Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The government moved the district court for entry of a forfeiture money judgment of $117,659 after defendant pled guilty to theft of government funds. The forfeiture money judgment was in the amount of loss sustained by the Social Security Administration as a result of defendant’s offense. The district court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $117,659, but denied the government's forfeiture motion. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in denying the motion where civil forfeiture was authorized against defendant for his offense under 18 U.S.C. 981 and the civil forfeiture statute is applicable in this case. Further, the district court could not offset the amount of restitution by the amount subject to forfeiture or consider defendant’s economic circumstances. The district court was required by law both to grant the forfeiture motion and order full restitution, and it erred when it denied the government’s forfeiture motion on the ground that it had also ordered defendant to pay restitution. The court rejected defendant's double jeopardy argument. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as head football coach, plaintiff filed suit against the School District under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and related federal laws, alleging that the school district committed racially discriminatory employment decisions. The court concluded that, although plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to infer that he was treated unfairly, he has failed to produce any evidence suggesting that his treatment was on account of his race. The school district argued that it terminated plaintiff because he committed recruiting violations that resulted in ineligible students being enrolled at the high school to play football. The court rejected plaintiff's contentions and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the school district. View "Flowers v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Florida law denies due process because it permits the State to keep intellectually disabled people like him involuntarily committed indefinitely without periodic review. The district court concluded that the statutory scheme was constitutional, concluding that Fla. Stat. 393.11 contains an implicit requirement that if a committed person no longer meets the admission criteria, the APD must petition the circuit court to order release. The court certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court about Florida’s scheme for the involuntary commitment of the intellectually disabled. Florida law contains no requirement, explicit or implicit, that the APD review the continuing commitment of intellectually disabled persons. Neither does Florida law require that the APD petition the admitting circuit court to release a person who no longer meets the criteria for commitment. Therefore, the court held that Florida's statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it does not provide periodic review of the propriety of ongoing commitment by someone with the duty to consider and the authority to order release when appropriate. The court noted that it is sympathetic to the State of Florida’s interest in involuntarily admitting the intellectually disabled to residential services in order to “prevent or reduce the severity of developmental disabilities” and to “enable individuals with developmental disabilities to achieve their greatest potential for independent and productive living.” Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "J.R. v. Hansen" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an intellectual property dispute between two religious organizations. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant is infringing its registered service marks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and Florida law. The district court granted judgment for defendant. In the first appeal, the court reversed in part and remanded for reconsideration of whether the parties' marks are likely to be confused. The court was also critical of disparaging comments that the district judge made about the parties. On remand, the court concluded that the district court misapplied several factors in its analysis of likely confusion, incorrectly assessed the Florida Priory’s defense of prior use, relied on historical testimony that the court previously deemed inadmissible, and misinterpreted the court's instructions about consulting facts outside the record. The court declined to order reassignment after balancing the three factors in United States v. Torkington. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sovereign Military Hospitaller v. The Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers" on Justia Law

AEA, a public-sector union, and related parties filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the constitutionality of Alabama Act No. 2010-761, Ala. Code 17-17-5. Act 761 “prohibit[s] a state or local government employee from arranging by payroll deduction or otherwise the payment of any contribution to an organization that uses any portion of those contributions for political activity.” AEA claims that Act 761 violates the First Amendment rights of AEA and its members because the subjective motivations of the lawmakers in passing the Act was to retaliate against AEA for its political speech on education policy. AEA pursued its claim through subpoenas seeking files of four certain lawmakers. At issue on appeal are the lawmakers' petitions for writs of mandamus and their appeals, all challenging the district court’s refusal to quash AEA’s subpoenas. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to quash AEA’s subpoenas. The court’s precedent applying United States v. O’Brien recognizes that, when a statute is facially constitutional, a plaintiff cannot bring a free-speech challenge by claiming that the lawmakers who passed it acted with a constitutionally impermissible purpose. The court concluded that the O’Brien rule applies here, which means that AEA has no valid federal claim to justify intruding upon the lawmakers’ legislative privileges. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re: Mike Hubbard" on Justia Law

Allied suspended and discharged two of the employees who supported the campaign to elect the union after Allied employees elected the union to represent them. The Board found that Allied illegally interfered with its employees’ union activities and unlawfully retaliated against the employees. The Board ordered Allied to refrain from future violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and to reinstate the employees with backpay. The court granted the petition for enforcement, concluding that the petition for enforcement is not moot and that substantial evidence supports the finding of the Board that the employees' support for the union was a motivating factor in the decision to fire them. The employees both actively supported and participated in the campaign to elect a union; Allied knew that the employees supported the union, and it suspended and discharged them only weeks after the workers voted in favor of the union; and Allied's CEO expressed antiunion animus. Substantial evidence also supports the finding that Allied would not have suspended and discharged the employees in the absence of their union activities. View "NLRB v. Allied Medical Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAAs) the IRS issued disallowing all items they claimed on their partnership returns on the ground that partnerships constituted an abusive tax shelter designed to generate artificial, noneconomic tax losses desired by the taxpayer. The district court upheld the administrative adjustments to the partnerships’ returns and entered judgment for the Government. The court concluded that the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order correctly resolved these questions; and therefore, the court affirmed on this basis. The district court concluded that the FPAAs properly found that the partnerships lacked economic substance and made adjustments accordingly. However, the FPAAs improperly imposed penalties. View "Kearney Partners Fund v. United States" on Justia Law

Efraim Diveroli, an international arms dealer, won a $298 million contract with the United States Army to provide ammunition to Afghanistan. The contract prohibited Diveroli’s company, AEY, from acquiring ammunition from Chinese manufacturers. When Diveroli learned that his primary supplier obtained its ammunition from China, he and others concealed the origin of the ammunition and falsely attested that it was from Albania. On appeal, Diveroli challenged his 48 months sentence after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy. Diveroli claimed that his attorney miscalculated his potential sentencing exposure. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Diveroli was not entitled to relief. In this case, the record establishes that Diveroli faced overwhelming evidence of guilt and had no valid affirmative defenses. It would not have been rational for Diveroli to reject his plea bargain. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of Diveroli's motion to vacation. View "Diveroli v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4, as a result of her actions during and following a traffic stop. The jury found that defendant knew about a federal felony (her convicted-felon boyfriend’s possession of the firearm which he used to shoot the officers that made the stop), did not report that crime to the authorities, and, in the aftermath of the murders, took affirmative steps to conceal her boyfriend’s felony from the authorities. The court concluded that defendant did not establish that her prosecution was improperly selective where she has not shown that she is similarly situated to her purported comparator and she has not shown that the decision to prosecute her was based upon any constitutionally impermissible standard. The court also concluded that defendant's prosecution did not violate her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Brantley" on Justia Law

Cartoon Network provides a free mobile application for smartphones called the CN app. After plaintiff downloaded the free app, the Cartoon Network kept records of the videos he watched and shared those records with Bango without his consent. Bango specializes “in tracking individual behaviors across the Internet and mobile applications . . . [and claims] that its technology ‘reveals customer behavior, engagement and loyalty across and between all [ ] websites and apps.’” Plaintiff filed suit against Cartoon Network under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2710, alleging that he was a “subscriber” of Cartoon Network and therefore a “consumer” under the Act. Plaintiff further claimed that Cartoon Network violated the Act when it disclosed his “personally identifiable information” to Bango. The district court granted Cartoon Network's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that a person who downloads and uses a free mobile application on his smartphone to view freely available content, without more, is not a “subscriber” (and therefore not a “consumer”) under the VPPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ellis v. The Cartoon Network, Inc." on Justia Law