Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Laurence Bonday, a former employee of Nalco Company LLC, filed an arbitration demand against Nalco, alleging that the company violated its severance plan by demoting him without offering severance pay. Nalco argued that a court needed to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement before proceeding. However, the arbitrator concluded that Bonday’s severance claim fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarded him nothing on that claim. Instead, the arbitrator awarded Bonday $129,465.50 on an ERISA discrimination claim that he never raised.Nalco moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by deciding the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on a claim Bonday never made. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted Nalco's motion, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by interpreting the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on an unraised ERISA discrimination claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by granting relief on an ERISA discrimination claim that Bonday did not submit for arbitration. The court emphasized that an arbitrator can only bind the parties on issues they have agreed to submit and that the arbitrator's decision to award relief on an unsubmitted claim was beyond her authority. The court did not address the district court's first reason for vacating the award, as the second reason was sufficient to affirm the decision. View "Nalco Company LLC v. Bonday" on Justia Law

Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. (Sunshine State) is an EB-5 regional center that was designated in 2014. The EB-5 program allows immigrants to obtain visas by investing in job-creating enterprises in the U.S. The EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (the Act) introduced an annual fee for regional centers to fund the EB-5 Integrity Fund, aimed at preventing fraud. Sunshine State, which is not currently sponsoring new investment projects, argued that it should not be subject to this fee because it was designated before the Act was passed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Sunshine State’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, the motion to dismiss filed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The district court found that the Act’s text did not exempt pre-Act regional centers from the Integrity Fund Fee and that the structure of the Act suggested the opposite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act’s language and structure indicate that all regional centers, regardless of when they were designated, are subject to the Integrity Fund Fee. The court reasoned that the term “designated under subparagraph (E)” includes both pre- and post-Act regional centers because the Act governs the entire EB-5 program, and any designation for that program must now operate under subparagraph (E). The court also rejected Sunshine State’s argument that imposing the fee would be retroactive, stating that the fee is prospective and applies to the ongoing status of being a designated regional center.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the imposition of the Integrity Fund Fee on Sunshine State. View "Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

AST & Science LLC, a company in the satellite technology and communications business, hired Delclaux Partners SA to introduce it to registered broker-dealers for investment purposes. Delclaux introduced AST to LionTree Advisors LLC, which handled AST's Series A financing. Two contracts were involved: a Finder’s Fee Agreement between AST and Delclaux, and a separate agreement between AST and LionTree. After the Series B financing, Delclaux claimed it was owed fees from four transactions, which AST refused to pay, leading to AST suing Delclaux for breach of contract, alleging Delclaux acted as an unregistered broker-dealer.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied summary judgment on AST’s complaint and granted summary judgment to AST on Delclaux’s counterclaim. Delclaux appealed, but the appeal was voluntarily dismissed due to jurisdictional questions. The district court later held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction but claimed federal-question jurisdiction, asserting that the case involved a federal issue regarding the Securities Exchange Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s assertion of federal-question jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the breach-of-contract claim was governed by state law and did not meet the criteria for federal-question jurisdiction under the Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing test. The court found that the federal issue was not substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "AST & Science LLC v. Delclaux Partners SA" on Justia Law

BenShot, LLC, a family-owned business, sells a unique drinking glass design featuring a bullet "penetrating" the side. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC and Lucky Shot USA, LLC (the Debtors) sell similar glasses imported from China, falsely advertised as "Made in the United States." BenShot sued the Debtors in the Eastern District of Wisconsin for Lanham Act violations and Wisconsin common law. A jury found in favor of BenShot, awarding punitive damages and determining the Debtors acted maliciously or in intentional disregard of BenShot's rights.Following the jury verdict, the Debtors filed for bankruptcy under Subchapter V of Chapter 11. BenShot argued that the jury award was a non-dischargeable debt for willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and 1192(2). The Debtors moved to dismiss, claiming § 523(a)(6) only applied to individual debtors, not corporate debtors like themselves. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed with the Debtors and dismissed BenShot's complaint, relying on similar interpretations by other bankruptcy courts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under § 1192, both individual and corporate debtors cannot discharge any debts of the kind listed in § 523(a). The court found the plain language of § 1192 unambiguous, applying to both individual and corporate debtors, and that "debt" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish between individual or corporate debtors. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Benshot, LLC v. 2 Monkey Trading, LLC" on Justia Law

Rajesh Patel filed for bankruptcy in 2016, which triggered an automatic stay on all creditor actions against him. Despite this, Patel participated in an arbitration proceeding and lost. After a state court affirmed the arbitration award, Patel sought to stay the enforcement of the award in bankruptcy court, arguing that the arbitration violated the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court annulled the stay, finding that Patel had engaged in gamesmanship by participating in the arbitration without raising the stay and then attempting to use it to void the unfavorable outcome.The bankruptcy court's decision was appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's annulment of the stay, rejecting Patel's argument that the annulment was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano. The district court found that Acevedo, which dealt with the jurisdiction of a district court after a case was removed to federal court, did not affect the bankruptcy court's statutory authority to annul the automatic stay for cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had the authority under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to annul the automatic stay for cause. The court distinguished the case from Acevedo, noting that Acevedo addressed the removal jurisdiction of a district court and did not impact the bankruptcy court's power to annul a stay. The court also rejected Patel's procedural objections, finding that any error in the process was harmless as Patel had sufficient notice and opportunity to oppose the requested relief. View "Patel v. Patel" on Justia Law

The case involves a business dispute where ECB USA, Inc. and Atlantic Ventures Corp. (the buyers) sued Savencia Cheese USA, LLC and several individuals (the sellers) after a failed business deal. The buyers, who are foreign nationals, acquired Schratter Foods Incorporated, a Delaware corporation based in New Jersey, after the sellers allegedly misrepresented the company's corporate governance and financial health. The deal was negotiated primarily in France, but the buyers hired a Florida lawyer and moved the company to Florida post-closing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the claims against the sellers for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed the claims against Savencia Cheese for failure to state a claim. The buyers appealed these dismissals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the sellers because the buyers' use of a Florida lawyer did not establish sufficient contacts between the sellers and Florida. The court emphasized that due process requires more than a plaintiff's unilateral conduct to confer jurisdiction in a forum.Regarding the claims against Savencia Cheese, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the buyers failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court found that the buyers' allegations were conclusory and did not meet the required pleading standards for conspiracy, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with a contract.In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against both the sellers and Savencia Cheese. View "ECB USA, Inc. v. Savencia Cheese USA, LLC" on Justia Law

John Labriola, a media aide for the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners, wrote an inflammatory opinion piece criticizing the Equality Act, using derogatory language towards the LGBT community. Following public backlash and internal complaints, the County suspended him without pay, mandated anti-discrimination training, and eventually terminated him for not completing the training.Labriola sued Miami-Dade County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, compelled speech, and that the County's anti-discrimination policy was unconstitutionally overbroad. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all counts, applying the Pickering-Connick test to Labriola's free speech and free exercise claims, and ruling that his free-press claim was invalid because he was not a journalist.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Labriola's free speech and free exercise claims failed the Pickering-Connick balancing test, as his speech impeded the County's ability to perform its duties efficiently and disrupted workplace harmony. The court also rejected Labriola's free-press claim, noting that even though the district court erred in stating he couldn't bring the claim as a non-journalist, his claim failed on the merits. Additionally, the court found no evidence to support Labriola's compelled speech claim, as the required training did not compel him to express views he disagreed with. Lastly, the court dismissed Labriola's overbreadth challenge to the County's anti-discrimination policy, as he failed to demonstrate that the policy was substantially overbroad.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Miami-Dade County on all counts. View "Labriola v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Carmen Lamonaco sued Experian Information Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act after a fraudulent auto loan appeared on her credit report. She claimed Experian failed to implement reasonable procedures to ensure credit report accuracy and did not conduct a proper reinvestigation. Experian moved to compel arbitration based on a clickwrap agreement that included an arbitration clause and a delegation clause. The District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the motion, concluding that Experian did not prove the existence of an agreement and had waived arbitration by engaging in litigation.The District Court found that Experian's declaration, which was based on internal records and described the enrollment process, lacked probative value because it did not attach the internal records or provide sufficient detail. The court also held that Experian waived its right to arbitration by participating in litigation activities such as answering the complaint, participating in a case management conference, and serving Rule 26 disclosures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that Experian provided competent and unrebutted evidence that Lamonaco agreed to the Terms of Use, which included the arbitration clause. The court also determined that the delegation clause in the agreement assigned the question of waiver to the arbitrator, not the court. Therefore, the District Court lacked the authority to decide the waiver issue. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to grant Experian's motion to compel arbitration. View "Lamonaco v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Joff Stenn Wroy Philossaint pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. These charges stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Plan (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) loans. He was sentenced to 50 months in prison, followed by supervised release, and ordered to pay $3.85 million in restitution. Additionally, a forfeiture judgment of $673,210 was entered against him. On appeal, Philossaint contested the forfeiture amount, arguing it was miscalculated.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially handled the case. Philossaint pled guilty to the wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy charges, and the court accepted a factual proffer detailing his role in the fraudulent loan scheme. The presentence investigation report (PSI) provided additional details, including the specific companies involved and the amounts of the fraudulent loans. The government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture, but miscalculated the amount by assuming Philossaint received a 10% kickback on every loan funded, which was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed a clear error in determining the forfeiture amount due to the government's miscalculation. The correct amount of forfeiture should have been $549,226.30, based on the accurate figures of the loan proceeds and kickbacks Philossaint received. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the forfeiture order and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court did not make any factual findings about whether Philossaint was a leader or mastermind of the scheme, which could affect the forfeiture amount under the Honeycutt v. United States hypothetical. View "USA v. Philossaint" on Justia Law

Katie Wood, a transgender woman teaching at a public high school in Florida, challenged the enforcement of Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3), which prohibits her from using the honorific “Ms.” and the gendered pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with students during class time. Wood argued that this statute violated her First Amendment right to free speech and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted Wood a preliminary injunction, finding that she had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. The district court reasoned that Wood’s use of her preferred honorific and pronouns constituted speech as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and that her interest in expressing her gender identity outweighed the state’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court held that Wood had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3) infringed her free speech rights. The court concluded that when Wood used her preferred honorific and pronouns in the classroom, she was speaking as a government employee, not as a private citizen. Consequently, her speech was not protected under the First Amendment in this context. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wood v. Florida Department of Education" on Justia Law