Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant's original 72-month sentence represented a downward departure from his advisory guidelines range of 87 to 108 months based on his substantial assistance to the government. The district court applied a 3-level reduction in defendant’s offense level in making this downward departure. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order ruling on his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that USSG 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) grants the sentencing court in a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding the discretion to comparably reduce a defendant’s sentence where that defendant previously received a USSG 5K1.1 departure at his original sentencing. If a sentencing court chooses to exercise its discretion and make a comparable reduction, it is not bound to use the percentage-based approach - or any one specific method - to calculate the comparable reduction. Rather, the court may use any of the reasonable methods that were available to calculate the original section 5K1.1 departure, so long as they result in a comparable reduction. In this case, the district court’s mistaken belief about the limitation of its discretion constitutes procedural error. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Marroquin-Medina" on Justia Law

Debtor declared bankruptcy in 2011 and sought to discharge his federal income tax liability for tax years 2000 through 2003. Debtor had filed Forms 1040 for those tax years many years late, and only after the IRS had issued notices of deficiency and had assessed the amount of taxes he owed. The bankruptcy court determined that debtor's tax debts were nondischargeable and granted the government's motion for summary judgment. The court assumed, without deciding, that Congress did not intend to include filing deadlines when it required, in the hanging paragraph, that tax returns comply with “applicable filing requirements.” Even making that assumption, however, the court held that debtor's late-filed Forms 1040 do not qualify as tax returns under the Beard test because they do not evince an honest and reasonable effort to comply with the tax law. Consequently, debtor's tax debts for tax years 2000 through 2003 are debts for tax obligations with respect to which no return was filed, and they are not dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 23(a)(1)(B)(i). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Justice v. United States" on Justia Law

Tamaz, a Saudi Arabian company, appealed the denial of its Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion to vacate a default judgment against it as void for lack of service of process. Tamaz argues that the district court erred in concluding that De Gazelle had properly served it using Federal Express, when that means of service is not specifically authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and De Gazelle had not received prior court authorization to serve Tamaz using that method. The court agreed, concluding that when De Gazelle FedExed the summons and complaint to Tamaz’s post office box on September 21, 2013, it was not acting pursuant to a court order. In fact, De Gazelle did not seek court authorization to serve Tamaz via Federal Express until the magistrate judge denied its first motion for a default judgment on the ground that De Gazelle failed to show that service via FedEx was authorized under Rule 4. Furthermore, the magistrate judge’s reliance, in later finding that service had been effected on September 21, 2013, on evidence showing that Althawadi, Tamaz’s registered agent, had actual notice of the lawsuit was misplaced, since notice does not confer personal jurisdiction on a defendant when it has not been served in accordance with Rule 4. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "De Gazelle Group, Inc. v. Tamaz Trading Establishment" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his pro se habeas petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on these issues: (1) Whether the proper filing of a Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial tolls the time period for filing a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition; and if so, whether petitioner’s Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial was properly filed; and (2) If a Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial is a tolling motion under 28 U.S.C 2244(d)(2), and petitioner properly filed his extraordinary motion, whether the district court erred by dismissing his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as time-barred. After the court granted the COA, the state acknowledged that it had been wrong and now agrees that petitioner's petition is timely. The court agreed too and reversed and remanded. View "Westmoreland v. Warden" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, appealed the district court's denial of his first and only 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Petitioner asserts that his sentence is illegal pursuant to Descamps v. United States and Johnson v. United States. The court held that Descamps and Johnson apply retroactively in the first post-conviction context. In this case, neither the enumerated clause nor the residual clause applies to petitioner’s prior burglary conviction, and it is therefore not a violent felony. Because petitioner only has two qualifying prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), his sentence is illegal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "Mays v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to charges related to his use of stolen identity information to add himself as an authorized user to other individuals’ pre-existing credit card accounts and open new accounts in the names of stolen identities, causing banks to create new credit cards that included him as an authorized user. The court concluded that USSG 2B1.6 does not prevent application of a section 2B1.1 production enhancement to a sentence imposed in conjunction with a 18 U.S.C. 1028A (aggravated identity theft) conviction when the underlying conduct at issue involves “production,” rather than conduct limited to “transfer, possession, or use.” The court also held that willfully causing an innocent third party to produce a fraudulent credit card qualifies as “production” under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

FEB filed suit against the government seeking to quiet title to a spoil island off Key West, known as Wisteria Island. Wisteria Island was formed as a result of the Navy's dredging operations. In this case, it is undisputed that the state of Florida, F.E.B.’s predecessor in interest, had actual knowledge of the United States’ claim to the island in 1951. F.E.B.'s Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a(g), claim expired in 1963, well before initiation of this suit. The court concluded that the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315, does not rise to the level of the “clear and unequivocal” abandonment of the government’s interest in Wisteria Island necessary to reset the QTA statute of limitations. The court found F.E.B.'s arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. Therefore, the court found that the QTA's statute of limitations has run and affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "F.E.B. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Bersin filed suit, alleging that it had been induced into investing more than $350,000 in a BWB franchise through fraud and misrepresentations, some of which concerned OBWB’s advertising of patented technology. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its case against OBWB in state court; nor did the district court err in declining to hold Bersin in contempt. The court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, deprived the district court of the power to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its state court suit. Even if the district court had the power to issue such an injunction, it would have been improper on the merits to bind Bersin to a settlement release it had no part in negotiating and from which it obtained no benefit. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Original Brooklyn Water Bagel Co., Inc. v. Bersin Bagel Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Collectors, alleging that the debt collection letter they sent her violated section 1692(g) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(g), by failing to notify her of the "in writing" requirement. Plaintiff also alleged that omitting the “in writing” requirement violated section 1692e, which prohibits using “false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court joined the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that a debt collection notice sent to a consumer’s attorney is an “indirect” communication with the consumer; the court rejected the notion that section 1692g gives debt collectors discretion to omit the “in writing” requirement or cure improper notice by claiming waiver; the FDCPA already specifies a remedy for violations of section 1692g and the court will not judicially fashion a waiver remedy for violations of section 1692g when the FDCPA identifies civil liability as the remedy for noncompliance; and the communication alleged in this case states a claim for “false, deceptive, or misleading” behavior under section 1692e where neither the “competent lawyer” nor the “least sophisticated consumer” could be said to have notice of the “in writing” requirement after receiving a letter like the one alleged. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his role as an international sex trafficker. The government argues that the district court erred when it refused to award restitution to a victim of defendant’s sex trafficking in Australia. The court concluded that Congress has the constitutional authority to punish sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion that occurs overseas. The court concluded that the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C.1596(a)(2), is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution. Furthermore, section 1596(a)(2) does not violate the due process clause. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the supplemental jury instruction; the district court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; and the district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in calculating defendant's restitution obligations. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, but the court vacated the order of restitution and remanded with an instruction for the district court to increase his restitution obligation. View "United States v. Baston" on Justia Law