Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Green Rock LLC, a company that solicited taxpayers to invest in arrangements promising conservation-easement deductions. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Notice 2017-10, which required taxpayers and their advisors to comply with reporting requirements when claiming deductions for donations of conservation easements. Green Rock challenged this notice, arguing that the IRS violated the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing the notice without public notice and comment.Previously, the district court ruled in favor of Green Rock, stating that the IRS had unlawfully promulgated Notice 2017-10 because Congress did not expressly authorize its issuance without notice and comment. The district court set Notice 2017-10 aside for Green Rock.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Notice 2017-10 was a legislative rule and Congress did not expressly exempt the IRS from notice-and-comment rulemaking. Therefore, Notice 2017-10 is not binding on Green Rock. The court clarified that its decision was specific to Notice 2017-10 and did not rule on the validity of any other listed transaction not before it. View "Green Rock LLC v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

The case involves Cynthia Allen and Kristine Webb, who filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, AT&T Mobility Services, LLC, alleging pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. The district court denied their motion for class certification, and the plaintiffs settled with AT&T and voluntarily dismissed their case. The following day, Amanda Curlee, who claimed she would have been a member of the proposed class, sought to intervene in the case to appeal the denial of class certification. The district court allowed her to intervene, and she immediately appealed.The district court had denied the original plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and the plaintiffs subsequently settled with AT&T and voluntarily dismissed their case. The court had not addressed the merits of any plaintiff's discrimination claims. Amanda Curlee, who claimed she would have been a member of the proposed class, sought to intervene in the case to appeal the denial of class certification. The district court allowed her to intervene.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Curlee's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that there was no final decision as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the district court had not resolved the merits of any plaintiff's discrimination claims. The court held that Curlee, as an intervenor, must litigate her claims on the merits before she can appeal the denial of class certification. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Curlee's appeal because there was no final judgment in the case. View "Curlee v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the American Alliance for Equal Rights (the Alliance), a membership organization dedicated to ending racial classifications and preferences in America, and Fearless Fund Management, LLC (Fearless), a venture capital fund that invests in businesses led by women of color. Fearless organized the "Fearless Strivers Grant Contest," a funding competition open only to businesses owned by black women. The Alliance, representing several members who wished to participate in the contest but were not black women, sued Fearless, alleging that the contest violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits private parties from discriminating on the basis of race when making or enforcing contracts.The district court denied the Alliance's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent Fearless from closing the application process. The court concluded that the Alliance had standing to sue and that § 1981 applied to Fearless's contest. However, it also concluded that the First Amendment "may bar" the Alliance's § 1981 claim on the ground that the contest constitutes expressive conduct, and that the Alliance hadn't demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Alliance has standing and that preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate because Fearless's contest is substantially likely to violate § 1981, is substantially unlikely to enjoy First Amendment protection, and inflicts irreparable injury. The court affirmed the district court's determination that the Alliance has standing to sue but reversed its decision and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. View "American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Fearless Fund Management, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Justin Keener, who operated under the name JMJ Financial. Keener's business model involved purchasing convertible notes from microcap issuers, converting those notes into common stock, and selling that stock in the public market at a profit. This practice, known as "toxic" or "death spiral" financing, can harm microcap companies and existing investors by causing the stock price to drop significantly. Keener made over $7.7 million in profits from this practice. However, he never registered as a dealer with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).The SEC filed a civil enforcement action against Keener, alleging that he operated as an unregistered dealer in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for the SEC, enjoining Keener from future securities transactions as an unregistered dealer and ordering him to disgorge the profits from his convertible-note business.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Keener appealed the district court's decision. He argued that he did not violate the Securities Exchange Act because he never effectuated securities orders for customers. He also claimed that the SEC violated his rights to due process and equal protection.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that Keener operated as an unregistered dealer in violation of the Securities Exchange Act. The court rejected Keener's argument that he could not have been a dealer because he never effectuated securities orders for customers. It also dismissed Keener's claims that the SEC violated his rights to due process and equal protection. The court upheld the district court's imposition of a permanent injunction and its order for Keener to disgorge his profits. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Keener" on Justia Law

An Alabama inmate, Jamie Mills, who was scheduled for execution on May 30, 2024, for committing two murders in 2004, appealed the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. Mills claimed that the State's practice of restraining its condemned prisoners on a gurney before execution would violate his constitutional rights to access the courts, to counsel, to due process, and against cruel and unusual punishment.Mills's case had been reviewed by multiple courts. His death sentence was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Court of Alabama. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Mills also sought postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court of Alabama. His federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the district court in 2020. This Court denied a certificate of appealability in 2021, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2022.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Mills's motion for a stay of execution. The court found that Mills had not established that he was substantially likely to succeed on the merits of his appeal or that the equities favor a stay of execution at this late stage. The court rejected Mills's arguments that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claims under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also found that Mills's delay in seeking a preliminary injunction and a stay was "unnecessary and inexcusable," and that other equities weighed against a stay. View "Mills v. Hamm" on Justia Law

Jamie Mills, an Alabama inmate, was convicted of the capital murders of Floyd and Vera Hill in 2007 and sentenced to death. Mills and his common-law wife, JoAnn, had plotted to rob the Hills, and Mills was found to have executed the Hills with a machete, tire tool, and ball-peen hammer. JoAnn testified against Mills at his trial and later pleaded guilty to murder, receiving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. Mills moved for a new trial, arguing that JoAnn had perjured herself by denying that she testified against him to procure leniency for herself. The trial court denied the motion, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the decision. Mills also unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.Mills petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2017, which was denied in 2020. His motion for a certificate of appealability was denied, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari in 2022. In 2024, Mills filed a successive motion under Rule 32 in state court, offering an affidavit by JoAnn Mills’s attorney, Tony Glenn, alleging that JoAnn had been offered a plea deal in exchange for her testimony at Mills's trial. Mills also moved for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, arguing that newly discovered evidence established that the district attorney had engaged in misconduct by falsely stating to the trial court that there was no deal with JoAnn. The district court denied relief on each ground.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Mills's application for a certificate of appealability and his motion to stay his execution. The court found that no reasonable jurist could conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mills's motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(2), Rule 60(b)(3) and (d)(3), and Rule 60(b)(6). The court also found that Mills's motion for Rule 60(b)(6) relief was not timely and that no reasonable jurist would question the denial on the merits as supported by the record. View "Mills v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between James Snell, a landscaper, and his insurer, United Specialty Insurance Company. Snell was sued for negligence after a child was injured on a trampoline he had installed at a client's home. United refused to defend Snell in the lawsuit, arguing that the accident did not arise from Snell’s landscaping work as defined in his commercial general liability policy. Snell sued United, alleging breach of contract and bad faith denial of coverage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of United. The court held that the accident did not arise from Snell's landscaping work within the meaning of his insurance policy. The court also found that Snell's bad faith claim failed because United had a lawful basis to deny the claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the allegations in the complaint did not trigger United’s duty to defend. The court also found that Snell's insurance application, which expressly stated that he did not do any recreational or playground equipment construction or erection, made clear that the policy did not cover his work in this case. The court further held that Alabama law does not preclude a decision on the duty to indemnify before judgment in the underlying case. Finally, the court concluded that Snell’s bad faith claim failed because he did not show that United wholly failed to investigate any part of his claim. View "Snell v. United Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action brought by Earlene McBride against Carnival Corporation. McBride fell out of her wheelchair while being assisted by a Carnival crewmember, Fritz Charles, during disembarkation from a Carnival cruise ship. McBride claimed that she suffered severe injuries due to the fall and sued Carnival for negligence.The case was initially heard in the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court allowed the deposition testimony of Charles to be presented to the jury over McBride's objection. The jury awarded McBride economic damages for past medical expenses related to the fall but did not award her any damages for past pain and suffering. McBride appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in allowing Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury and that the jury's verdict was inadequate because it did not award her past pain and suffering damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury. The court found that McBride had waived her objection to the use of the deposition by not raising it at the appropriate time during the trial. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of McBride's motion for a new trial on the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. The court found that the jury's verdict was inadequate as a matter of law because there was uncontradicted evidence that McBride suffered at least some pain in the immediate aftermath of the wheelchair incident. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. View "McBride v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

Patricia Lee, a debtor, defaulted on her mortgage held by U.S. Bank on a 43-acre property in Georgia, which she used as her principal residence and also leased to a farming company. In an attempt to restructure her debts, Lee filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. She proposed a reorganization plan that included payments to U.S. Bank. However, U.S. Bank moved for relief from the automatic stay that had been triggered by Lee's bankruptcy filing, arguing that the anti-modification provision in Chapter 11 prevented the bankruptcy court from approving a plan that modified U.S. Bank's claim.The bankruptcy court agreed with U.S. Bank, concluding that the anti-modification provision applied because the property was Lee's principal residence, regardless of its additional use as farmland. The court granted U.S. Bank's motion for relief from the automatic stay, effectively allowing the bank to foreclose on Lee's property. Lee appealed this decision to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The appellate court held that the anti-modification provision in Chapter 11 has three requirements: the security interest must be in real property; the real property must be the only security for the debt; and the real property must be the debtor's principal residence. The court found that all three requirements were met in this case, as U.S. Bank's claim was secured by Lee's real property, which was the only security for the debt and was used by Lee as her principal residence. The court rejected Lee's argument that the property's additional use as farmland should exempt it from the anti-modification provision. View "Lee v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

In 2006, Doris Sloan filed for survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act following the death of her husband, Gurstle Sloan, who had worked as a coal miner for Drummond Company for 16 years. Sloan's claim was denied by an administrative law judge, and this denial was reviewed twice. Sloan argued that the administrative law judge improperly excluded evidence supporting her request to modify her claim and erred by finding that the evidence did not establish that her husband’s death was due to pneumoconiosis.The Benefits Review Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s denial of survivor’s benefits. Sloan timely moved for reconsideration by the en banc Board, arguing that the administrative law judge erred by excluding and failing to consider certain evidence and by improperly relying on the opinion of the government’s expert witness. The Board denied Sloan’s motion for reconsideration en banc. Sloan filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the Board.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court was required to decide whether it had jurisdiction over a petition for review of a denial of survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act filed in this Court one day late. The court found that the filing deadline is jurisdictional and it had no jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for reconsideration by the Benefits Review Board. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Sloan v. Drummond Company, Inc." on Justia Law