Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, alleging that Capital One violated certain provisions of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, by attempting to collect on defaulted or delinquent credit card accounts that Capital One had acquired from HSBC. The district court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. The court concluded that it need look no further than the statutory text to conclude that, under the plain language of the FDCPA, a bank (or any person or entity) does not qualify as a “debt collector” where the bank does not regularly collect or attempt to collect on debts “owed or due another” and where “the collection of any debts” is not “the principal purpose” of the bank’s business, even where the consumer’s debt was in default at the time the bank acquired it. In this case, the amended complaint’s factual matter establishes that Capital One’s collection efforts in this case related only to debts owed to it and that debt collection is only some part of, and not the principal purpose of, Capital One’s business. Therefore, Capital One's activity, as alleged by plaintiff, is not the activity of a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, and plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against DAI, alleging claims of fraud, breach of contract, and misrepresentation. Plaintiffs also requested to vacate the arbitration award issued by the ADRC. After removal to the district court, the district court granted DAI’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ counterclaims. The district court further granted plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the arbitration award based on its finding that the arbitrator was biased. The court vacated the district court's grant of the motion to vacate the award because plaintiffs have failed to show that any of the circumstances enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 10(a), are present in these circumstances. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Directory Assistants Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against CAL, an international airline based in Trinidad and Tobago. CAL is Trinidad and Tobago’s national carrier and it is majority-owned by the Minister of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago (Minister). At issue was whether CAL qualifies for jury immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330. Because the court concluded that the district court correctly held that the Minister is a political subdivision of Trinidad and Tobago, CAL qualifies as an agency or instrumentality of Trinidad and Tobago, and the district court’s strike of plaintiff’s jury demand was not erroneous. Therefore, the court affirmed the order and the final judgment. View "Singh v. Caribbean Airlines Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against DCI, alleging that DCI violated the Telephone Communications Practice Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by sending plaintiff two text messages. The court concluded that plaintiff gave his prior express consent to be contacted by voluntarily providing his cell phone number to DCI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff’s complaint alleges, on its face, facts that demonstrate prior express consent. View "Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the district court's decision to apply the one year delay contemplated by U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(e) to his motion for a sentence reduction. The court held that the district court did not err when it applied section 1B1.10(e) to the motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 filed by defendant. The court concluded that there was no imposition or lengthening of defendant's sentence; section 1B1.10(e) is binding on the courts; the adoption of section 1B1.10(e) did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.; and the limitation on retroactive application of Amendment 782 imposed by section 1B1.10(e) does not violate the separation of powers principle. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Maiello, Jr." on Justia Law

This court previously determined that the State of Alabama failed to sufficiently justify its decision to impose certain taxes on rail carriers, including CSX Transportation, when motor carriers and water carriers (both railroad competitors) are not subject to the same. Then the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the court should reconsider whether the State has offered sufficient justification for exempting railroad competitors from the sales and use taxes the State imposes on railroads when they purchase or consume diesel fuel. The court vacated its prior opinion, vacated the judgment of the district court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. AL Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the personal representative of Paola Penafiel, filed suit against GEICO, alleging Coblentz v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. bad faith claims. On appeal, GEICO challenged the judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court agreed with GEICO that the district court erred in denying the admission of evidence of the development of Florida law as it pertained to whether an insurance policy GEICO issued to Edgar Baena (Edgar) covered a vehicle collision involving Edgar and Penafiel. The court also agreed with GEICO that the district court improperly excluded evidence of earlier decisions of the district court rejecting the theory on which plaintiff based her argument that coverage existed. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Garcia v. Geico General Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of three counts of tax evasion and two counts of structuring a currency transaction. The court concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief on his claim that the indictment is defective; the indictment properly charges him with structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3), and although there is a factual error in the indictment, he has not shown that the error affected his substantial rights; and defendant’s claim that the order of forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment also lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sperrazza" on Justia Law

Gaston Glock, creator of the Glock 17 handgun, began divorce proceedings with his wife, Helga, in Austria in 2011. The litigation moved to the United States in 2013, where Helga filed a miscellaneous proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 1782, seeking to discover evidence from the Glock Entities, in the United States for use in Gaston and Helga’s Austrian divorce proceedings. After Helga filed the section 1782 application, she filed a separate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, lawsuit, in the United States, against Gaston and the Glock Entities. Helga then returned to the section 1782 court in 2014, to seek authorization to allow her to disclose the documents she obtained in that litigation to her RICO attorney, for potential use in the RICO Action. The magistrate judge subsequently vacated her earlier paperless order but then entered a written order granting Helga permission to use the documents in the RICO Action. The district judge sustained the objections of the Glock Entities and concluded that the magistrate judge’s determination that Helga could use evidence obtained in a section 1782 proceeding for a separate civil lawsuit in the United States was “contrary to law.” In regard to the Protective Order, the district court concluded that although it did not expressly exclude use of the documents in civil lawsuits in the United States, it must be construed to prohibit such use since it was entered into in the context of a section 1782 action. Nevertheless, the district court stated, “This order does not preclude Helga Glock from seeking the documents in the [RICO] Action.” The court concluded that the restrictions on subsequent use of evidence obtained under section 1782 urged here by the Glock Entities are simply not supported by statutory text, legislative history, conventional discovery practice, or policy considerations. The court found that section 1782 does not preclude, as a matter of law, the use of evidence procured pursuant to it in subsequent United States civil litigation. Because the district court’s rulings were erroneous as a matter of law, the court reversed the judgment. View "Glock v. Glock, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks an application for leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence. At issue was whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States established “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” The court denied the application, holding that Johnson did not establish a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. The new rule announced in Johnson neither prohibits Congress from punishing a criminal who has a prior conviction for attempted burglary nor prohibits Congress from increasing that criminal’s sentence because of his prior conviction. View "In re: Gilberto Rivero" on Justia Law