Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo closed her bank accounts and refused to return the money in her accounts. The court concluded that plaintiff defaulted on Wells Fargo’s counterclaim when she failed to file a timely answer. So her request for leave to file an out-of-time answer to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim should have been analyzed as a motion to set aside an entry of default under the more forgiving Rule 55(c) standard as opposed to the more exacting Rule 6(b)(1)(B) standard. Because plaintiff’s failure to respond to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim meant that the pleadings had not yet closed, the district court’s evaluation of Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order granting Wells Fargo's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's motion under Rule 55(c). Even if Wells Fargo's motion could have been properly considered as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it should have been denied. Because the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court, the contents of the Agreement must be evaluated in determining whether Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court also reversed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint and remanded for further proceedings because the district court was required to review the actual contract at issue in evaluating whether amendment of the complaint would necessarily be futile. Because the court reversed the order granting judgment on the pleadings for Wells Fargo, on which the award of attorney's fees was based, the court remanded the attorney's fee issue. View "Perez v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a law student, filed a breach of contract suit against a lawyer who extended a "million-dollar challenge" on national television while representing a client accused of murder. The lawyer denied payment, claiming that he did not make a serious offer. The court concluded that the district court properly applied Florida law to plaintiff's claim. The court did not find that the lawyer's statements were such that a reasonable, objective person would have understood them to be an invitation to contract, regardless of whether the court looks to the unedited interview or the edited television broadcast seen by plaintiff. Neither the content of the lawyer's statements, nor the circumstances in which he made them, nor the conduct of the parties reflects the assent necessary to establish an actionable offer. The court found no genuine issue as to whether the parties' conduct implied a contractual understanding where the lawyer's spoken words, the circumstances in which those words were said, and the parties' conduct are all undisputed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kolodziej v. Mason" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, police saw evidence of possible identity theft in plain view. A vehicle search revealed mail addressed to people unrelated to Earnest or his passenger, 39 debit cards, $4,000 in cash, and documents containing names, birth dates, Social Security numbers, and addresses for 1,000 individuals, plus their online tax return personal information and debit card account numbers. Hundreds of fraudulent tax returns had been filed, seeking $1.8 million in refunds; the IRS paid out $840,000. Many refunds were loaded onto debit cards. Earnest was linked to residences where the returns were filed and was photographed using the unauthorized debit cards. Tax returns were filed from Earl's IP addresses; he also was recorded using thecards. Both were convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud against the government, conspiracy to use unauthorized access devices, use of unauthorized access devices, and aggravated identity theft. Earnest also was convicted of possessing 15 or more unauthorized access devices. Earl was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. Earnest was sentenced to 172 months. Belizaire recruited people to provide addresses , exchanged identification information of victims, filed fraudulent returns, and used the debit cards; he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government and aggravated identity theft and was sentenced to 129 months’ imprisonment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both convictions and all sentences. View "United States v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance closed Community Bank & Trust. St. Paul, which provided liability coverage to the Bank’s officers and directors, sought a declaratory judgment in response to a separate lawsuit (underlying action) brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for the Bank, against Miller and Fricks, former Bank officers. In that action, the FDIC alleged gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty related to the Bank’s Home Funding Loan Program and claimed more than $15 million in damages. Finding the policy’s an “insured-versus-insured” exclusion unambiguous, the district court held that there was no coverage. The exclusion precludes coverage only for actions brought “by or on behalf of any Insured or Company in any capacity.” Neither the exclusion nor the defined terms make any reference to the FDIC, regulators, or any liquidating entity. St. Paul argued that the FDIC “steps into the shoes” of the bank, as a receiver. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the provision ambiguous. View "St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Alabama's ballot access statute violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Secretary and adopted much of the district court's reasoning contained in its memorandum opinion and order. The court held that plaintiffs' constitutional claims failed where plaintiffs did not present evidence showing that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the State's restrictions on petition-based ballot access unconstitutionally burdens their associational rights. Rather, the burden on plaintiffs was slight, and the State's interests in treating all political parties fairly and in setting a deadline that provides sufficient time to verify the petition signatures outweigh the burden to plaintiffs' associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Stein v. AL Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of second degree murder, appealed the denial of his federal habeas petition. When petitioner claimed that the state court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it denied his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing and denied the habeas petition. The court concluded that the district court correctly examined only the state record; the state court could have reasonably concluded that petitioner failed to establish prejudice regarding his trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate witness accounts; and petitioner failed to acknowledge the overwhelming evidence against him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the petition. View "Velazco v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced to death for committing murder, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial where his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his trial. The court concluded that the Supreme Court of Georgia' denial of the petition was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States where reasonable jurists could rule that the additional mitigation evidence was largely cumulative of the other evidence of petitioner's neglectful childhood. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "Wilson, Jr. v. Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to rescind a loan she entered into with the trustee of a mortgage investment trust, and the district court granted rescission, finding that the mortgaged property was plaintiff's "principal dwelling" and the trustee failed to give plaintiff adequate notice of her right to rescind. In this case, the trustee failed to comply with two requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635, and a related regulation where he instructed plaintiff to sign simultaneously the loan documents and a postdated waiver of her right to rescind the transaction and the trustee failed to give plaintiff two copies of the notice of her right to rescind. The court concluded that the record fairly supports the district court's findings of fact; plaintiff was entitled to rescission because the trustee failed to give plaintiff clear and conspicuous notice of her right to rescind; but the district court lacked the discretion to deny plaintiff statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a determination of the amounts owed. View "Harris v. Schonbrun" on Justia Law

The district court denied defendant's motion to set aside his conviction nunc pro tunc and his request for a certificate certifying his conviction had been set aside as required by the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5021. Defendant then petitioned the district court for a writ of error coram nobis, which the court denied. In this appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his petition. The court concluded that the district court effectively revised defendant's initial sentence to leave the Parole Commission out of the picture entirely; instead, it simply required that the Bureau of Prisons release defendant on December 1, 1983. Because the district court determined defendant's discharge in this way, it was obligated under section 5021(b) to issue the certificate stating that his conviction had been set aside. Therefore, the court issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to issue a certificate stating that defendant's conviction was automatically set aside on December 1, 1983. View "United States v. Cruanes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State, challenging the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 414.0652, which requires suspicionless drug testing of all applicants seeking Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The court granted a preliminary injunction barring the application of the statute against plaintiff and the State stopped the drug-testing program. Then the district court granted final summary judgment to plaintiff, declaring the statute unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a substantial special need to drug test all TANF applicants without any suspicion; even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the State has not demonstrated a more prevalent, unique, or different drug problem among TANF applicants than in the general population; the ordinary government interests claimed in this case are nothing like the narrow category of special needs that justify blanket drug testing of railroad workers, certain federal Customs employees involved in drug interdiction or who carry firearms, or involve surpassing safety interests; and the State cannot circumvent constitutional concerns by requiring that applicants consent to a drug test to receive TANF payments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lebron v. Secretary of the FL Dept. of Children and Families" on Justia Law