Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

George Russell Curtis, Betty Curtis, and the George Russell Curtis, Sr., Living Trust, who are the defendants in this adversarial proceeding, appeal the bankruptcy court’s judgment, which allowed the bankruptcy trustee to avoid a $200,000 transfer from the debtor, International Management Associates (IMA), to the defendants. Kirk Wright ran IMA and its affiliates, which he claimed was a hedge fund but which looked like a Ponzi scheme. The defendants invested $500,000 with IMA from 2002 to 2006. Over that same period, they received $621,000 in disbursements from IMA. The last of those disbursements took place on January 10, 2006, when IMA transferred $200,000 to the defendants. On March 16, 2006, the bankruptcy trustee, whom a Georgia state court had appointed as IMA’s receiver,1 filed a voluntary petition to place IMA in bankruptcy. As part of that bankruptcy action, the trustee filed a series of adversary proceedings against IMA’s investors, including the defendants. In those proceedings, he sought to avoid transfers that IMA had made to those investors shortly before being placed in bankruptcy. Based on the evidence presented at that consolidated hearing, the bankruptcy court found that IMA was a Ponzi scheme. Finding no reversible error, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. View "George Russell Curtis, Sr. Living Trust v. Perkins" on Justia Law

David Edmond was indicted for conspiracy to commit access-device fraud and aggravated identity theft based upon his use of social security numbers to make fraudulent bank transfers. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to possession of fifteen or more unauthorized access devices (an unindicted offense) and one count of aggravated identity theft. On the basis of this plea, the District Court sentenced Edmond to prison for a total of forty-eight months. Edmond appealed his sentence, arguing: (1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction because Count One of the indictment failed to state an offense; (2) the District Court erroneously calculated his number of victims resulting in an unduly large sentence. The Eleventh Circuit reached neither argument. Instead, the Court noticed plain error and reversed his conviction for possession of fifteen or more access devices. And, because this reversal eliminated the factual support for an element of his aggravated identity-theft conviction, the Court also reversed that conviction for lack of sufficient evidence. View "United States v. Edmond" on Justia Law

In 2006, Detective Carl Rousseau of the Miami-Dade County Police Department stopped a vehicle driven by Ricardo Garcia. During the traffic stop, Detective Rousseau shot Garcia’s passenger, Roberto Valderrama, in the genitals. After he was shot, Valderrama was arrested for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, although the charges ultimately were dropped. This appeal stemmed from a civil lawsuit Valderrama filed against Detective Rousseau and two other officers involved in his arrest, Sergeants Yasmina Smith and Braulio Gonzalez. Valderrama brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the officers for excessive use of force, false arrest, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, as well as other claims under state law. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and state law sovereign immunity. The district court granted in part and denied in part their motions, and the officers appealed. With regard to Sergeant Gonzalez, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the 1983 claims and the state law claim for false arrest. As to Sergeant Smith and Detective Rousseau, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the 1983 claim for violations of Valderrama’s Fourth Amendment rights and the state law claim for false arrest; however, the Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the 1983 claim for violation of Valderrama’s Fourteenth Amendment rights based on deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. Finally, the Court dismissed the portion of the appeal related to Valderrama’s state law conspiracy and concert of action claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Valderrama v. Rousseau" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Joseph Clarke and Bobby Jenkins appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, specifically, the Hobbs Act robbery. Both defendants raised a number of challenges on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit addressed all but one in a separate opinion. Here, the Court addressed only whether Jenkins’s prior guilty plea to possession of cocaine in Florida, where adjudication was withheld, qualified as a “conviction” under Florida law. Because this question raised an important issue of state law, for which there is no on-point ruling from the Florida Supreme Court, the Court certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court before deciding this case. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In October 2012, John Lary filed a pro se complaint against Hong and Trinity in which he alleged that they sent him a fax in violation of two provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The questions raised by this appeal before the Eleventh Circuit came from a default judgment in favor of Lary that Joseph Hong and Trinity Physician Financial & Insurance Services used an automatic telephone dialing system to send an unsolicited advertisement to Lary’s emergency telephone line in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227: (1) whether a single fax can serve as the basis for two separate violations of the Act; (2) whether the district court erred when it decided that Lary’s complaint was ineligible for treble damages; and (3) whether the district court erred when it denied Lary a permanent injunction, denied his discovery motions, and failed to award Lary costs. Although the district court erred when it limited each fax to a single violation of the Act, the error was harmless. And on every other issue, the district court committed no error. View "Lary v. Trinity Physician Financial & Insurance Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Elliot Rivera appealed his convictions for murder for hire and conspiracy to commit murder for hire. At trial, evidence was presented showing that Defendant attempted to hire a hit man to murder a person on whom Defendant held a large life insurance policy. Seeking to reverse his conviction, Defendant argued: (1) the district court erred in admitting tape-recorded conversations between himself and the wife of the coconspirator in this plot; (2) the district court erred in allowing the wife to testify about her understanding of the meaning of certain parts of the taped conversations between herself and Defendant; and (3) that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor asked Defendant on cross-examination whether other witnesses had lied and when at closing the prosecutor suggested to the jury that Defendant had lied during his testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

SE Property Holdings, LLC, and affiliated entity Vision-Park Properties, LLC, (collectively “Vision”) appealed a district court’s order upholding decisions in the bankruptcy restructuring proceedings of Seaside Engineering and Surveying, LLC. Seaside was a civil engineering and surveying firm whose principal shareholders prior to all bankruptcy litigation were John Gustin, James Mainor, Ross Binkley, James Barton, and Timothy Spears. The principals branched out from their work as engineers and entered the real estate development business, forming Inlet Heights, LLC, and Costa Carina, LLC. These wholly separate entities borrowed money from Vision with personal guaranties from the principals. Inlet Heights and Costa Carina defaulted on the loans, and Vision filed suit to recover amounts under the guaranties. Gustin filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection for himself. Mainor and Binkley followed suit. All were appointed Chapter 7 trustees. Gustin, Mainor, and Binkley listed their Seaside stock as non-exempt personal property in their required filings. The Chapter 7 trustee in the Gustin case conducted an action to sell Gustin’s shares of Seaside stock. Gustin bid $95,500.00, and Vision defeated the bid with a purchase price of $100,000.00. Seaside attempted to block sale of Gustin’s stock to Vision, but the bankruptcy court confirmed the sale. Following the sale of Gustin’s stock, Seaside filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Seaside proposed to reorganize and continue operations as the entity Gulf Atlantic, LLC (“Gulf”), an entity managed by Gustin, Mainor, Binkley, and Bowden, and owned by four members, the respective irrevocable family trust of each manager. The outside equity holders would receive promissory notes with interest accruing at a rate of 4.25% in exchange for their interest in Seaside and thus be excluded from ownership in Gulf. The bankruptcy court approved the Second Amended Plan of Reorganization over Vision's objection. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court. After careful review of the record, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2011, officers were searching for defendant Shedrick Hollis based on an outstanding Georgia arrest warrant for a parole violation. Law enforcement learned that Hollis could be found in an apartment the officers suspected to be a drug house. After surrounding the apartment, the officers saw Hollis through a window, broke through the door, and arrested him, and other officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment. During that sweep, the officers discovered marijuana and firearms in plain view. After he was indicted on charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, Hollis moved to suppress the drugs and firearms found in the apartment. The district court denied his motion. Hollis was convicted on all counts. The issue this appeal presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on whether the subject of an arrest warrant could challenge the use of evidence found in plain view during a protective sweep in a third party’s residence. Because the evidence was discovered in plain view during a protective sweep incident to a valid arrest, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Hollis' suppression motion. View "United States v. Hollis" on Justia Law

In a consolidated qui tam action, three relators brought claims under the False Claims Act against an educational institution for falsely certifying to the government that it was in compliance with various federal statutes and regulations to receive Title IV financial-aid funds. The district court ruled against the relators. After final judgment was entered, two of the relators appealed. Relator Carlos Urquilla-Diaz appealed from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his claims under the False Claims Act against Defendants Kaplan University, Kaplan Higher Education Corp., and Kaplan, Inc. (Kaplan). Relator Jude Gillespie appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Kaplan on his claims under the False Claims Act as well as several other orders. Diaz worked for Kaplan University from August 2004 through April 2005 as a professor of paralegal studies. In April 2007, he filed his qui tam action against Kaplan, alleging that Kaplan had violated several provisions of the Higher Education Act and its implementing regulations. These violations in turn rendered Kaplan ineligible to receive Title IV funds. And because these violations were committed with the requisite scienter, Kaplan was liable under the False Claims Act. Gillespie, began working for Kaplan University in 2004 as an associate professor of paralegal studies. He was promoted to department chair. Two months later, he informed Kaplan that he had a medical disorder and requested several accommodations. His requests were granted. Even so, in April 2005, Gillespie complained an associate general counsel for Kaplan, Inc., that Kaplan’s grievance policies violated section 504 the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations. At that time, he indicated that he planned to file an administrative complaint with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (the OCR). The following day, Kaplan fired him for job abandonment because he had refused to perform his job duties. After investigating Gillespie’s allegations against Kaplan, the OCR rejected his individual claims. The agency found that Kaplan did not discriminate or retaliate against him, but did take issue with some of Kaplan's policies and procedures regarding disabled employees in the Kaplan Higher Education Corporation Employee Handbook, Kaplan Field Employee Handbook, and Kaplan University Faculty Handbook. Kaplan voluntarily entered into a resolution agreement with the OCR to change its policies. In doing so, Kaplan did not admit to any violation of or noncompliance with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or its implementing regulations. In April 2007, Gillespie filed his qui tam action against Kaplan, alleging that Kaplan violated the False Claims Act by making false statements in its 2004 and 2007 program participation agreements when it certified that it would “comply with . . . Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the implementing regulations 34 C.F.R. Part 104 (barring discrimination on the basis of physical handicap).” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Diaz’s claims against Kaplan that were based on its alleged violations of the Department of Education’s satisfactory-progress regulation and the accreditation requirement. But the Court modified the judgment of dismissal to be without prejudice with respect to the government. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Diaz’s claims against Kaplan to the extent that they were based on its alleged violation of the incentive-compensation ban, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Kaplan on all of Gillespie’s claims. View "Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan University" on Justia Law

A jury convicted the defendant Jerry Thomas Davis of possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun, and he appealed. This case presented three issues for the Eleventh Circuit's review: (1) does Federal Rule of Evidence 610, which excludes evidence of a witness’s “religious beliefs or opinions . . . to attack or support the witness’s credibility,” bar evidence that a witness’s job is city and police-department chaplain, even when neither side argues that this affected credibility?; (2) must a court give a special jury instruction on the credibility of a law enforcement officer and the defendant’s right to attack an officer’s credibility?; and (3) may a court that has already given one modified Allen charge tell a deadlocked jury to keep deliberating (with a reasonable suggestion for how to do it) while also telling the jurors they will be released if they are unable to agree within a short additional period of deliberations? Finding no abuse of discretion in any of the issues raised on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law