Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a claimant, Isaac Flowers, who applied for Social Security Disability benefits due to various health issues including back, neck, shoulder, and joint problems, obesity, vision loss in one eye, and depression and opioid dependence. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially denied his claim, deeming that he could perform "sedentary work". Later, Flowers applied for benefits again, and the ALJ denied his claim again, this time finding that he could perform "light work", a classification slightly more intensive than "sedentary work".Flowers appealed this decision, arguing that the ALJ's finding that he could perform "light work" wasn't supported by substantial evidence as there was no proof of his condition improving. He also suggested that the ALJ should have considered the previous finding of him only being able to perform "sedentary work".The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Flowers' argument. Firstly, the court found that Flowers hadn't raised this legal issue in the lower courts and they declined to consider it for the first time on appeal. Secondly, the court concluded that even if Flowers had raised the issue in the lower courts, any error would have been harmless because Flowers hadn't shown that he would be entitled to disability benefits even if he was limited to "sedentary work". Lastly, the court found that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision. View "Flowers v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Victor Vargas, was convicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the 35-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the delay did not weigh heavily against the government.The court noted that the delay was broken down into three parts. The first ten months involved diligent efforts by the case agent to arrest Vargas. The second part was an eight-month period of inactivity due to the case agent being transferred to another position. The final period was a 16-month delay due to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.The court found that none of these delays were intentional or in bad faith. It further pointed out that throughout this period, Vargas was living freely and was not restricted in any way. Given these considerations, the court concluded that the delay did not uniformly weigh heavily against the government. Consequently, the court held that Vargas must demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay, which he admitted he could not do. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision that Vargas's right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida by Talal Qais Abdulmunem Al Zawawi, a citizen of Oman. Al Zawawi was seeking to overturn the bankruptcy court's decision that recognized foreign proceedings in a Chapter 15 bankruptcy case. The main question was whether 11 U.S.C. § 109(a), which limits the class of persons and entities that could constitute a “debtor,” applied to cases brought under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing the case, found that a plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code indicated that § 109(a) did apply to Chapter 15 cases. However, the Court was bound by prior precedent that stated that Chapter 1’s debtor eligibility language did not apply to cases ancillary to a foreign proceeding.The Court found that the former § 304 and Chapter 15 had sufficiently similar purposes such that their decision in a previous case, In re Goerg, controlled their analysis in this case. Based on this reasoning, the Court held that debtor eligibility under Chapter 1 was not a prerequisite for the recognition of a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15. The Court therefore affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to recognize the foreign proceeding. View "Al Zawawi v. Diss" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by Quinton Handlon, a prisoner convicted of producing, coercing, and possessing child pornography. Handlon had requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because his elderly father needed a caregiver. The district court denied the request as Handlon failed to provide substantial evidence about his father's condition or proving that he was the only available caretaker. Handlon appealed this decision.The Appeals Court upheld the district court's decision, affirming that Handlon's case did not meet the extraordinary and compelling reasons necessary for compassionate release under the policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. At the time of Handlon's motion, the policy statement recognized four categories for compassionate release, none of which included the incapacitation of a parent when the defendant could serve as a caregiver.The court noted that a recent amendment to the policy statement now includes such a scenario, but clarified that it could not be applied retroactively in this appeal because it was a substantive amendment, not a clarifying one. The court affirmed the denial of Handlon's motion for compassionate release, but hinted that Handlon might be able to file a new motion for compassionate release under the updated policy. View "USA v. Handlon" on Justia Law

The case involves Haitham Yousef Alhindi, the defendant-appellant, who was charged with five counts of cyberstalking. Alhindi's counsel requested a competency evaluation, which was conducted by the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau), albeit late. Based on limited information and caution, the Bureau's report deemed Alhindi incompetent. The court ordered Alhindi to be hospitalized for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). However, before Alhindi was hospitalized, the Bureau reported that he was not exhibiting any signs of mental illness and recommended a second competency evaluation, which the court ordered over Alhindi's objection. The second evaluation also concluded that Alhindi was incompetent. Alhindi appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to order a second competency evaluation and commitment for hospitalization.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 4241 authorizes district courts to order multiple competency evaluations and commitments for hospitalization when appropriate under the statute's terms. The court also found that the four-month limit in § 4241(d)(1) applies to the period of hospitalization, not the entire commitment period. The court emphasized the importance of district courts’ continued close supervision of competency proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's entry of the commitment order. View "USA v. Haitham Alhindi" on Justia Law

In February 2020, Thomas Daniels was convicted of carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, brandishing and discharging a firearm during the carjacking, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. The incident occurred when Daniels entered a tow yard, threatened two individuals with a gun, shot them both, and then stole their possessions and vehicle. Daniels appealed his convictions, challenging on evidentiary and suppression grounds.Daniels argued that the district court erred in excluding a defense expert who was offered to testify on the reliability of eyewitness identification, and in admitting the victim’s out-of-court identification testimony. He also objected to a detective’s testimony identifying him in the tow yard surveillance footage, and the failure to suppress photographs taken of him after the crime. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found no error in the district court's decisions and affirmed Daniels’ convictions.The court held that given the detective's familiarity with Daniels, his identification of Daniels in the surveillance footage was indeed helpful to the jury. In addition, the court found that the photo array shown to one of the victims was not unduly suggestive, and even if it were, the victim's identification of Daniels was nonetheless reliable. Finally, the court found no constitutional violation in the encounter between the detective and Daniels as there was probable cause to arrest Daniels, and thus the photos taken during that encounter were not the "fruit" of an unlawful seizure. View "USA v. Thomas Daniels" on Justia Law

A Black woman, Erika Buckley, filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Army, alleging that her former colleagues at Martin Army Hospital engaged in conduct that was racially discriminatory. Buckley, a speech pathologist, claimed her colleagues diverted white patients from her care, encouraged white male patients to complain about her, and engaged in other race-based harassing conduct. The Secretary moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on all counts. Buckley appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the lower court's decision regarding Buckley's retaliation claims, but vacated the lower court's decision on her race-based disparate treatment claim and her race-based hostile work environment claim. The court found that Buckley had provided enough evidence to suggest that her race played a role in the decision-making process leading to her dismissal, even if her race was not the but-for cause of the dismissal. The court also concluded that Buckley had provided sufficient evidence to establish a hostile work environment claim. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the appeals court's opinion. View "Buckley v. Secretary of the Army" on Justia Law

The case involves Maria Acosta, who sued six Miami-Dade officers involved in the arrest of her son, Maykel Barrera, who died after the encounter. Acosta alleged federal excessive-force claims and state wrongful-death claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, and Acosta appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to five of the six officers on Acosta’s excessive-force claims and to all of the officers on Acosta’s wrongful-death claims.The Court of Appeals found that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Acosta, the officers used excessive force when they tased and kicked Barrera while he was subdued, on the ground, and no longer resisting arrest, violating clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.Furthermore, the court vacated the summary judgment on Acosta’s wrongful-death claim, concluding that there was enough evidence for the case to go to trial. The court ruled that the district court erred in emphasizing Acosta’s lack of expert evidence directed to the cause of Barrera’s death since she did not have to present expert testimony to show causation. View "Acosta v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Tyler Copeland, a transgender male, sued his employer, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC), for workplace harassment. Copeland was a sergeant at a prison in Georgia and alleged that, after coming out as transgender at work, he endured constant and demeaning harassment from colleagues at various levels, despite repeated complaints to supervisors and HR personnel.He brought three claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The first was that his employer had created a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of GDOC, concluding that the harassment Copeland experienced was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. However, the appellate court disagreed and vacated the summary judgment on this claim.The second claim was that Copeland had been denied promotion due to his transgender status. The district court also granted summary judgment on this count, as Copeland failed to provide evidence that those who decided not to promote him were aware of his protected conduct. The appellate court affirmed this decision.The third claim was that GDOC had retaliated against Copeland for engaging in a protected practice, namely opposing sex discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment on this count as well, and the appellate court affirmed the decision, citing lack of evidence of causation.In summary, the appellate court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim but affirmed the summary judgments on the failure to promote and retaliation claims. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the fifth element of Copeland’s hostile work environment claim. View "Copeland v. Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) denial of a whistleblower award. The petitioner, John Meisel, reported his suspicions about his former tenant's involvement in a Ponzi scheme, which he read about in a newspaper, to the SEC. After the SEC's successful enforcement action against the scheme's perpetrators, Meisel applied for a whistleblower award. The SEC denied his application, reasoning that Meisel's information did not contribute to the enforcement action. Furthermore, his assistance to a court-appointed receiver, who was tasked with recovering funds related to the scheme, did not qualify him for an award as the receiver was not a representative of the Commission. Meisel appealed the denial, claiming it was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Meisel’s petition for review. The court held that the SEC's denial of the whistleblower award was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor was it unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found that the SEC had not used Meisel’s information in its enforcement action, and therefore, his information did not lead to its success. The court also held that Meisel's assistance to the receiver did not qualify him for an award because the receiver was an independent court officer, not a representative of the SEC. Lastly, the court determined that Meisel could not qualify for an award in any related actions because he did not qualify for an award in the covered action. View "Meisel v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law