litigation without finding that such litigation was either baseless or preempted. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and vacated the injunction. View "Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Lear Corp. EEDS and Interiors" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(b). The court rejected the government's contention that it should review only for plain error where the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that the court reviews de novo even when it is raised for the first time on appeal. In this case, the district court did not expressly make any factual findings with respect to its jurisdiction. In the plea agreement, defendant does not admit to facts that give rise to jurisdiction. The agreement does not state, for example, that defendant and his coconspirators failed to “make a claim of nationality” upon request when United States officials apprehended them. Instead, it asserts that defendant was on a vessel subject to the United States’ jurisdiction. The court concluded that a limited remand is the proper course of action in this case. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. View "United States v. Gonzalez Iguaran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired bank manager, filed suit against Nationstar under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., a consumer-protection statute geared toward mortgagors. Plaintiff claimed that her mortgage payment incorrectly increased after Nationstar began servicing the loan. The district court granted Nationstar's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Nationstar did not offer a written explanation stating the reason or reasons for its determination, in violation of section 2605(e)(2)(B) and 12 C.F.R. 1024.35(e)(1)(i)(B); that this failure indicated Nationstar's investigation was unreasonable; and that Nationstar’s unreasonable investigation prevented it from discovering and appropriately correcting the account error. The court concluded that the district court improperly elevated Nationstar's allegations over those of plaintiff at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and that plaintiff adequately pleaded damages. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Renfroe v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law