Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the United States District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) denial of a church's petition for a religious exemption from the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth, Inc. petitioned the DEA for an exemption to the CSA so it could lawfully use and handle a sacramental tea known as ayahuasca, which contains a controlled substance, Dimethyltryptamine (DMT). The DEA denied the petition, concluding that the church had not met its burden under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to show that its members' beliefs were sincerely held and that its use of ayahuasca was part of a religious exercise. The DEA also found compelling governmental interests in maintaining public safety and preventing diversion of the tea into improper channels. The DEA's denial of the petition was deemed a final decision made under the CSA, thereby triggering the jurisdictional bar of 21 U.S.C. § 877. The court ruled that because the DEA's decision was made under the CSA, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial on the merits. The court also held that Soul Quest's additional constitutional, statutory, and procedural claims were "inescapably intertwined" with the DEA's final decision, making the CSA's jurisdictional bar applicable to those claims as well. View "Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth, Inc. v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

This case concerns a petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by a group of petitioners including a non-profit organization, a corporation that resells telecommunications services, and various individuals. They challenge the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 254, also known as the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s universal service requirements, arguing that it violates the nondelegation doctrine. They also argue that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency Congress put in charge of § 254, has impermissibly delegated authority over the universal service fund to a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), in violation of the private nondelegation doctrine.The court rejected these arguments, finding that § 254 provides an "intelligible principle" for the FCC to follow in its regulation of the universal service fund, and that the FCC maintains control and oversight of all actions by the private entity, USAC. Therefore, the court held that there were no unconstitutional delegations and denied the petition.In terms of the facts leading to the case, the FCC was created in 1934 to regulate interstate commerce in communication and was instructed by Congress in 1996 to establish and maintain a universal service fund. This fund was created with the goal of making communication services available to all the people of the United States, without discrimination. To manage this, the FCC relies on the USAC, a private entity, to determine the amount each contributor must provide to the fund. However, the petitioners argued that the actions taken by both the FCC and the USAC in creating the 4th Quarter 2022 Contribution Factor were unconstitutional. The court rejected these arguments and upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's and USAC's roles in managing the fund. View "Consumers' Research, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Reginald McCoy, who was charged in 1990 with conspiracy to possess and possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2019, McCoy filed a motion to reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, which allows some defendants to have their sentences reevaluated under reduced statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses that were implemented after their sentences became final. He argued that he should be able to object to the drug-quantity finding made at his original sentencing as he did not have reason to do so at the time because he did not know that the statutory sentencing thresholds would be lowered in the future. However, the district court denied McCoy's motion, concluding that it lacked the authority to reduce the sentence because McCoy was already serving the lowest statutory penalty available to him under the Fair Sentencing Act, which was life imprisonment. The court also ruled that it would not have exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence even if McCoy was eligible due to the large quantity of crack cocaine attributable to him and his "ongoing and excessive disciplinary infractions" while incarcerated.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the First Step Act does not grant authority to relitigate a drug quantity finding made at the original sentencing. It also rejected McCoy's argument that the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act via the First Step Act violates due process. The court reasoned that it is impossible for courts to provide notice of a hypothetical future law whose passage is uncertain and whose operative text is uncertain. The court concluded that McCoy was not entitled to notice in 1991 of what the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act would provide decades later. View "USA v. McCoy" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court reviewed the conviction of the defendant, Jirard Kincherlow, for coercing or enticing a minor into engaging in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant had connected a fourteen-year-old girl, J.D., with adult men to engage in sexual activity for money, and advised her on how to make more money as a prostitute through social media messages. The defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the district court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that a variance between the language of the indictment and the jury charge denied him due process notice of the charge against him.The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. The court ruled that presenting the opportunity or paying money for a minor to engage in prostitution qualifies as inducement under § 2422(b), and the defendant's actions went beyond merely offering an opportunity. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court found that the district court did not err in its instructions to the jury regarding the definition of "induce". Lastly, the court held that the variance between the indictment and the proof did not affect the defendant's substantial rights and his ability to defend himself. Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction. View "USA v. Kincherlow" on Justia Law

Doris Lapham, a former employee of Walgreen Co., filed a lawsuit against the company claiming violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Florida’s Private Sector Whistleblower Act (FWA). Lapham asserted that Walgreens interfered with her attempts to obtain leave under the FMLA to care for her disabled son, and retaliated against her for those attempts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Walgreens on all claims.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Appeals Court held that the proper causation standard for both FMLA and FWA retaliation claims is but-for causation, meaning that the plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the purported cause. Here, Lapham failed to show that Walgreens’ stated reasons for her termination (insubordination and dishonesty) were merely pretext for retaliation and that, but for her attempts to exercise her FMLA rights, she would not have been fired. Furthermore, Lapham failed to produce evidence showing she suffered any remediable prejudice due to Walgreens' alleged interference with her FMLA rights. View "Lapham v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

This case concerns an appeal by the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (the "Department") against a jury's verdict in favor of Lawanna Tynes, a former employee. Tynes had sued the Department for race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, after she was terminated from her position as the superintendent of the Broward Regional Juvenile Detention Center. The Department argued on appeal that Tynes failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as required under the evidentiary framework set by the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green case, because the comparator employees she presented were not similarly situated in all material respects.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court ruled that the Department's focus on the McDonnell Douglas framework and the adequacy of Tynes's comparators missed the ultimate question in a discrimination case, which is whether there is enough evidence to show that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination. The jury found that the Department had intentionally discriminated against Tynes, and the Department did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for that conclusion on appeal. Therefore, the Department's arguments regarding the adequacy of Tynes's comparators and the insufficiency of her prima facie case were irrelevant and did not disturb the jury's verdict.The Department also challenged the jury's verdict on Tynes's § 1981 claim, arguing that her complaint did not adequately plead the § 1981 claim and that she did not prove that race was a but-for cause of her termination. However, the appellate court found that the Department had forfeited both arguments because it failed to challenge the district court's authority to allow an amendment to the pleadings during the trial under Rule 15(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and did not argue that Tynes failed to prove that race was a but-for cause in its post-trial motion.Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Tynes on both her Title VII and § 1981 claims. View "Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the appellant, Christopher Ounjian, claimed that his employer, Globoforce, Inc., retaliated against him and forced him to resign after he objected to their unlawful conduct. Ounjian filed a suit alleging constructive discharge and sought damages under the Florida Private Whistleblower Act and Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The district court dismissed the complaint, stating that Ounjian failed to allege facts constituting a constructive discharge under the Florida Private Whistleblower Act and failed to allege damages cognizable under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's ruling, stating that the alleged instances of criticism, improper disclosure of personal information, and the withdrawn demotion threat did not meet the high bar for stating a constructive discharge claim. The court also stated that the company's actions were not compelling enough to force a reasonable employee to resign. The court further stated that the company's alleged improper sales practices were not a result of Ounjian's objections, thus negating any causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action required by the Florida Private Whistleblower Act.Regarding the claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the court ruled that while Ounjian did allege deceptive or unfair actions in the conduct of trade or commerce, the damages he sought resulting from the loss of his employment were not cognizable under the Act. As such, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. View "Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc." on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case involving Theresa Phillips and Legacy Cabinets, Ms. Phillips, a white woman, claimed she was fired due to racial discrimination by her supervisor, Derrick O’Neal, a Black man. Mr. O'Neal argued that he fired Ms. Phillips for insubordination. After being dismissed by the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Ms. Phillips appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, holding that a reasonable jury could find that Legacy Cabinets discriminated against Ms. Phillips when it punished her more severely than her Black coworkers for similar conduct. The evidence included Ms. Phillips's own testimony and the fact that she was punished more harshly than her similarly situated non-white coworkers. The appellate court did not make a definitive finding of discrimination, but rather decided that there was enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to potentially make such a finding. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment ruling of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Phillips v. Legacy Cabinet" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia regarding a dispute over the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in Georgia. The plaintiff, Charles Baldwin, had worked for various franchisees of Express Oil Change, LLC, and was asked to sign a restrictive covenant as a condition of receiving a payment after the franchisees' stores were sold to Express. The covenant restricted Baldwin from engaging in certain competitive business activities for a specified duration and within a specified geographic area. After leaving Express, Baldwin sued, seeking a declaration that the covenant was unenforceable under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act (GRCA). The district court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the covenant, finding it unreasonable in terms of its geographic scope and duration. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court correctly concluded that the covenant's geographic scope was unreasonable under the GRCA, but that it applied the wrong presumption in concluding that the covenant's duration was unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, dismissed the appeal in part, and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of its preliminary injunction under the proper presumptions. View "Baldwin v. Express Oil Change, LLC" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, a group of Florida restaurants brought a lawsuit against Sysco Jacksonville, Inc., a food distribution company. The restaurants, which include A1A Burrito Works, Inc., A1A Burrito Works Taco Shop 2, Inc., and Juniper Beach Enterprises, Inc., alleged that Sysco violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and breached their contracts when Sysco regularly delivered underweight boxes of poultry. The district court dismissed the restaurants' claims, ruling that the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) preempted their state law claims because their claims sought to impose on Sysco labeling requirements that are "in addition to, or different than" the requirements prescribed by federal law.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court agreed with the district court that the restaurants failed to show that their FDUTPA claim was not preempted by the PPIA. However, the court disagreed with the district court's dismissal of the restaurants' breach of contract claim. The court found that this claim, which argued that the restaurants did not receive the amount of poultry they paid for in accordance with their contracts with Sysco, was not preempted because it merely sought to enforce the parties' private agreements regarding the cost and weight of poultry packages and did not amount to a state imposing a labeling requirement inconsistent with federal regulations. View "A1A Burrito Works, Inc., et al v. Sysco Jacksonville, Inc." on Justia Law