Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegally reentering the United States for a second time. At issue was whether defendant's sentence, which was 60 months above the high end of defendant's revised guidelines range but 33 months below the statutory maximum of 120 months imprisonment, is substantively unreasonable. After considering and giving reasonable weight to each of the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the district court in this case imposed an upward variance sentence. The court concluded that the sentence did not exceed the outer bounds of the wide range of discretion that the district courts are afforded and, given all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the sentence is reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Untied States v. Rosales-Bruno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Hamlin, discriminated against her on the basis of race and disability, and that Hamlin interfered with, or retaliated against her for exercising her right to take medical leave. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a default judgment and sua sponte dismissed with prejudice her second amended complaint. The court concluded that the district court evaluated plaintiff’s race- and disability discrimination claims under the wrong standard, but that even under the right standard, her complaint plainly fails to make out a claim of disability discrimination; and the district court improperly dismissed the interference portion of her Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., claim without giving her notice and an opportunity to respond, though it properly dismissed the retaliation portion of this claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found." on Justia Law

Defendant, who suffers from early-onset dementia, was indicted for 49 counts related to his involvement in engaging in various schemes to fraudulently divert monies from a non-for-profit organization. He subsequently plead guilty to a single count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in not sua sponte conducting a competency hearing because reasonable cause to believe that defendant might be incompetent exists on this record. The court remanded to the district court so that it can determine whether defendant's competency can be evaluated nunc pro tunc, and if so, for an assessment of his competency at the time of his guilty plea and sentencing. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wingo" on Justia Law

This case concerns Lolita, a killer whale held in captivity since 1970, who performs each day at the Seaquarium. ALDF filed suit against the USDA for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Seaquarium houses Lolita in conditions that violate the Animal Welfare Act's (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131-59, standards for granting a license under 7 U.S.C. 2133-34. The district court granted summary judgment to USDA. The court held that USDA’s renewal of Seaquarium’s April 2012 license is a final agency action subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. 706(2). On the merits, the court concluded that USDA’s licensing regulations constitute a reasonable policy choice balancing the conflicting congressional aims of due process and animal welfare, and the AWA licensing scheme is entitled to deference by the court. USDA has the discretionary enforcement authority to revoke a license due to noncompliance. Only Congress possesses the power to limit the agency’s discretion and demand annual, substantive compliance with animal welfare standards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. USDA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Tamborlee for negligence in the Southern District of Florida after she was injured during a shore excursion in Belize. At issue was whether the district court had general personal jurisdiction over Tamborlee, a Panama corporation that provides shore excursions for tourists in Belize. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Tamborlee's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because Tamborlee's activities in Florida are not so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home there. Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that any office Tamborlee might have had in Florida played a significant role in its operations and Tamborlee’s remaining activities in Florida are not meaningfully different from the activities of the defendants in general personal jurisdiction caselaw. View "Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Beltram, her former employer, claiming that it interfered with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2631-2636, by firing her instead of giving her medical leave. The district court dismissed plaintiff's interference claim and declined to consider her two alternative causes of action. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concluded that there are disputes of fact about whether plaintiff suffered from a serious health condition; she gave proper notice to Beltram of her need for FMLA leave; and her doctor’s initial estimate that she would need more than twelve weeks of leave disqualified her from FMLA leave. The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed the first cause of action alleging that Beltram failed to give proper notice to employees about their rights and obligations under the FMLA, but erred in dismissing the second cause of action alleging retaliation against plaintiff for exercising her FMLA rights where plaintiff's allegation that Beltram terminated her for taking leave put Beltram on notice that she was stating a retaliation cause of action. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Dominican Republic and INDRHI for breach of contract and unjust enrichment related to an irrigation project in the Dominican Republic. After the district court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants moved to vacate the default judgment. The district court denied the motion and defendants appealed. While that appeal was pending, the Dominican Republic moved to vacate the default judgment for voidness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). The district court denied the motion on the merits, finding that the Dominican Republic had waived its sovereign immunity. The Dominican Republic appealed. In these consolidated appeals, the court concluded that the district court erred by denying the Dominican Republic’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate for voidness the default judgment entered against the foreign nation because at least one statutory exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611, applies; the district court abused its discretion by denying the Dominican Republic and INDRHI’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate for excusable neglect the default judgment entered against them because the factual findings underlying the district court's decision were unsupported by the record; and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Architectural Ingenieria Siglo XXI v. Dominican Republic" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 federal habeas petition, arguing that he was questioned in violation of his Miranda v. Kentucky rights and his lawyer was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements he made during that interrogation. The court held that the state court’s decision that petitioner had waived his ineffective assistance claim by entering a plea was contrary to clearly established federal law, and the court rejected the district court’s alternative reasons for denying petitioner's claim. Petitioner's allegation, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief. Because neither the state habeas court nor the district court afforded petitioner the opportunity to develop the factual basis for this claim, the record before the court is insufficient to properly resolve the petition. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to reconsider petitioner's claim. View "Arvelo v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

The Parish filed suit against Kiker, alleging that Kiker breached the implied warranty in the parties' contract to repair Parish's roof using reasonable skill. At issue was whether Penn National has a duty to indemnify its insured, Kiker, with respect to a judgment Parish obtained against Kiker for breach of contract. The court concluded that, because the conduct that caused damage to the Parish was accidental, the damage is covered under the policy. The court also held that the contractual liability exclusion is inapplicable in this case and therefore, the district court erred in granting Penn National's summary judgment motion and denying the Parish's motion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Pennsylvania Nat'l Mutual Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. Catherine of Sienna Parish" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit raising a Second Amendment challenge to a regulation, 36 C.F.R. 327.13, banning firearms and ammunition on property managed by the Corps. Plaintiffs would like to carry their handguns with them while they visit and camp at Allatoona Lake and other Corps property. The district court denied plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the regulation does not completely destroy plaintiffs' right to bear arms because its effects is cabined to a limited geographic area designed for recreation. Because plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the court need not consider the remaining factors in the preliminary injunction test. Whatever else the regulation does, it does not destroy plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms altogether. View "GeorgiaCarry.Org v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law