Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The PAPER COMPANY's creditors successfully petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court then granted the PAPER COMPANY's motion to transform the Chapter 7 case into a Chapter 11 proceeding. While the Chapter 11 case was pending, the PBGC brought an action against the PAPER COMPANY. At issue on appeal was whether, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., the trustee of a corporation that is a contributing sponsor and is in bankruptcy can maintain an action for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and the estate's unsecured creditors against the corporation's former owner (as a former member of the controlled group) for liabilities arising from the termination of a pension plan. The court held that the answer is no. The court concluded that ERISA's funding requirements were put in place for the benefit of plan beneficiaries, not for the protection of a bankrupt plan sponsor's unsecured creditors. The trustee's complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it was brought for the benefit of the bankrupt's unsecured creditors. View "Durango-Georgia Paper Co., et al. v. H.G. Estate, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Chapter 2007-1 of the Laws of Florida made state-subsidized reinsurance available to Florida insurers at rates lower than those offered in the private market. Plaintiffs filed suit against Allstate alleging that it violated Chapter 2007-1 by failing to promptly reduce its premiums and retaining the costs savings resulting from the state's subsidy of its reinsurance. The district court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court relied on several alternative grounds to reach the conclusion that plaintiffs failed to state a claim. Plaintiffs failed to clearly raise any challenge to the alternative holdings. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs abandoned any argument they may have had that the district court erred in its alternative holdings that each of their four claims was inadequate as a matter of Florida law independent of any issue concerning the filed rate doctrine or whether there was a private right of action for insureds against insurers who violate Chapter 2007-1. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sapuppo, et al. v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of motions for a stay of execution and applied for a stay of execution with the court. Plaintiff challenged the method of execution in Florida as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff could not establish that he had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; the Supreme Court of Florida had already decided his Eight Amendment claim; and res judicata barred his federal complaint. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to stay the execution and the amended motion to stay the execution. The court also denied plaintiff's application for a stay of execution. View "Muhammad v. Secretary, FL DOC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Harris and Stanley appealed their securities fraud convictions and sentences stemming from their role in a "pump and dump" scheme. The court concluded that Harris waived his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the district court did not err by refusing to allow counsel to represent an absconded Harris; the district court, which issued a curative instruction to mitigate any perceived prejudice, did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant severance and mistrial; because the district court at no point pressured Harris into foregoing his right to silence, it did not err by considering remorseless statements freely volunteered by Harris at the sentencing hearing; and the district court did not clearly err in finding that Stanley played more than a minor role in this massive fraud, and it did not abuse its considerable discretion because Stanley's sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed both defendants' convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition brought under the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded, concluding that petitioner satisfied the five requirements necessary to proceed with a section 2241 petition under section 2255(e) as set forth in Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium. View "Mackey v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that LINA violated the disability insurance policy's terms and ERISA requirements - in part because LINA ignored the SSA process and the information it generated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LINA. Because LINA did not have the evidence presented to the SSA when it denied her last appeal - and in fact could not have had that evidence when it initially denied her claim - the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to remand plaintiff's claims to LINA for its consideration of the evidence presented to the SSA. View "Melech v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death row inmate convicted of murder, appealed the denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision of Martinez v. Ryan constituted an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to justify the reopening of the final judgment of his prior 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. Martinez involved the procedural default doctrine as to an ineffective-trial-counsel claim in initial-review state collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Martinez did not apply to petitioner's section 2254 petition that was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), statute of limitations. Even assuming that the Martinez rule changed or affected in some way the decisional law about AEDPA's statute of limitations and equitable tolling, any such change in law was not an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Arthur v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, against the District, alleging that the District violated the FCA by fraudulently claiming FEMA reimbursements for ineligible canal repairs. The court held that, as an arm of the State of Florida, the District was not a "person" that could be subjected to suit by a qui tam relator under the FCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of relator's claims. View "Lesinski v. South Florida Water Mgmt." on Justia Law

After appellants failed to pay their medical debts, Urology and UAB West referred the accounts to Franklin Collection Service and added to appellants' accounts a charge for collection fees. The court held that Franklin violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p, when it collected from appellants a debt that included a 33-and-1/3% "collection fee" when appellants only agreed to pay the actual costs of collection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin on appellants claims under section 1692f of the FDCPA. The court affirmed the remaining federal and state law claims. View "Bradley, et al. v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after removal for committing an aggravated felony. At issue was whether second-degree sexual battery under Florida law was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the district court erred by applying only an 8-level enhancement to defendant's base offense level by relying on the Supreme Court precedent, Johnson v. United States, which held that a defendant's prior battery conviction under Florida law was not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). However the Supreme Court in Johnson was dealing with a different issue under the ACCA, not the amended definition of "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii). Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law