Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jane Doe, an eighth-grade student, filed suit against the Board and officials because she was raped in a bathroom after school officials decided to use her as bait in a sting operation to catch another eighth-grade student in the act of sexual harassment. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board on Doe's Title IX claim where, to prevail on a student-on-student sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must prove the funding recipient had actual knowledge the sexual harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. In this case, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Doe has satisfied all five elements necessary to succeed under Title IX. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board on Doe's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim where the rape-bait scheme was not a known or obvious consequence of the "catch in the act" policy or the Board's allegedly inadequate training policies; reversed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant Blair on Doe's section 1983 equal protection claim where there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Blair violated Doe’s constitutional right to equal protection by acting with deliberate indifference to the rape of Doe; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Dunaway on Doe's section 1983 equal protection claim where Dunaway acquiesced to and ratified the sting operation; affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant Terrell on Doe's section 1983 equal protection claim because Terrell is entitled to qualified immunity; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant Simpson for the alleged section 1983 substantive due process violation where Simpson is entitled to qualified immunity. In regard to the state law claims, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Blair for negligence/wantonness because he is entitled to state-agent immunity; affirmed the denial of summary judgment to Dunaway; and reversed the grant of summary judgment to Simpson for the tort of outrage. View "Hill v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

DFA filed suit against Estee Lauder after Estee Lauder refused to do business with DFA and communicated that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to offer rental space to DFA. DFW alleged three claims in its amended complaint: (1) attempted monopolization, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2; (2) contributory false advertising, in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); and (3) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, in violation of Florida law. The district court dismissed the suit based on failure to state a claim. The court concluded that DFW failed to allege basic facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face where DFW did not adequately allege that Estee Lauder engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct for its antitrust claims; DFA does not come close to establishing standing to seek injunctive relief from the requirements that Estée Lauder places on its competitors, inasmuch as DFA no longer does any business with Estée Lauder; DFA failed to plead sufficient facts from which a court could find that Estée Lauder made false statements, or, for that matter, was responsible for any such statements made by DFA’s competitors in DFA's false advertising claim; and the complaint failed to allege any improper conduct sufficient to constitute tortious interference with a business relationship in violation of Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. The Estee Lauder Co." on Justia Law

DFA filed suit against Estee Lauder after Estee Lauder refused to do business with DFA and communicated that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to offer rental space to DFA. DFW alleged three claims in its amended complaint: (1) attempted monopolization, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2; (2) contributory false advertising, in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); and (3) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, in violation of Florida law. The district court dismissed the suit based on failure to state a claim. The court concluded that DFW failed to allege basic facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face where DFW did not adequately allege that Estee Lauder engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct for its antitrust claims; DFA does not come close to establishing standing to seek injunctive relief from the requirements that Estée Lauder places on its competitors, inasmuch as DFA no longer does any business with Estée Lauder; DFA failed to plead sufficient facts from which a court could find that Estée Lauder made false statements, or, for that matter, was responsible for any such statements made by DFA’s competitors in DFA's false advertising claim; and the complaint failed to allege any improper conduct sufficient to constitute tortious interference with a business relationship in violation of Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. The Estee Lauder Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, male inmates in the custody of the ADOC, filed suit against the ADOC and others challenging the ADOC's hair-length policy on various constitutional grounds and under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Plaintiffs wish to wear their hair unshorn in accordance with the dictates of their Native American religion but the policy prohibits them from doing so. The United States intervened on plaintiffs’ behalf. The ADOC’s witnesses asserted that its policy is necessary to accomplish several compelling goals, including the prevention of contraband, facilitation of inmate identification, maintenance of good hygiene and health, and facilitation of prison discipline through uniformity. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the ADOC, because the ADOC carried its RLUIPA burden to demonstrate that its hair-length policy is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling governmental interests. View "Knight v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, appealed his sentence of 288 months in prison as substantively unreasonable. The court subsequently granted defendant's motion to file a supplemental brief on the constitutionality of the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), residual clause. The court held that where precedent that is binding in this circuit is overturned by an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, the court will permit an appellant to raise in a timely fashion thereafter an issue or theory based on that new decision while his direct appeal is still pending in this court. In this case, the intervening decision is Johnson v. United States, which addresses whether the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband filed suit against NCL after she slipped on the pool deck of NCL's cruise ship and fractured her wrist, alleging negligence and seeking damages. The district court excluded all of the expert testimony and publications submitted by plaintiff with respect to the coefficient of friction (COF), and granted summary judgment in favor of NCL. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of one of the expert's publications relied on for his opinion of the industry COF standard; assuming without deciding that the “substantial similarity” test applied to the COF measurements taken by the expert, the district court erred; the court left it to the district court to consider Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on remand given what the court discussed about the admissibility of portions of the expert's testimony; but the district court correctly ruled that the expert's "false sense of security" theory was unreliable. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's evidentiary rulings, vacated the grant of summary judgment and the award of costs in favor of NCL, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas), LTD" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, defendants challenged their convictions resulting from the first of two trials involving the same indictment and the same Medicare fraud conspiracy charges. Defendant Dr. Ward appeals her conviction resulting from the second trial. The court reversed the conviction of Dr. Abreu because no reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Abreu falsified patient eligibility records as alleged in the indictment. Therefore, the court vacated her sentence entered a judgment of acquittal. The court affirmed the convictions of Defendants Ayala, Morris, and Wilner. View "United States v. Willner, M.D." on Justia Law

Aero filed a class action in Florida state court in 2010 against defendants, alleging that defendants sent unsolicited facsimile advertisements to the putative class in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C). These claims concern conduct that took place in 2006 and are governed by a four-year statute of limitations. The Florida state court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in 2013. Later that year, Ewing filed a similar class complaint in federal court against the same defendants containing similar allegations. Recognizing that more than four years had passed since the alleged conduct, the complaint alleges that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of Aero’s purported class action. The court affirmed, under Griffin v. Singletary, the district court's judgment, concluding that the pendency of Aero's purported class action did not toll the statute of limitations for Ewing's purported class action. View "Ewing Indus. Corp. v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced to death for murdering his wife, appealed the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition. The district court held that the petition was untimely, but that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling in light of his attorney’s egregious misconduct. However, the district court denied relief on the merits. The Attorney General filed a motion to limit briefing to the question of equitable tolling. Petitioner filed a motion to stay the current briefing schedule until the resolution of the AG's motion. The court concluded, sua sponte, that the proper course is to remand this case to the district court to make additional and detailed findings of fact concerning petitioner's claim to equitable tolling, including exactly what may have happened and, most importantly, why counsel did not timely file this section 2254 petition. The court directed the district court to apply these findings of fact to the changing landscape in the law of equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court denied as moot the state's motion to limit briefing before the court to equitable tolling and the petitioner's motion to stay the current briefing schedule. View "Thomas v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Yellow Pages Group (YPG) appealed from a $123,000 judgment against it in favor of Yellow Pages Photos (YPPI) following a jury verdict in a copyright infringement trial. YPPI cross appealed, raising several claims of error. The court concluded that YPG meets the requirement that it possess standing to litigate this controversy, as it has a concrete and actual interest in avoiding a judgment being entered against it on YPPI’s copyright infringement claim, an interest that will be directly affected by the outcome of this appeal; YPG can nonetheless assert its defense even though it was not in privity of contract with YPPI; the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Ziplocal breached its contract with YPPI by transferring YPPI’s photos to YPG; the court found no merit in any of YPG’s contentions that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the End User License Agreement (EULA) was an invalid contract; and there were sufficient facts at trial to support a finding of willful infringement based on YPG’s reckless disregard for the possibility that it might be infringing on YPPI’s copyrights. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of YPG’s renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law. In regards to the cross-appeal, the court concluded that YPPI’s arguments lack merit and thus do not warrant a new trial on damages. View "Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Yellow Pages Group, LLC" on Justia Law