Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Defendant was convicted of attempting to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor into engaging in prostitution or unlawful sex, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his response to a posting on an internet site frequented by prostitutes and their clients. Law enforcement, posing as a fifteen-year-old girl, offered to have sex with defendant for money and defendant accepted, arranged to meet, and was arrested after arriving at the meeting spot. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant. The court held that, where an underage prostitute holds herself out as willing to engage in sex for money, the offer to pay that money qualifies as sufficient inducement under section 2422(b). The court also concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief based on the district court’s refusal to deliver a confusing and erroneous jury instruction requested by defendant or in its exclusion of particular evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rutgerson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiffs, two survivors of a bus crash that occurred because the driver fell asleep at the wheel, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2680, against the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Plaintiffs alleged that agency officials were at fault for allowing the bus company to continue operating after it should have been declared unsafe to do so. The case was dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, analysis in its order granting summary to the United States on plaintiffs' claims. The district court correctly held that because it lacks jurisdiction to determine the validity of 49 C.F.R. 385.17(f), the district court must proceed with its discretionary function analysis based on the regulation as it stood in 2011. Therefore, the court's review is limited to the portion of plaintiffs' claims that would not require it to assume invalid the version of 49 C.F.R. 385.17(f) in effect at the time the FMCSA granted the company the ten-day extension. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the United States had not waived its immunity from suit related to the decision allowing the bus company to continue operating because that decision was a discretionary one, excepted under 28 U.S.C. 2680(a) from the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity for certain tort actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chhetri v. United States" on Justia Law

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The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 21 U.S.T. 2517, requires signatory states to recognize written arbitration agreements “concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” In this appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression for the Circuit: whether a cruise ship employee who is injured on the job, and whose employment contract contains an arbitration agreement governed by the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 201, can bar arbitration by showing that high costs may prevent him from effectively vindicating his federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. The court concluded that it need not definitely answer this question because, even if the court were to assume that plaintiff could raise a cost-based (public policy) defense in response to NCL's motion to compel arbitration, on this record he has plainly failed to establish that the costs of arbitration would preclude him from arbitrating his federal statutory claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order compelling the parties to arbitrate. However, the court denied defendant's motion for sanctions. View "Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a Florida prisoner serving a life sentence for second degree murder among other things, was granted federal habeas relief on the ground that appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to anticipate the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on a jury instruction issue and raise it before the Third District Court of Appeal. The court concluded, however, that the district court failed to apply the double deference standard mandated by 28 U.S.C. 2254 and Strickland v. Washington, and the district court should have evaluated the reasonableness of the state habeas court’s denial of petitioner's ineffective assistance claim. Instead, the district court bypassed that test and went straight to the reasonableness of appellate counsel’s actions. The district court’s error in disregarding the requirements of section 2254(d)(1) led it to skip the dispositive question of whether there was any “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” holding that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve an issue that was percolating in the courts at the time. The court found that no holding of the Supreme Court clearly establishes that in order to perform within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” counsel must accurately predict how the law will turn out or hedge every bet in the hope of a favorable development. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. View "Rambaran v. Secretary, Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Petitioner, a state prisoner and a serial litigator in federal courts, appealed the denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis because it concluded that he had six strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Two of petitioner’s earlier filings were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the other four were dismissed for want of prosecution. In three of the four dismissals for want of prosecution, a judge of this Court determined that petitioner could not proceed in forma pauperis because his filings were frivolous. But a single circuit judge cannot dismiss an action or appeal. Instead, panels of this Court dismissed petitioner’s filings because he failed to pay the filing fee. The court concluded that, although petitioner is a serial litigant who has clogged the federal courts with frivolous litigation, the court must follow the text of the Act, which does not classify his six prior dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and want of prosecution as strikes. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Daker v. Commissioner, GA Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant Timothy Filbeck, a lieutenant with the sheriff's office, arrested the new owner's agents of his foreclosed home. Plaintiffs, who were lawfully performing their jobs, filed suit against Filbeck and the Sheriff, individually and in their official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for violation of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs alleged a conversion claim against all defendants. Plaintiffs further alleged claims for negligent hiring and retention, as well as for ratification. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Filbeck based on qualified immunity where a jury could reasonably conclude on the record that Filbeck was never a tenant at sufferance after the foreclosure had been finalized, and he - not plaintiffs - was the intruder. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Filbeck on the conversion claim where the evidence could establish a substantive claim of conversion under Georgia law. However, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment with respect to the County and Sheriff on the conversion claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Carter v. Filbeck" on Justia Law

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An IJ found that petitioner did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, that he had no basis for withholding of removal, and that he could not obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court agreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that, where an alien pursues a reasonable fear proceeding following DHS’ initial reinstatement of a prior order of removal, the reinstated removal order does not become final until the reasonable fear proceeding is completed. Therefore, the court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction when petitioner filed his petition for review. However, the court joined the Second and Third Circuits and held that if a petition for review is premature when filed, the petition becomes ripe (and jurisdiction vests) when subsequent agency action renders the initial ruling final, and the petition can be adjudicated if no action has been taken on the merits and there is no prejudice to the government. Therefore, the government's motion to dismiss is denied. 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) provides that an alien whose order of removal is reinstated “is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter.” On the merits, the court joined the Second and Fifth Circuits in holding that, because asylum is a form of relief from removal, a person like petitioner is not eligible for and cannot seek asylum. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Jimenez-Morales v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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VRC filed suit against HHS and the Secretary, seeking the recoupment of payments VRC returned to Medicare after it was issued notice of an overpayment. At issue is the reimbursement rate of the intravitreal injection of Lucentis. VRC did not follow the Lucentis label’s instructions limiting dosage to one per vial. Instead, VRC treated up to three patients from a single vial. Because VRC was extracting up to three doses from a single vial, it was reimbursed for three times the average cost of the vial and three times the amount it would have received had it administered the drug according to the label. The court affirmed the denial of recoupment, concluding that VRC's charge to Medicare did not reflect its expense and was not medically reasonable; the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence; and VRC is liable for the overpayment. View "Vitreo Retinal Consultants v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

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Garrity v. New Jersey held that a public employee may not be coerced into surrendering his Fifth Amendment privilege by threat of being fired or subjected to other sanctions. The principle issue on appeal is one of first impression: whether a state employee can, after he has been fired, waive his Garrity rights and allow his prior compelled and protected statements to be used by the federal government in a criminal investigation. The court concluded that Garrity rights may be waived in such circumstances, as long as the employee’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Because defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Garrity rights when he spoke to agents of the FBI following his termination by the Alabama Department of Corrections, the court held that the government did not violate the Fifth Amendment when it used his prior statements in a federal criminal investigation concerning the beating and death of an inmate. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions for violating civil rights, making false statements, obstructing justice, and conspiring to obstruct justice. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiffs Patterson and Breedlove filed suit against Mortgage Systems, seeking to enforce a contract between Patterson and CitiMortgage for the sale of Breedlove’s home to Patterson for a bargain basement price. CitiMortgage contends that the sale price stated in its offer letter to Patterson was an obvious clerical error and that the contract should be rescinded for that reason. Because of the clerical error, the letter actually said that CitiMortgage wanted a net payout amount of $113,968.45, instead of the “corrected” net payout amount was $423,940. Because that letter did not lead to formation of a valid contract based on CitiMortgage's unilateral mistake that plaintiffs knew or should have known about, CitiMortgage did not have any duty not to foreclose on the property. Therefore, the wrongful foreclosure claim fails and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for CitiMortgage and Mortgage Systems. View "Patterson v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts