Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was ordered removed, he remained in ICE custody from November 25, 2008 until October 21, 2009 - an amount of time greatly exceeding the 90-day statutory period for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff filed a Bivens action, arguing that various government officials, knowing that his removal order could not be executed, made false statements in order to unconstitutionally prolong his detention. The district court dismissed his complaint. Although the court held that section 1252(g) does not bar it from considering the merits of plaintiff's claim, the court also found no Bivens remedy available to him, because the INA sets out sufficient meaningful remedies for plaintiff and similarly situated aliens, and because numerous special factors counsel against supplementing this scheme with a new judicially created cause of action. The court noted that Congress did not provide an avenue by which plaintiff can seek monetary relief. The court deferred its judgment and held that no Bivens remedy is available to a plaintiff. View "Alvarez v. ICE" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death-row inmate, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, raising several challenges to his conviction and death sentence. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that petitioner was not intellectually disabled. The district court denied petitioner's multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to petitioner's claims of intellectual disability and ineffective trial counsel in the guilt and penalty phases. The court held that: (1) a district court is not required to apply a Flynn effect reduction to an individual’s IQ score in a death penalty case; (2) a district court should consider all of the expert medical testimony, including evidence about the Flynn effect, and make its own fact findings; and (3) a district court’s application or rejection of the Flynn effect constitutes a fact-finding subject to review only for clear error. In this case, the district court erred by not clearly discrediting petitioner's Flynn effect evidence or alternatively finding that, even applying the Flynn effect, petitioner is not intellectually disabled. The court also concluded that the district court committed no error in its consideration of the standard error of measurement. The district court also committed no clear error in finding that petitioner failed to prove that he suffered from significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning. Finally, the district court properly denied relief on petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including petitioner's claim that trial counsel's primary defense - that petitioner was involuntarily intoxicated due to his early onset alcoholism - was foreclosed by Georgia law. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Ledford v. Warden, GDCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, consumers from California and Texas, filed class actions against Electrolux, the manufacturer of front-loading washing machines, alleging warranty and consumer claims. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the rubber seal on the front door of the machines retains water, allowing mildew to grow, causing stains on clothing, and creating a foul odor. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in assessing predominance and therefore vacated the class certification. On remand, the district court should revisit Electrolux's argument that the consumer claims do not satisfy predominance because plaintiffs cannot prove causation on a classwide basis, and the district court abused its discretion by certifying the warranty claims without first resolving preliminary questions of state law that bear on predominance. The court further concluded that plaintiffs' damages do not necessarily defeat predominance, and Electrolux's defense of misuse does not necessarily defeat predominance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Brown v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Two off-regular-duty Miami-Dade police officers were moonlighting by providing "police services" to a local bar and nightclub, Blue Martini. The officers got into an altercation with two individuals, Gustavo and Elsa Martinez, and arrested them. The Martinezes filed suit against the officers, as well as Miami-Dade and Blue Martini. The Martinezes' claims have been settled or resolved. In this appeal, Blue Martini challenged the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the County on the County’s indemnification claim against Blue Martini. Blue Martini claims for the first time on appeal that Fla. Stat. 30.2905 - which makes a private employer responsible for the acts or omissions of the deputy sheriff while performing services for that employer while off duty - wrongfully deprived it of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Because the constitutional question raised is purely a legal one and because the matter is likely to arise again, the court exercised its discretion to entertain the claim. The court held that Fla. Stat. 30.2905 reasonably serves a variety of legitimate governmental interests, easily passes rational basis scrutiny, and, therefore, does not violate the due process clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blue Martini Kendall, LLC v. Miami Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges stemming from his participation in a scheme to file fraudulent income tax returns with stolen identities. Defendant, an Arab Muslim, argues that he was denied a fair trial after Juror 9, at the start of deliberations, slipped a note to the clerk stating that she feared for her safety because “this reeks of al Qaeda.” The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of aggravated identity theft; the jury instructions did not plainly amend the indictment by adding an additional means of identification to the means listed in the indictment; the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the note from Juror 9 where the district court did not clearly err in finding that Juror 9 could be fair and impartial; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying an enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) for an offense involving fifty or more victims; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a downward departure under USSG 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility where the district court found that defendant had not accepted responsibility; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it departed upward to a higher criminal history category; and the sentence is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Sammour" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm that traveled interstate. The district court determined that defendant's three prior armed robbery convictions were committed on separate occasions and thus he could be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The court concluded that the charging documents, plea colloquy transcript, and paragraph 29 of the PSI do not provide “reliable and specific evidence” reflecting three violent felonies that defendant “committed on occasions different from one another.” Because the documents are vague as to which offense(s) they relate, even when taken collectively they do not satisfy the Government’s evidentiary obligations. Therefore, the burden of showing that defendant is an armed career criminal is not met and the district court erroneously applied the 15-year ACCA sentencing enhancement. The court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. McCloud" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of illegally possessing and making guns, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255. A pretrial intervention officer observed a bolt-action rifle in petitioner's bedroom. Based on that information, the police obtained a search warrant for the house where they found thirteen guns. The court concluded that the warrantless search of petitioner’s house was reasonable because the pretrial intervention officer had reasonable suspicion, because the supervision permitted by the pretrial intervention agreement gave petitioner a diminished expectation of privacy, and because the state has strong interests in the effectiveness of its pretrial intervention program. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "Castillo v. United States" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, these consolidated appeals challenge six actions brought by the district court to enforce summonses issued by the IRS in an investigation of DHLP and Beekman. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether defendants’ allegations of improper purpose were improper as a matter of law or sufficiently supported under United States v. Clarke to require a hearing. The district court enforced the summonses, finding that defendants neither alleged improper motives as a matter of law nor met their burden under Clarke. The court concluded that issuing a summons for the sole purpose of retaliation against a taxpayer would be improper as a matter of law; issuing summons in bad faith for the sole purpose of circumventing tax court discovery would be an improper purpose as a matter of law; the district court's decision not to hold a status conference or permit additional evidence is appropriate in light of the summary nature of a summons enforcement proceeding; and, although the district court erred in finding that the allegations set forth by defendants could not constitute an improper purpose as a matter of law, the district court correctly found that defendants failed to meet their burden under Clarke. Clarke permits a taxpayer challenging the enforcement of a summons “to examine an IRS agent when he can point to specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad faith.” In this case, defendants' submissions suggest that the summonses were issued in bad faith anticipation of tax court proceedings rather than in furtherance of Agent Fierfelder’s investigation. Conjecture and bare allegations of improper purpose are insufficient as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

The IRS sent petitioner a Letter 1153 (notice of proposed assessment) informing her that, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6672(a), she - as the chief operating officer of NPRN - was personally responsible for the company’s unpaid trust fund taxes for the second quarter of 2005. The IRS then made an assessment against her in the amount of $346,732.38. The court held that a taxpayer is entitled to a pre-assessment administrative determination by the IRS of her proposed liability for trust fund taxes if she files a timely protest. Therefore, in this case, the IRS erred by not making such a determination for petitioner after she filed a timely protest. The court vacated the judgment of the tax court and remanded so that it can address whether the IRS’ error, under the circumstances, is harmless or requires setting aside the 2007 assessment (or some lesser form of corrective action). View "Romano-Murphy v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law