Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. 9.407-4(b), governs the acquisition of supplies and services by all federal agencies. At issue was whether a federal agency may suspend two affiliates of an indicted government contractor for the duration of the legal proceedings against the indicted contractor under the Regulation. Because the suspension of an affiliate was included as part of the suspension of the indicted government contractor, the court concluded that legal proceedings initiated against the indicted government contractor tolled the 18-month time limit for the suspension of the affiliates. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the affiliates and rendered a judgment in favor of defendants. View "Agility Defense & Gov't Svcs, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, et al." on Justia Law

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Petitioner pled guilty to one count of knowingly possessing firearms and ammunition while being a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 933(g)(1) and 924(e). On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, brought pursuant to the "savings clause" in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). The court concluded that defendant has proven that his prior section 2255 motion was "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention" and that his 2241 petition could not proceed under section 2255(e) because: (1) from the time of his initial sentencing in 2002 throughout his first section 2255 proceeding in 2005, the court's binding precedent in United States v. Hall held that a concealed-firearm offense under Fla. Stat. 790.01 was a "violent felony" under section 924(a); (2) subsequent to petitioner's first 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court's decision in Begay v. United States set forth a new standard to evaluate which crimes constituted violent felonies under section 924(e), and Begay, as interpreted by United States v. Archer overturned the court's precedent in Hall; (3) Begay's new rule is substantive and applies retroactively to petitioner's section 924(e) claim on collateral review; (4) as a result of pure section 924(a)-Begay error and retroactive application of Begay, petitioner's 235-month sentence exceeds the 10-year statutory minimum authorized by Congress in section 924(a); and (5) the savings clause in section 2255(e) reaches his claim of illegal detention above the statutory maximum penalty. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Bryant, Jr. v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that a corrections officer at the county jail sexually assaulted her. Officers other than the accused moved for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The court concluded that, in determining whether plaintiff alleged a constitutional violation, the district court made two related errors: it applied an incorrect legal standard and it allowed plaintiff to satisfy the standard it applied with conclusory allegations. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff had failed to plead a constitutional violation and that the officers were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. View "Franklin v. Curry, et al." on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his conviction and 420-month sentence for, inter alia, conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The court concluded that when the officers in this case installed GPS trackers on defendant's vehicles without a warrant, they acted in reasonable reliance upon the court's then-binding precedent. Suppression of reliable, competent, and probative evidence was a last resort justified only where the benefits of deterrence outweigh the substantial social costs of exclusion. Therefore, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case and the district court properly denied defendant's motion based on United States v. Jones. The court also rejected defendant's evidentiary claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and judgment. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

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This interlocutory appeal arose from an action filed by the FDIC, as receiver for Integrity Bank, against former Bank directors and corporate officers (defendants). The FDIC sought to recover losses that the Bank suffered as a result of defendants' alleged negligent conduct. The court certified questions of state law regarding the standard of care established in O.C.G.A. 7-1-490 and Georgia's business judgment rule to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Because the FDIC has failed to demonstrate the existence of an established and long-standing common law rule barring defendants' affirmative defenses, and because the court must decline to create a barring rule, the FDIC was unentitled to partial summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and certified questions in part. View "FDIC v. Skow, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, daughters of the late Kenneth Weinberg, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to county jail officers. Kenneth, a pretrial detainee at the jail for twenty months, commenced this civil rights suit under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming deliberate indifference to his basic medical needs because the officers refused to provide him with batteries for his hearing aids, rendering the aids worthless and leaving him unable to hear. Kenneth also filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and a First Amendment retaliation claim against the officers for the same conduct. The court concluded that Kenneth stated a viable constitutional claim but that state law did not provide the officers with "fair warning" that their alleged conduct was unlawful. Accordingly, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Weinberg Gilmore, et al. v. Hodges, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, on behalf of their daughter, filed suit challenging the district's implementation of a new individualized education program (IEP) for their daughter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Determining that the daughter's case was not moot, the court concluded that the court need not decide whether the various notice requirements were satisfied because whatever notice deficiencies there could have been in this case, they did not warrant relief; there was no error in requiring the parents to present a complaint and demand a due process hearing because they disagreed with the IEP team's decision; the district court correctly stated the Loren F. ex. rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Independent School System standard, fully reviewed the administrative record, and independently analyzed each of the parents' claims; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the parents' proposed order and then decided the case on summary judgment; and the court held that 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions for denial of rights conferred by the IDEA were barred because the IDEA's comprehensive enforcement scheme provided the sole remedy for statutory violations and, therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the parents' section 1983 claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "K.A. v. Fulton County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court found that the district court erred in holding that the emergency aid exception justified law enforcement officers' warrantless entry into defendant's apartment where, considering the totality of the circumstances, it was not reasonable for the officers to believe that someone inside defendant's apartment was in danger and in need of immediate aid. Because the officers' initial entry into defendant's apartment was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the district court erred in holding that the same justification permitted the officers to enter defendant's bedroom. Finally, the court held that the district court erred in denying defendant's ore tenus motion to suppress with regard to defendant's statements during two telephone calls at issue, but did not err in denying defendant's ore tenus motion to suppress with regard to defendant's statements during another telephone call. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Timmann" on Justia Law

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Mr. Chafin appealed the district court's grant of Ms. Chafin's petition for wrongful removal under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670. The district court found that the child's country of habitual residence was Scotland and that Mr. Chafin failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to Scotland would expose her to grave risk of harm. The court affirmed, concluding that Mr. Chafin had not demonstrated that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that the district court correctly applied the law to the facts. View "Chafin v. Chafin" on Justia Law

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Dr. Hinchee, who resides in Florida, and Chevron appeal the district court's discovery order compelling production of Dr. Hinchee's documents to the Republic of Ecuador. Dr. Hinchee served as a testifying expert for Chevron in a related proceeding. The discovery dispute at issue stemmed from a suit brought by Ecuadorian plaintiffs alleging that Texaco's oil exploration in the Amazonian rain forest polluted private and public lands in Ecuador and that Texaco was responsible for plaintiffs' oil-related health problems and the environmental contamination of plaintiffs' property. The court concluded that Dr. Hinchee's notes and email communications with non-attorneys, including other experts, were relevant within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), and the Republic was thus entitled to discover these materials. Neither the text of Rule 26(b)(3)(A) nor its structure, history, and rationale support extending the work-product doctrine to all testifying expert materials. To the extent any attorney core opinion work-product was embedded in the 1,200 documents at issue here, Chevron and Dr. Hinchee could appropriately redact such portions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling discovery. View "Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, et al." on Justia Law