Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Florida jury convicted Antonio Melton of armed robbery and first-degree felony murder for shooting George Carter during a robbery of Carter’s pawn shop. He was sentenced to death. Melton sought postconviction relief from the Supreme Court of Florida, which denied relief. Melton then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that under "Roper v. Simmons," (543 U.S. 551 (2005)), the state courts violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when they relied on a juvenile conviction as an aggravating factor in a capital case and when they failed to consider his "mental and emotional age." The district court denied the petition and refused to grant a certificate of appealability. Melton moved the Eleventh Circuit to grant him a certificate of appealability, and that request was denied. Melton moved for reconsideration to include as new issues his arguments based on Roper. Because neither issue was debatable, the Eleventh Circuit denied Melton’s motion. View "Melton v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patricia Clements refinanced a mortgage with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which hired LSI Title Agency, Inc. to provide mortgage refinancing services for the transaction. Because Georgia law required all closing services to be performed by a licensed attorney, LSI contracted with the Law Offices of William E. Fair, LLC to provide a closing attorney, and the Law Offices arranged for Sean Rogers to serve in that capacity. After the refinancing, Clements filed a putative class action in a state court against LSI, the Law Offices, Fair, and other unnamed defendants. Clements alleged that LSI routinely had non-attorneys prepare all of the documents for the closing and that the Law Offices and Fair arranged for a licensed attorney, Rogers, to witness the signing of the documents, in violation of Georgia law. This appeal presented three questions to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for review: (1) whether an allegation that a lender charged a borrower for unearned fees conferred standing on the borrower; (2) whether a mortgage service provider performs only nominal services when it procures a closing attorney; and (3) whether a mortgage service provider "give[s or] . . . accept[s] any portion, split, or percentage of any [settlement] charge" when it marks up the price of a third-party service. Clements alleged two violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and three violations of Georgia law. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of standing. Although the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Clements had standing to sue, the Court affirmed in part the dismissal of her federal claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and vacated in part and remanded for the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claims under Georgia law. View "Clements v. LSI Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Kelly Gissendaner was convicted for murdering her husband, for which she was sentenced to death by lethal injection. She filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit alleging Georgia's method of execution violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. After a hearing, the district court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order, and dismissed her complaint for failing to state a claim for relief. She appealed that judgment. After review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the district court did not err in arriving at its decision, and affirmed. View "Gissendaner v. Commissioner, Georgia Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Rodolfo Hernandez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at least 1,000 kilograms of a substance containing marijuana, and three counts of possession with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of a substance containing marijuana. After Hernandez entered his plea, but before his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided "Padilla v. Kentucky," holding that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Hernandez later moved to vacate his sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded counsel did not render ineffective assistance and denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review was whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused that evidentiary hearing. Concluding that it did, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to conduct the evidentiary hearing. View "Hernandez v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner Putu Indrawati appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that she was barred from adjustment status because she knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. Petitioner was attacked in her native Indonesia while visiting family on break from college in the US. The incident convinced petitioner to apply for asylum in the US. Her closest friend was successful in gaining asylum in the US, and petitioner relied on her friend's advice to petition for asylum too. Though she should read and write in English, petitioner relied on third parties to complete her application. Petitioner signed blank forms and gave them to the third parties to present her application on her behalf. On appeal, petitioner argued: (1) the IJ denied her a sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of her claim; (2) the IJ's reliance on three documents prepared for her violated her right to due process; and (3) the BIA's decision reflected a lack of reasoned consideration. Upon review of the BIA's decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded it was without jurisdiction to consider the first two arguments petitioner made on appeal. As to the third, the Court concluded petitioner's claim was without merit. View "Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it. View "United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

DVI Receivables XIV, LLC; DVI Receivables XVI, LLC; DVI Receivables XVII, LLC; DVI Receivables XVIII, LLC; DVI Receivables XIX, LLC; DVI Funding, LLC (collectively, the "DVI Entities"); Lyon Financial Services, Inc. d/b/a U.S. Bank Portfolio Services ("Lyon"); and U.S. Bank, N.A. ("USB") (collectively, "Appellants") appealed a district court decision to affirm a bankruptcy court's final order awarding appellee Maury Rosenberg attorney's fees and costs. The DVI Entities filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against appellee Rosenberg. After the bankruptcy court dismissed the petition, the court awarded attorney's fees and costs to appellee Rosenberg. The bankruptcy court granted Rosenberg's motion and dismissed the involuntary petition with prejudice. The bankruptcy court found, inter alia, that the DVI Entities were not eligible creditors of Rosenberg because his 2005 guaranty did not run to the DVI Entities. The DVI Entities therefore lacked standing as a matter of law to file an involuntary petition against Rosenberg. In his adversary complaint, Rosenberg asserted federal claims to recover attorney's fees, costs, and damages he incurred because of the filing of the involuntary petition, which the bankruptcy court had dismissed. After careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and following oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's award of the following three categories of attorney's fees and costs: (1) fees to obtain the dismissal, (2) appellate fees, and (3) fees on fees. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's award of the fourth category of fees and costs, those incurred to prosecute Rosenberg's bad-faith claims for damages, as prematurely entered. The case was remanded back to the district court: (1) to deduct from the total award the limited amount of fees and costs that were incurred solely for the legal work done to prosecute Rosenberg's bad-faith claims for damages; and (2) to reconsider that deducted fee and cost amount along with the motion to supplement. View "DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, et al. v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

Florida inmate Paul Everett petitioned for habeas relief after he was convicted of first-degree murder, for which he received the death penalty. The district court denied his petition, but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to one issue: whether a law enforcement officer's request for a consent to search from, or service of an arrest warrant on, a defendant in custody who invoked his right to counsel violated the Fifth Amendment. Upon Everett's motion, the Eleventh Circuit expanded the COA to include an additional issue: whether the district court erred in denying Everett's claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his 2002 trial. Having considered the state court record, the district court's thorough order, and the parties' submissions, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error in the district court's denial of Everett's petition for habeas relief, and affirmed. View "Everett v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court. Two cases before the Eleventh Circuit involved three Stranger-Originated Life Insurance (STOLI policies). Wells Fargo, N.A., the present owner of a STOLI policy on the life of Arlene Berger, appealed a district court's final judgment, entered in favor of Pruco Life Insurance Company, invalidating this policy. Regarding the second appeal, Pruco appealed a different district court's order dismissing its claim seeking the invalidation of two STOLI policies issued on the life of Rosalind Guild. The insurance company contended that, as with most STOLI policies, there was no such interest when these policies were issued, which the company says entitled it to have the policies declared void. Undermining the insurance company's argument, however, was another Florida statute requiring all insurance policies to include a clause providing that the policy is incontestable after it has been "in force" for two years. The policies at issue here contained such a clause, and the insurance company clearly failed to contest the policies within that two-year window. Thus, the question before the Eleventh Circuit was which statute controlled. Federal district courts have disagreed when asked how to interpret Florida law in this regard. View "Pruco Life Insurance Company v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on an insurance-coverage dispute that began in 2011 between Severin and Stephanie Hegel and The First Liberty Insurance Corporation. The Hegels claimed that First Liberty improperly denied their claim for a "sinkhole loss," defined under their homeowner's insurance policy as "structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity." First Liberty argued that the damage to the Hegels' residence did not qualify as "structural damage," a term that was not defined in either the policy or the version of the Florida sinkhole-insurance statute applicable to their claim. The the district court granted summary judgment for the Hegels, finding that "structural damage" meant any "damage to the structure" and awarded them $166,518.17 in damages. First Liberty appealed. After review, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded: the district court erred in equating the contractual term "structural damage" with any "damage to the structure." The case was remanded for further proceedings on whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding how much, if any, structural damage to the Hegels' house (as properly defined) was due to sinkhole activity. The district court's determination on this issue will in turn lead to either a new grant of summary judgment for the appropriate party or to a trial on the merits. View "Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp." on Justia Law