Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's revocation of his supervised release and sentence of 46 months imprisonment. The district court found that defendant committed a new felony controlled substance offense, had possessed a controlled substance, and had used a controlled substance. The court concluded that the admission of lab results without providing defendant an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the lab technician was not plain error because neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment applies in supervised release revocation hearings. Further, the district court's finding that the substances that the police seized on defendant's property were controlled substances was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Reese" on Justia Law

The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus to petitioner, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for the fatal shooting of a police officer, based on the ground that his right to represent himself was violated. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court, consistent with Faretta v. California, determined that, because of petitioner's serious mental disabilities, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. The court also concluded that the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply harmless error analysis to the admission of both an inaudible videotape and a mental health expert's opinion about whether a firearm had been hidden. The interrogating officer testified to the contents of the videotape and an investigating officer made similar comments about the gun's location. While the court concluded that exhaustion does not bar petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel's failure to object to improper statements, the court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's determinations that counsel performed adequately and that petitioner suffered no prejudice were reasonable. Finally, in regard to petitioner's claim that his custodial confession should have been suppressed, the court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Edwards v. Arizona. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to reinstate the conviction and sentence. View "Holland, Jr. v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Lilly, alleging that Lilly did not make certain incentive payments due to plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals who had been employed at the company. Lilly removed to district court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), but the district court remanded to state court. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Lilly had not met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000, as required by federal subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. Lilly failed to provide estimates of incentive payments that correspond to the categories of incentive payments identified in the complaint; failed to recognize and build into the calculus that not all of the Fixed Duration Employees were alleged to have been denied all of the incentive payments; and failed to provide any meaningful guidepost for the payment estimates it had provided. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dudley v. Eli Lilly and Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, fifty-four fire suppression lieutenants employed by the City, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a), contending that they are entitled to overtime compensation. The jury rejected plaintiffs' claims. The court found that, in light of the evidence presented during trial, the issues that the jury determined were properly before it and that the jury's conclusions on those issues were reasonable. The court also found that the district court sufficiently instructed the jury before the jury reached its verdict denying plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watkins v. Montgomery, AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, sought review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the BIA's explanation of why it reached the determination that petitioner had not endured past persecution reflects only that it considered his physical harm, not all forms of religious abuse that petitioner suffered. Therefore, the court cannot tell whether the BIA actually took into account the non-physical abuse to petitioner when it rejected his claim of past persecution. Consequently, the court remanded to the BIA to clarify its decision. View "Min Yong Huang v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The underlying case stemmed from a tragic accident that occurred on an oceangoing passenger vessel that resulted in the death of the captain. Under these circumstances, a marine engineering firm purchased an architect’s and engineer’s professional liability insurance policy, which insured the firm against any liability it might incur in a tort action for the negligent preparation of working drawings used to build the vessel. At issue was whether, under the terms of the architect's and engineer's professional liability (A&E) policy, Evanston was obligated to provide AMI a defense in the underlying lawsuit. Also at issue was whether the A&E policy obligated Evanston to pay American Home, as AMI's subrogee, the price of its settlement in the underlying lawsuit. The court found no basis for the district court's third-party beneficiary finding and set aside the district court's determination that Evanston was obligated to provide AMI a defense. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that Evanston was liable for the $325,000 sum American Home paid in the underlying lawsuit to settle the claims where American Home failed to establish, as established by Endorsement No. 11, that AMI's liability for the captain's death was the result of an act, error, or omission of GPA arising out of the professional services it had performed. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Atlantic Marine Florida, LLC v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to federal felony offenses and received enhanced sentences when the district courts ruled that their prior convictions were, respectively, serious drug offenses and controlled substance offenses. At issue in consolidated appeals is whether the definitions of "serious drug offense" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(A), and "controlled substance offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b), include crimes that do not require an element of mens rea regarding the illicit nature of the controlled substance. The court affirmed both convictions, concluding that drug crimes without an element of mens rea can be serious drug offenses where neither definition at issue requires that a predicate state offense include an element of mens rea with respect to the illicit nature of the controlled substance. Accordingly, the district courts correctly sentenced Defendant Smith as an armed career criminal and Defendant Nunez as a career offender. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife, natives and citizens of India, appealed from the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of their complaint challenging USCIS's revocation of I-140 visa petitions filed on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff and his wife challenged the district court's conclusion that, because plaintiff was a beneficiary, instead of the petitioner, of an I-140 visa petition, he and his wife lacked standing to bring their claims. In this case, the district court concluded that 8 C.F.R. 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) precluded constitutional standing because it specifically excludes immigrant beneficiaries such as plaintiff in its definition of parties with standing to challenge I-140 visa petition revocations. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of constitutional standing where the regulatory definition of "affected party" does not preclude the beneficiary from having standing in the district court, as it relates to who has the ability to challenge the administrative denial of a petition. Therefore, it is not a binding statement of constitutional standing. The court also concluded that a beneficiary of an I-140 visa petition who has applied for adjustment of status has attempted to port under 8 U.S.C. 1154(j) falls within the class of plaintiffs Congress has authorized to challenge the denial of that I-140 petition. Consequently, plaintiff falls within the zone of interests and may challenge the I-140 visa petition revocation. Further, applying the analysis in Bonillo v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the court concluded that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised in the complaint. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Kurapati v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Venezuela and citizen of Cuba, appealed the dismissal of his complaint challenging the USCIS's determination that he was statutorily ineligible to adjust status under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161. The court concluded that any arguments plaintiff may have had regarding the district judge's dismissal of his request for mandamus relief for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and any claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. 2201, has been abandoned by plaintiff's failure to raise them on appeal. Because the BIA lacked authority to review the USCIS CAA-eligibility determination, plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing his proceedings before the IJ. Therefore, the district judge erred when he determined that plaintiff's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies deprived him of jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint. The court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Perez v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Redus filed a foreclosure complaint against the Zagames and the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in a joint stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure. At issue on appeal was what a Marshal collects when he auctions a public judicial sale pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1921(c)(1). The district court calculated the Marshal's commission based only on the amount of the judgment lien because the judgment creditor failed to establish the property's appraisal value. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings because the court found that the plain meaning of "collected" in section 1921(c)(1) refers to the amount of the accepted winning bid. The court noted that this decision does not abolish the Marshal's commission. View "Redus Florida Commercial v. College Station Retail Center" on Justia Law