Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joshua Hill appealed his 192-month sentence, imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of minors. On appeal, Hill claimed the district court erred by applying: (1) a two-level enhancement for using a computer to solicit a person to engage in unlawful sexual activity with a minor pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(b)(3)(B); and (2) another two-level enhancement for his supervisory role in the offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on whether a Florida inmate satisfied the requirements set forth in the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Moliere Dimanche, Jr. sued 16 prison officials in federal court, alleging that he was subjected to harsh treatment in retaliation for filing grievances about prison conditions. The district court dismissed the suit because Dimanche did not file an internal grievance raising this complaint at the institutional level but instead submitted it directly to the Secretary. The court also dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). The Eleventh Circuit's review showed that Dimanche did satisfy the exhaustion requirement because he met the conditions for filing a grievance directly with the Secretary. Furthermore, the Court concluded that his complaint stated at least some claims that should not have been dismissed without either explanation or leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Dimanche v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Donald Kipnis, Lawrence Kibler, Barry Mukamal and Kenneth Welt,appealedthe district court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of their complaint against defendants-appellees Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG and HVB U.S. Finance, Inc. (collectively, “HVB”) as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. This appeal arose out of the parties’ participation in an income tax shelter scheme known as a Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (“CARDS”) transaction. In short, Plaintiffs alleged that HVB and its co-conspirators defrauded Plaintiffs by promoting and selling CARDS for their own financial gain. Plaintiffs “paid a heavy price in damages” as a result of HVB’s wrongdoing, including “substantial fees (and interest payments)” they paid HVB and other CARDS Dealers to participate in the CARDS strategy and “hundreds of thousands of dollars in ‘clean-up’ costs” they incurred after HVB failed to advise them to amend their tax returns. Consequently, Plaintiffs sought to recover the “damages that reasonably flow” from HVB’s misconduct. These damages included fees they paid to HVB and other CARDS Dealers, attorney’s fees and accountant’s fees incurred in litigating against the IRS, back taxes and interest paid by Plaintiffs, punitive damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the instant action. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims did not accrue until November 1, 2012, because they did not sustain any damages until the tax court issued its final decision. By December 5, 2001 (plaintiffs’ mandatory repayment date) Plaintiffs had sustained part of the damages they sought to recover, including the fees they paid to HVB.The district court found Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in "Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane," (565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990)), to be misplaced, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint as time-barred. The parties agreed that Florida law controlled the sole issue in this appeal: when did Plaintiffs’ claims against HVB accrue for purposes of the statutes of limitations. It was not clear under Florida law when Plaintiffs first suffered injury, and thus when their claims against HVB accrued for purposes of the applicable statutes of limitations. Because the relevant facts were undisputed, and this appeal depended wholly on interpretations of Florida law regarding the statute of limitations, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court. View "Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-UND Vereinsbank, AG" on Justia Law

Death row inmate-petitioner John Conner appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief. Conner was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1982 beating death of J.T. White. Conner confessed that he struck White with a bottle and then beat him with a stick. Conner had attempted suicide while awaiting trial, and was admitted to the hospital for treatment. Conner was given a full psychological evaluation; the hospital issued a letter to the trial judge stating that Conner was competent to stand trial and could be criminally responsible for his actions. In Conner’s first appeal, he was granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on three claims: “(1) whether he procedurally defaulted his [intellectual disability] claim; (2) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial; and (3) whether he was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.” Because the Eleventh Circuit held that Conner did not procedurally default his intellectual-disability claim and that the District Court erred by denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual-disability claim, the case was remanded the case for the District Court to determine in the first instance whether discovery and an evidentiary hearing were appropriate. On remand, the District Court granted Conner’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual-disability claim. After hearing testimony from seven experts who had evaluated Conner for intellectual disability, the District Court denied Conner’s intellectual-disability claim on the merits. Separately, the District Court once again denied Conner’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and prosecutorial-misconduct claims, but granted a COA as to “whether [the District] Court erred in concluding that [Conner’s] trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance during the mitigation phase of the trial.” The Eleventh Circuit granted Conner’s request to expand the COA to include two more claims: “[w]hether the District Court erred in denying Mr. Conner’s claim that he has [intellectual disability] and is not eligible for the death penalty”; and “[w]hether the District Court erred in determining that the state court’s decision (that the prosecutor’s closing arguments were not so egregious as to require reversal) was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.” After careful review of the record, and with the benefit of briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. View "Conner v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

Pro se inmate-appellant William Mobley appealed the grant of summary judgment, effectively dismissing his claim of excessive force during an arrest. Mobley was parked in a handicapped parking spot, slouched down in the seat "preparing to smoke crack cocaine." A deputy sheriff of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office was on bicycle patrol when he approached Mobley's car. Mobley did not see the deputy approach the truck, and was unable to see anything that identified the deputy as law enforcement from his slouched position. Fearing he'd be robbed, he dropped the pipe, and keyed his truck's ignition. The deputy reached through the window, grabbed Mobley's shoulder and tried to open the door. While he was still being held by the deputy, Mobley backed quickly out of the parking space, struck the deputy and dragged him approximately 20 feet before the deputy fell clear of the truck. Officers would later catch Mobley after he drove his truck into a small retention pond. When officers subdued him, they struck and kicked Mobley, breaking his nose, teeth and a plastic dental plate. Officers also tased Mobley repeatedly while he was on the ground. Mobley alleged eight officers were involved directly or indirectly in his arrest. Mobley was taken to the hospital, where doctors found that he had a broken nose, cuts and bruises along his arms and hands, and broken front teeth. He later was diagnosed with “Post Traumatic Syndrome” and began suffering seizures. In a state criminal trial arising out of his flight, he was convicted of assaulting the first deputy with a deadly weapon and fleeing to elude arrest and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. After review of the trial court record, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error as tot the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the officers. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Mobley v. Bronson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant J. Brian O'Neill purchased the Bryemere, a sport-fishing vessel, in 2006. As he negotiated the Bryemere’s price, O’Neill incorporated a limited-liability company in the state of Rhode Island, Carolina Acquisition, LLC to take ownership of the vessel. O’Neill then applied for a preferred ship mortgage with Bank of America, N.A. (BOA) to fund the Bryemere’s cost. O’Neill signed the mortgage in his capacity as managing member of Carolina, using the ship as collateral. As a condition of the loan, BOA required proof of insurance for the Bryemere, and requested that the insurance policy contain a mortgage clause that would protect BOA’s interests as a mortgagee in the event the underlying insurance policy was found void. O’Neill’s insurance broker, Willis of Pennsylvania, Inc., sought an insurance quote for the Bryemere from AIG Centennial Insurance Company. Susan Bonner, an underwriter, handled the application process on behalf of AIG. Sharon King, a broker, was assigned to O’Neill’s case on behalf of Willis. Instead of working directly with King, O’Neill delegated the task of obtaining insurance for the Bryemere to his executive secretary, Desiree Foulds. Instead of explaining the insurance-application process to Foulds, King forwarded the application to Foulds without comment and returned the application Foulds had completed to Bonner without reviewing it for accuracy or completeness. Foulds made three mistakes on the application that were relevant to this appeal: (1) she listed O’Neill as the owner of the vessel instead of Carolina; (2) in response to a question about whether the owner or captain had ever suffered any “losses,” she disclosed one prior loss in 2003, when O’Neill lost a boat due to fire, when in fact (by his own admission at trial) O’Neill had suffered two additional losses that went undisclosed: propeller damage to his Ocean yacht and a blown engine on his sailing vessel; and (3) Foulds listed the Bryemere’s purchase price as $2.35 million, when the closing statement reflected a purchase price of $2.125 million. AIG issued the final policy. Following the Bryemere’s purchase, O’Neill invested $225,000 to pay for repairs recommended for the ship. During the voyage from Florida to Rhode Island, the crew “noticed considerable flexing in the vessel’s hull.” Upon arrival in Rhode Island, several marine experts inspected the Bryemere and concluded that it suffered from a number of structural defects rendering the vessel, in the words of one marine surveyor, “un-seaworthy, dangerous and unsafe for any use.” O’Neill then submitted a claim to AIG for coverage under his insurance policy. In response, AIG filed a declaratory judgment action with the federal district court in Florida seeking affirmation that the insurance policy was void ab initio as to both O’Neill and BOA. After an eight-day bench trial, the District Court issued an order finding that neither O’Neill nor BOA could recover under the policy. As to O’Neill, the District Court held that the misrepresentations regarding O’Neill’s prior loss history and the Bryemere’s purchase price rendered the policy void ab initio under the maritime doctrine of uberrimae fidei. As to BOA, the District Court held, among other things, that the named insured on the policy, O’Neill, was not the mortgagor on the loan and that BOA had no rights under the standard mortgage clause as a result. O’Neill and BOA appealed. But finding no reversible error, however, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. View "AIG Centennial Insurance Co. v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Michael Albury, Jr. appealed after a jury convicted him of various narcotics offenses, including possession with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and N-Benzylpiperazine (“BZP” -- a schedule I controlled substance), along with various firearm offenses. Albury raised three claims on appeal: (1) that law enforcement officers unlawfully gathered and used evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when applying for a search warrant, rendering the warrant invalid; (2) that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because insufficient evidence supported his convictions and the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts; and (3) that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on insufficient evidence, inconsistent verdicts, and an improper flight instruction. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Albury" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against defendants Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., MJMM Investments, LLC, Marc Jablon, and Mark Kaley (collectively, defendants) for violations of the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC's allegations stemmed from the defendants' relationship with CyberKey Solutions, Inc. and its CEO James Plant. CyberKey sold customizable USB drives that could be loaded with encryption software to secure content stored on the drives. CyberKey's stock traded on a website called "Pink Sheets." Kaley executed a consulting agreement with CyberKey on behalf of MJMM, in which MJMM agreed to provide services intended to promote CyberKey's business. At first, there was no demand for CyberKey stock, but that changed when Plant began reporting fabricated contracts. A fake contract purportedly with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) "was a game changer." CyberKey publicized the DHS contract in several press released; MSI drafted the press release and Big Apple was listed as the primary contact. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD - now known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)), sent a fax to Plant informing him that it was reviewing CyberKey's trading activity. NASD requested that CyberKey provide it with the "documents and information" concerning: (1) the DHS contract; (2) an explanation of how the DHS contract was negotiated; (3) a list of CyberKey's contacts at DHS; and (4) details of CyberKey's relationship with Big Apple. Plant e-mailed the fax to Jablon and Kaley, and they advised Plant to have his securities attorney handle the matter. Jablon and Kaley did not follow up on the status of the inquiry. In early 2007, the SEC issued an order suspending the trading of CyberKey stock due to concerns as to the accuracy of assertions made by CyberKey and others in press releases and public statements to investors. Over the course of the defendants' relationship with CyberKey, Big Apple and MJMM sold more than a combined 720 million CyberKey shares for approximately $7.8 million. During the time that CyberKey was a client, it was one of the top five most actively traded stocks on Pink Sheets. The SEC filed its complaint in federal court and alleged that the defendants "knew, or were severely reckless in not knowing, that CyberKey did not have a $25 million purchase order from the DHS or any other [f]ederal government agency, and thus had very little legitimate revenue at all." Nonetheless, the defendants "persisted in promoting CyberKey and selling hundreds of millions of unregistered CyberKey shares to unsuspecting investors." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC as to some of the claims, and the remainder of the claims proceeded to trial. A jury found in favor of the SEC as to the remaining claims against all defendants. Defendants raised six errors on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. But finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision and the jury's verdict. View "U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, a Florida District Court of Appeal approved certification of a class-action lawsuit originating in the Circuit Court of Dade County that encompassed an estimated 700,000 Floridians who brought state-law damages claims against the major American tobacco companies for medical conditions, including cancer, "caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine." The Florida Supreme Court then decertified the class but held that the jury findings would nonetheless have "res judicata effect" in cases thereafter brought against one or more of the tobacco companies by a former class member. Here, a member of that now-decertified class, successfully advanced strict-liability and negligence claims that trace their roots to the pre-decertified class' jury findings. Over the defendants' objection, the District Court instructed the jury that "you must apply certain findings made by the [class action] court and they must carry the same weight they would have if you had listened to all the evidence and made those findings yourselves." When the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on both claims, the defendants renewed their motion for a judgment as a matter of law, contending, among other things, that federal law preempted the jury’s imposition of tort liability as based on the class-action jury findings. The District Court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed: "the State of Florida may ordinarily enforce duties on cigarette manufacturers in a bid to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. But it may not enforce a duty, as it has through the [class-action] jury findings, premised on the theory that all cigarettes are inherently defective and that every cigarette sale is an inherently negligent act. So our holding is narrow indeed: it is only these specific, sweeping bases for state tort liability that we conclude frustrate the full purposes and objectives of Congress. As a result, [plaintiff's class-action]-progeny strict-liability and negligence claims are preempted, and we must reverse the District Court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law." View "Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

The issues this appeal presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review stemmed from defendant-appellant Mark Alexander’s conviction for conspiring to sell cutting machines to companies in Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the federal conspiracy statute. Alexander was the chief executive officer and part-owner of Hyrdajet Technology, LLC, a company based in Dalton, Georgia, that manufactured waterjet cutting systems. In 2007, Hydrajet Technology shipped two waterjet cutting machines to Hydrajet Mena in Dubai, where the machines then were shipped companies in Tehran. The jury convicted Alexander on the sole count of the indictment. The district court sentenced Alexander to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, followed by a period of supervised release of three years. Alexander argued on appeal: (1) that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to permit a deposition of one of Alexander’s codefendants, a fugitive residing in Iran; (2) that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Alexander’s motion for a mistrial after a juror stated that her car had been impeded temporarily by unknown persons in the parking lot adjacent to the courthouse; and (3) that the district court erred when it addressed the jury on legal issues that arose during the trial. The Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law