Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the crime of lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim who was less than 12 years old. At issue is whether a petition for a belated direct appeal, under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c), qualifies as an “application for State . . . collateral review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), that, while pending, tolls the period of limitation for a Florida prisoner’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court answered the question in the negative, relying on its recent decision in Espinosa v. Secretary, Department of Corrections. In Espinosa, the court held that a petition for belated postconviction appeal under Rule 9.141(c) does not “involve ‘collateral review’ of [a] conviction” for the purpose of tolling the same statute of limitation. In this case, the petition does not qualify as an application for state collateral review. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition as untimely. View "Danny v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

Crew One refers stagehands to the producers of concerts and other live events in the Atlanta area. The Board determined that the stagehands were employees of Crew One, which gave the Board authority to regulate their relationship. The Board later directed an election and certified a union, and when Crew One refused to negotiate with the union, the Board entered summary judgment against Crew One for an unfair labor practice. Crew One petitioned for review. After considering all the relevant factors, the court concluded that the stagehands are independent contractors where the most important factor, control, supports this conclusion. Further, the failure to withhold taxes, the independent contractor agreements, the nature of Crew One’s business, the absence of benefits, the tools, and the insurance provided by the clients also support this conclusion. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the decision of the Board. View "Crew One Productions v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's order of removal, finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 229b(a), based on his conviction and sentence for a burglary offense. The Board reasonably concluded that house arrest, as a punitive measure that involves a “serious restriction of liberty,” constitutes confinement and is a “term of imprisonment” under the Act. In this case, petitioner's burglary offense, for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year, qualified as an aggravated felony and made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Herrera v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition as second or successive under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The court concluded that, under the court's prior decision in Insignares v. Secretary, petitioner's section 2254 petition is not second or successive within the meaning of section 2244(b). The court concluded that, as in Insignares, the state trial court’s grant of petitioner’s Rule 3.800 motion and its vacatur of the punishment of chemical castration from the original sentence constituted a resentencing that resulted in a new judgment, even though petitioner’s total custodial term (life in prison) remained the same, and even though the current habeas corpus petition challenges only the underlying convictions. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Patterson v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder and robbery, moved the court to recall its 2014 mandate denying his petition for habeas corpus relief and to reconsider his original habeas petition after the full Court issues an en banc decision in a different, although currently pending case, Wilson v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison. The court concluded that it was foreclosed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(b), and Supreme Court precedent from recalling the mandate denying habeas relief; even if the court were not foreclosed and examined the merits of his motion, the court would still deny it because, regardless of how Wilson is decided, petitioner’s claim is without merit; and, even if the court could recall the mandate, the court's respect for the State of Georgia’s interest in the finality of its criminal judgments would strongly counsel against doing so. Further, the court denied petitioner's motion to stay his execution because, regardless of how Wilson is decided, petitioner has not shown a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits of his underlying claim View "Jones v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

Petitioner, guilty of 35 counts arising from his role in armed robberies of fast food restaurants, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court concluded that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to argue that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's kidnapping convictions in light of Garza v. State. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to issue the writ. View "Overstreet v. Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and its officers under 42 U.S.C.1983, federal maritime law, and state law, alleging that defendants seized his sailboat and destroyed it without justification and without notice. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court should not have placed a “heightened pleading” burden on plaintiff for his section 1983 claims. The court also concluded that the district court erred to the extent that it dismissed the federal constitutional claims in Counts I, II, and V, and the maritime claims in Counts III and IV, based on the contents of the incident reports. On remand, the court instructed the district court to assess the sufficiency of the procedural due process, search and seizure, and takings claims without reliance on the disputed portions of the incident reports. The court further instructed that the district court should assume that the sailboat was not derelict, and that plaintiff was never given adequate notice that it was derelict and subject to removal and destruction. The court further concluded that the district court erred with respect to the procedural due process claim in Count I and the Fourth Amendment claim in Count II. In this case, all plaintiff needed to do to establish municipal liability was allege a policy, practice, or custom of the City which caused the seizure and destruction of his sailboat, which he did. Further, defendants cannot point to any post-Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit Supreme Court or circuit cases - and the court has not been able to locate any - holding that a complaint asserting a section 1983 municipal liability claim must, as a Rule 8(a) pleading matter, always specifically identify the municipality’s final policymaker by name. Finally, plaintiff also sufficiently stated a claim for an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. However, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to state a substantive due process claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hoefling, Jr. v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

Two separate groups brought pre-enforcement challenges to the MSHA's final rule, entitled Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous Personal Dust Monitors (New Dust Rule). On the first challenge, the court concluded that, consistent with the plain language of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and with the earlier precedent of this court, the statute as amended clearly evinces a congressional intent that, although it must consider the advice of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), MSHA has the sole responsibility to issue regulations covering the subjects addressed by this rule. On the second challenge, the court concluded that MSHA’s decades-long effort, culminating in the publication of this rule, adequately took into account the scientific evidence of record and arrived at conclusions which, given MSHA’s expertise, are worthy of deference. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "National Mining Ass'n v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for eight counts of armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and eight counts of carrying, using, and brandishing a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court sentenced defendant to 150 months for the section 1951(a) violations and to a mandatory 182 years for the section 924(c) violations, to run consecutively. The court concluded that, because defendant cannot demonstrate that he suffered compelling prejudice from the joinder of claims, the district court did not commit error, much less plain error, in denying his motion; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant; and defendant's sentence for the section 924(c) violations does not violate the separation of powers, due process and equal protection, nor the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Bowers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the officers who searched their home, the officers who arrested them, and the sheriff in charge of the jail. Plaintiffs' trailer was searched because officers believed the trailer belonged to someone else. Contraband was found in the trailer and plaintiffs were arrested. However, charges against plaintiffs were dropped after the evidence from the trailer was suppressed. They alleged violations of their federal constitutional and statutory rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and various claims under state law. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the deputies are entitled to official immunity from the claim of trespass under Georgia law; the deputies and investigator are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim of malicious prosecution; the court joined its sister circuits and held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil suit against police officers; but the sheriff is not entitled to sovereign immunity from the claim under Title II of the Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Black v. Wigington" on Justia Law