Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and three counts of money laundering, alongside several co-conspirators. He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge in exchange for dismissal of the substantive money laundering counts. The factual proffer established that, during his brief involvement in the conspiracy, he knowingly laundered approximately $550,000 in what he believed to be drug proceeds, receiving a fee for his services. His participation consisted of three wire transfers over roughly one month, using his own bank account.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida accepted his plea and adjudicated him guilty. At sentencing, the court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report’s recommendation to apply a two-level enhancement for “sophisticated laundering” and denied a two-level reduction for playing a minor role in the offense. The district court determined a Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months and imposed a 57-month sentence. The defendant objected to both the enhancement and the denial of the reduction, and argued the court’s statement under United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006), could not shield any Guidelines error from appellate review.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the sophisticated-laundering enhancement because the record did not support a finding that the defendant’s own conduct involved complex or intricate transactions, nor did the court make individualized findings as required. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of a minor-role reduction, finding the district court’s conclusion supported by the record. The Eleventh Circuit found the district court’s Keene statement ineffective because it was made before hearing arguments on sentencing factors and before allocution. The sentence was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "USA v. Alberto Morilla" on Justia Law

A federal special agent in South Florida was involved in a scheme to obtain and distribute oxycodone for profit, alongside other participants including a patient recruiter, a physician, and patient recruits. The agent, who was aware of the illegal activity, provided information about ongoing law enforcement investigations to his co-conspirators and tried to disrupt those investigations. After a long-term investigation, a federal grand jury indicted the agent on several charges, including conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, conspiracy to commit witness tampering, multiple counts of witness tampering, and conspiracy to obstruct justice. Other participants pleaded guilty, and the agent proceeded to trial.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the defendant was acquitted of conspiracy to distribute oxycodone but convicted of conspiracy to commit witness tampering, witness tampering, and conspiracy to obstruct justice. He was sentenced to 97 months in prison. During pretrial and trial proceedings, the district court denied the agent’s motions to suppress wiretap evidence as untimely, motions for mistrial, and request for a good-faith jury instruction. The court also limited recross-examination of a witness and admitted evidence of the agent’s prior workplace misconduct related to sale of personal protective equipment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the agent challenged evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of evidence for several counts, the denial of certain jury instructions, and the calculation of his sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit reversible error on any issue. The court found no cumulative error and concluded that the agent’s sentence was properly calculated based on the scope of his obstructive conduct. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Crespo" on Justia Law

A Black resident of the Middle District of Florida, descended from enslaved individuals, brought suit against the Mayor of Jacksonville and the Governor of Florida in their official capacities. He alleged that the continued presence and maintenance of nearly fifty Confederate memorials, monuments, and naming tributes on public land, funded by city or state tax dollars, caused him to feel “deeply repulsed, disheartened, and intimidated.” He asserted that these symbols were governmental celebrations of White supremacy, and sought a declaratory judgment that their presence violated his rights under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, the Thirteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the complaint. The magistrate judge had recommended dismissal, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts showing a particularized injury, and thus lacked Article III standing. The magistrate also found that the plaintiff did not have taxpayer standing, as he failed to allege a direct injury or that taxpayer funds were specifically used to maintain the memorials. The district court adopted the recommendation, concluding that the plaintiff’s objections were not sufficiently specific, but nonetheless conducted a de novo review and agreed that standing was lacking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff’s alleged psychological harm—feelings of repulsion and intimidation—did not constitute a concrete or particularized injury for Article III standing. It further found he did not demonstrate municipal taxpayer standing, as he failed to allege facts indicating that taxpayer funds were used for the memorials. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing and affirmed the dismissal. View "Johnson v. Mayor, City of Jacksonville" on Justia Law

A woman, identified as J.B., fatally overdosed on fentanyl and methamphetamine in the home of the defendant, who operated a drug distribution operation from that location. Security footage showed J.B. participating in drug sales, obtaining drugs from the defendant’s bedroom, and then injecting herself shortly before her death in the living room. After her overdose, the defendant and others attempted to revive her and later removed her body and drug paraphernalia from the home. An autopsy confirmed lethal levels of both drugs, each of which could have independently caused her death.The defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on multiple drug-related charges, including conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances and possession with intent to distribute, both carrying enhanced penalties because of J.B.'s death and his prior conviction. At trial, the defendant was allowed to argue that J.B. may have obtained the drugs elsewhere for some charges, but the court limited his ability to present a theory that J.B. stole the drugs as a defense to the charges that carried the enhanced penalty for causing death. The jury found that the defendant’s drugs were the but-for cause of J.B.’s death, resulting in two concurrent life sentences.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly applied the penalty enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and the related jury instructions. The Eleventh Circuit held that the penalty enhancement applies to violations involving possession with intent to distribute, does not require a separate mens rea as to the resulting death, and does not permit a proximate or intervening cause defense. The court affirmed both the convictions and the sentences. View "USA v. Lebarron" on Justia Law

A Haitian citizen who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States was convicted in Florida of aggravated assault with a firearm and sentenced to imprisonment and probation. Following this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, asserting that the conviction constituted an aggravated felony—a crime of violence—under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The individual, represented by counsel, conceded removability before an Immigration Judge and proceeded with applications for asylum and withholding of removal, which the judge denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal decision.After removal, the petitioner submitted pro se motions to the BIA: a motion to reopen proceedings and an emergency stay of removal. The motion to reopen argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge removability, contending that the Florida statute permitted convictions based on recklessness, which did not meet the federal “crime of violence” standard requiring intent. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, finding the petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive and concluding he was not prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial for abuse of discretion and legal error. The court held that precedent interpreting both the Armed Career Criminal Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act establishes that Florida’s aggravated assault statute requires at least knowing conduct, not mere recklessness. Thus, a conviction under this statute categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” for removal purposes, even for convictions predating clarification by the Florida Supreme Court. The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. View "Senatus v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual who, following advice from his accountant, opened and maintained several foreign bank accounts in Switzerland and Panama between 2006 and 2012. He did not timely file the required Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBARs) disclosing these accounts to the United States government. The accounts were significant in value and were sometimes held under an alias. The individual self-prepared his tax returns during this period, and while he reported domestic investment income, he did not disclose his foreign accounts. In 2014, after learning of the FBAR requirements, he entered an IRS voluntary disclosure program, filed untimely FBARs, and attempted to resolve his liabilities with the IRS through a settlement, which was ultimately not honored by the IRS.The United States initiated a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to collect penalties for the willful failure to file timely FBARs. The individual moved for summary judgment, asserting affirmative defenses of accord and satisfaction and equitable estoppel, based on his attempted settlement with the IRS. The United States also moved for summary judgment, seeking a finding of willfulness as a matter of law. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding the failure to file was willful, rejecting the affirmative defenses, and holding that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to FBAR penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s rulings on willfulness and rejection of the affirmative defenses, holding that the failure to file FBARs was willful under an objective standard and that the IRS agents lacked authority to bind the government to a settlement. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s determination regarding the Excessive Fines Clause, holding that FBAR penalties are subject to the Eighth Amendment and remanding for factual development on whether the penalties were unconstitutionally excessive. View "USA v. Niksich" on Justia Law

Members of the rap group 2 Live Crew, including Mark Ross, created five albums between 1986 and 1989. Through a written agreement, the group assigned the sound recording copyrights to Luke Records, a company owned by one of the group’s members. In 1995, following Luke Records’ bankruptcy, these copyrights were sold to Lil’ Joe Records. In 2000, Mark Ross filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; his termination interests in these copyrights were never listed or addressed in his bankruptcy proceedings. Years later, within the statutory window, Ross, another group member, and heirs of a third served a notice attempting to terminate the copyright grants to Luke Records, as permitted by the Copyright Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially concluded that Ross’s termination interests did not enter his bankruptcy estate, interpreting the Copyright Act and Bankruptcy Code to exclude them. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the effectiveness of the termination notice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury’s factual findings, the district court concluded the termination notice was valid. Lil’ Joe Records appealed the district court’s final judgment, the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Ross’s termination interests were property of his bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s inalienability restriction. Because these interests were never scheduled or administered by the bankruptcy court, they remained with the bankruptcy estate when Ross attempted to exercise them. As a result, Ross could not validly sign the termination notice, and the group did not have the required majority to terminate the copyright grants. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lil' Joe Records, Inc. v. Won" on Justia Law

Donald Smith owned and operated a company called No Rust Rebar, along with four other related entities. All these entities were controlled by Smith, shared business locations, and had overlapping operations and assets. No Rust Rebar filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which was later converted to Chapter 7 liquidation after a creditor's motion. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the court found that Smith routinely commingled the assets of No Rust Rebar with those of the other entities, failed to observe corporate formalities, and treated the businesses as a single operation subject to his personal discretion.Following these findings, the bankruptcy court appointed a trustee, who moved to substantively consolidate the assets and liabilities of the four non-debtor entities with No Rust Rebar’s bankruptcy estate. All entities received notice of this motion and objected, arguing that substantive consolidation required a separate adversary proceeding and an additional evidentiary hearing. However, they did not challenge the merits of consolidation or the findings that led to it, focusing solely on procedural issues. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed the bankruptcy court’s consolidation order after the non-debtor entities appealed, again raising only procedural arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s decision de novo for legal conclusions and for clear error as to factual findings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had the authority to order substantive consolidation based on its findings that the entities were alter egos with a substantial identity. The court also concluded that any procedural errors related to the style or process of the motion were harmless, as all parties had notice and an opportunity to be heard. The substantive consolidation order was affirmed. View "Smith v. Slott" on Justia Law

A Florida attorney was retained by a consumer who was sued in small claims court for an alleged debt. The attorney attempted to resolve the case with the debt collector’s counsel before a scheduled pretrial conference and was told a settlement would be communicated to the court. Relying on this, he did not attend the conference. The court entered a default against the consumer for failure to appear. Despite assurances from opposing counsel that the default would be set aside, and after a settlement agreement was executed, the debt collector moved for a default judgment and the court entered a default final judgment against the consumer. The attorney spent significant time and effort remedying the situation, ultimately securing vacatur of the default judgment. He then brought suit in federal court in his own name, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Florida law, claiming personal injuries such as distress, embarrassment, and lost time.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the case, finding the attorney lacked statutory standing under both federal and state law because the alleged debt collection activities targeted his client, not him. The district court did not reach the merits of the state law claim because it found no standing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the attorney had not alleged a concrete injury in fact sufficient to establish Article III standing. The court explained that any harm he experienced was derivative of his client’s injury and did not amount to a cognizable injury for standing purposes. The Eleventh Circuit therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without reaching the merits of the statutory claims. View "Light v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

A company operating a railroad in Florida took precautionary measures in anticipation of Hurricane Irma in 2017 by removing and later reinstalling crossing gates at approximately 600 locations to prevent storm-related damage. These actions caused operational delays and additional expenses, but ultimately prevented significant physical damage. The company submitted a claim for these expenses, totaling over $5.6 million, under its property insurance policy covering direct physical loss, time element losses, and certain preventative measures. The insurers denied the claim, contending the deductible applicable to hurricane-related events exceeded the claimed amount.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida reviewed the insurance policy and determined that only the provisions related to “Protection and Preservation of Property” applied, not broader coverage provisions. The court concluded that the “Named Windstorm” deductible of 5% of the property value at all affected locations applied, resulting in a deductible of over $10.9 million, which surpassed the company’s losses. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment to the insurers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the relevant coverage provisions were indeed those for “Protection and Preservation of Property,” but determined that the correct deductible was $750,000, not the higher amount calculated by the district court. The Court of Appeals found that since there was no actual physical damage to the properties, the policy did not require the 5% calculation, and the minimum deductible applied. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s identification of the applicable coverage, vacated the summary judgment based on the deductible calculation, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount recoverable after the $750,000 deductible. View "Florida East Coast Holdings Corporation v. Lexington Insurance Company" on Justia Law