Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Ortiz and Malpica petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A), on the grounds that they were inadmissible at the time of their adjustment of status. The court found that the IJ erred as a matter of law in finding petitioners inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) because that section only applied to applicants for admission and not to immigrants like petitioners who sought post-entry adjustment of status while already in the United States. Because willful misrepresentation was an essential element of both fraud and willful misrepresentation and because the IJ found that Ortiz did not make any willful misrepresentation, Ortiz was not inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Under Matter of Arrabally, Malpica's exit pursuant to a grant of advance parole did not qualify as a "departure" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) and Malpica was, thus, not inadmissible under this section. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Ortiz-Bouchet, et al v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner was serving a life sentence for murdering his girlfriend when he murdered a fellow inmate. A jury convicted him of malice murder and imposed a death sentence. This case came before the court on petitioner's application, under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), for permission to file a second or successive federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 in the district court. The court denied the application because petitioner's claim of mental retardation, proposed in his successive petition, was already presented in his first petition and was barred by the statutory prohibition in section 2244(b)(1). Further, petitioner's mental retardation claim challenged only his eligibility for a death sentence, and not whether he was "guilty of the underlying offense," and thus did not fall within the narrow statutory exception in section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). View "In re: Warren Hill, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a handgun. At issue on appeal was whether defendant's sentence was properly enhanced by his prior 2006 felony conviction for possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. The court held that possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun qualified as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines and affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Hall" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute involving an administrative complaint filed by the Board against Mardi Gras, claiming that Mardi Gras unlawfully discharged employees who were involved in a union organizing campaign on behalf of the Union. The Board appealed from the district court's decision to deny the Board temporary injunctive relief pending a final order from the Board in administrative proceedings. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the temporary reinstatement of six discharged employees was not a "just and proper" form of relief requested by the Board under section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(j). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Hartman and Tyner, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, sought a continuance of his deportation proceedings to await the availability of an immigrant visa based on his approved I-140 petition. The IJ denied petitioner's motion for a continuance and the BIA affirmed the IJ's judgment. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, which was also denied. The court agreed with petitioner's argument that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to consider the factors set forth in Matter of Hashmi and Matter of Rajah. Accordingly, the court granted the petition, vacated the decision of the BIA, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ferreira v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Merle Wood, a yacht-broker, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Trinity, a manufacturer and seller of yachts. Merle Wood sued Trinity for, among other things, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Merle Wood alleged that Trinity refused to pay for the fair, reasonable value of the benefit it provided in brokering a deal that led to Trinity selling two multi-million dollar yachts. The court held that Merle Wood's quantum meruit and unjust enrichment causes of action were time-barred under Fla. Stat. 95.11. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Trinity. View "Merle Wood and Assoc., Inc v. Trinity Yachts, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Estate, challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Zenith on the Estate's breach of the insurance contract claim. After review and oral argument, the court certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation . . . law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? (3) If the estate's claim was not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama established that imposing a life sentence without possibility of parole under the circumstances described was unconstitutional, and because it was decided in June 2012, it announced a new, previously unavailable rule of constitutional law that was retroactive to cases on collateral review. The court held, however, that Miller was not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review and, therefore, the court denied the motion. View "In re: Michael Morgan" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition for habeas corpus, claiming that his 293-month sentence for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), was improper because he did not have the three violent felony predicates required to apply the ACCA enhancement. At issue was whether the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) allowed the district court to entertain petitioner's section 2241 petition and, if it did, whether petitioner's 1989 and 1990 burglary convictions were proper ACCA predicates. In these circumstances, petitioner's direct appeal and first collateral attack were not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention, and the savings clause did not apply. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's section 2241 petition and, therefore, affirmed the judgment. View "Williams v. Warden, et al" on Justia Law

When Dustin Myers and Kelley Bowman ended their engagement, Dustin attempted to retrieve the diamond ring and other personal property. That attempt prompted allegations that Dustin had stolen Kelley's dog, followed by a police chase on rural roadways, and a brief arrest of Dustin and his father, Rodney Myers. The Myers subsequently field a complaint against Murry Bowman, Kelly's father and the magistrate judge of Jefferson County; Wiley Clark Evans, a deputy sheriff who arrested the Myers; and Charles Hutchins, Evans's supervisor. The complaint alleged that defendants conspired to violate and violated the Myers' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 1983. After reviewing the videotape of the police chase and other evidence, the court agreed with the district court that the Myers' effort to make a federal case out of these events failed: Murry and Evans did not subject the Myers to excessive force; Evans had probable cause to arrest the Myers; Murry did not act under color of law; and the Myers failed to present any evidence that Murry, Evans, and Hutchins conspired to commit a false arrest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against the Myers' complaint. View "Myers, et al v. Bowman, et al" on Justia Law