Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity following Plaintiff’s Section 1983 false arrest claim and a state law false arrest claim against two Huntsville, Alabama police officers and the City itself. Plaintiff brought both a Section 1983 false arrest claim and a state law false arrest claim against two Huntsville, Alabama, police officers and the City itself. After the district court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, he appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court explained that the officers violated Plaintiff’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested him with neither actual nor arguable probable cause. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants because it determined that arguable probable cause was a defense to those claims as well. The court wrote that the district court did not conduct any independent analysis of these claims and instead linked its decision directly to the finding of arguable probable cause on the federal claims. There was no actual probable cause to conclude that Plaintiff was driving a car without displaying his license at the time the officer arrived. Nor could any reasonable officer interpret the law as permitting arrest in this case, and therefore there was no arguable probable cause either. Accordingly, the court held that there was no arguable probable cause—i.e., the lack of probable cause was clearly established. View "Roland Edger v. Krista McCabe, et al." on Justia Law

The case at hand is about whether Plaintiff was retaliated against by her former employer, Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants, Inc. (“APC”), and the company that contracted with her employer, Centurion of Florida, LLC (“Centurion”) (together, “Defendants”), for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged four counts. Centurion and APC both moved for summary judgment on all counts. The district court granted summary judgment on three of them. The district court directed the clerk to enter a final judgment on the three resolved counts, and it certified that the fourth count satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) for immediate interlocutory review, should either party file an appropriate application with the Eleventh Circuit. At issue is whether the district court’s certification was proper as to Plaintiff’s direct appeal and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) have been met as to Centurion’s cross-appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the answer to both questions is not and dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that there are substantial reasons to delay resolving Plaintiff’s appeal of her whistleblower counts against APC. Plaintiff’s whistleblower counts against Centurion and APC are identical. It makes good sense that appeals of an order dismissing those counts should be heard together. But because there is no final judgment against Centurion, the court wrote that it lacks the power to adjudicate those counts against Centurion at this time. View "Ronda Scott v. Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants Inc, et al." on Justia Law

Noble Prestige Limited lent Paul Thomas Horn $500,000 to pursue litigation against a telecommunications company. While the litigation was pending, a conservatorship over Horn’s assets was commenced in a probate court in Denver, Colorado (the “Denver Probate Court”). The case was settled, and the proceeds were placed in the conservatorship estate, subject to Galle’s management and the ultimate custody and control of the Denver Probate Court. Noble ultimately obtained arbitral awards that required Horn to pay Noble the debt owed under the loan agreement and Galle to pay Noble costs associated with the arbitration. Noble moved to confirm the awards and sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting Galle, Horn, and Galle’s law firm. Galle and GLG (together, “Respondents”) opposed Noble’s request and moved to dismiss the action. The district court granted Noble’s request, entering what it termed a “temporary restraining order” that prohibited Galle from dissipating or transferring $10,000,000 “notwithstanding any order(s) entered by the [Denver] Probate Court.” The district court also entered an order granting Respondents’ motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part. Respondents appealed both orders.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Respondents’ appeal to the extent it challenged the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss, vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case. The court explained that Noble’s petition fails to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the district court and, therefore, the issuance of a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 was improper. Further, the court explained that district court lacked the power to issue an order freezing the AT&T settlement funds pending judgment. View "Noble Prestige Limited v. Craig Thomas Galle, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of five individuals, filed this petition for review, claiming that the FAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) during its Phase II approval process. Petitioners assert that the FAA violated NEPA by (1) segmenting its review of a single Airport development project into multiple, smaller projects to make the project’s environmental effect appear less significant, (2) failing to consider the project’s cumulative effects, and (3) failing to analyze all air quality impacts. The FAA responds that, as an initial matter, Petitioners cannot bring this petition for review because they lack standing and did not exhaust their administrative remedies. Alternatively, the FAA contends that it did not violate NEPA, and the petition for review should be denied.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court held that Petitioners have standing and did not fail to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners, however, fall short on the merits because it is clear that the FAA satisfied NEPA’s requirements. The court explained that Petitioners are unhappy that the FAA greenlighted Phase II (as well as the Airport developments preceding Phase II). However, the court does not vacate agency decisions over mere policy disagreements. Accordingly, the court held that the FAA did what it was supposed to do, and its review processes were not arbitrary and capricious. View "John S. Lowman, IV, et al v. Federal Aviation Administration, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant filed liens against property owned by a slew of people he thought had wronged him—including, as relevant here, a former Commissioner of the IRS and a former Secretary of the Treasury. Defendant was thereafter charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 1521, which criminalizes the filing of retaliatory liens against the property of “an individual described in” Section 1114, which, in turn, refers to “any officer or employee of the United States. At issue on appeal is whether a former civil servant counts as an “officer or employee of the United States” within the meaning of Section 1114 and, thus, of Section 1521.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s convictions on four counts and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. establish that words like “officer” and “employee” can sometimes include formers—but only when the statutory context makes clear that they should. Neither suffices to show that the ordinary meaning of those terms includes ex-officers or erstwhile employees. Here, given the absence of textual indicia supporting a broader reading of the terms, the court declined to adopt the government’s strained interpretation. The court wrote that because Defendant filed the liens at issue when the relevant parties were no longer government “officer[s] or employee[s]” within the meaning of Section 1114, his conduct wasn’t covered by 18 U.S.C. Section 1521. View "USA v. Timothy Jermaine Pate" on Justia Law

Plaintiff became a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, in 1999. At the age of 47, Plaintiff took disability retirement on November 1, 2018. When Plaintiff retired, she continued to receive free health insurance through the City. Under a policy in effect when Plaintiff first joined the fire department, employees retiring for qualifying disability reasons, such as Plaintiff’s Parkinson’s disease, received free health insurance until the age of 65. But, unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the City changed its benefits plan in 2003. Under the new plan, disability retirees such as Plaintiff are entitled to the health insurance subsidy for only twenty-four months after retiring. Her complaint alleged various claims, including violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court entered judgment for the City.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff cannot establish that the City committed any discriminatory acts against her while she could perform the essential functions of a job that she held or desired to hold, her Title I claim fails. For the same reason, so do her claims under the Rehab Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Further, the court held that the City’s s benefits plan does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Disabled persons are not a suspect class, and government-paid health insurance is not a recognized fundamental right. Thus under rational basis review, the City’s benefits plan advances the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving funds. View "Karyn D. Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody and care of the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC). Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis C (HCV) in 2009 but did not receive medication for it until nine years later. By then, Plaintiff’s HCV had progressed to stage F4 cirrhosis with indications of severe liver inflammation. Plaintiff sued numerous prison doctors, three of whom are the subject of this appeal, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors and dismissed all claims against them. Plaintiff appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its denial of his motion to amend the complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment but affirmed its denial of the motion to amend. The court explained that the bar to proving an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is high, but it is not insurmountable. The court explained that Plaintiff has raised a number of factual disputes regarding the denial of his HCV treatment for over eight years. These disputes are sufficiently material to be decided by a jury. View "Ricky J. Johnson v. Dr. Sharon Lewis, et al" on Justia Law

After entering a conditional guilty plea, Defendant appealed his convictions on four counts related to child pornography. At the start of the COVID-19 global pandemic, Defendant was arrested on a criminal complaint on March 10, 2020. Thereafter, the district court entered a series of pandemic-related administrative orders that continued grand jury sessions five times at the ends of justice, spanning March 26, 2020, to November 16, 2020. Due to the pandemic, a grand jury did not formally indict Defendant until December 1, 2020. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for failure to indict him within thirty days from his arrest, as required by the Speedy Trial Act. Defendant does not challenge the time between indictment and his guilty plea, but only between his arrest on March 10 and grand jury indictment on December 1, 2020.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The court concluded that the pandemic-related continuances in 2020 were not an abuse of discretion and were within the ends-of-justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act. The court explained that the magistrate judge was not required to expressly consider each statutory factor in its order or recite specific language from the statute. The court explained that not every statutory factor will be relevant to the circumstances warranting the continuance. Instead, it is sufficient if the record shows, as it does here, that the magistrate judge considered the pertinent factors. View "USA v. Robert Dunn" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff sustained serious injuries from a hot-soup spill at Noodle College Park, an Atlanta-area restaurant, she and her spouse sued Shou & Shou, Inc., which owned and operated the restaurant. Shou & Shou tendered the defense to and sought coverage from AmGuard Insurance Company. But AmGuard denied coverage on the ground that the policy named “Noodle, Inc.”—an entity that did not exist—as insured. Shou & Shou settled the suit and assigned the Lowerys its rights under the policy. Plaintiffs, as assignees, then sued AmGuard for equitable reformation of the policy. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and later entered a final judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that reformation of the policy was proper under Georgia law. The court explained that the district court correctly equitably reformed the 2016–17 policy to insure the true owner of the restaurant. The court explained that AmGuard insists that it could not have shared Shou & Shou’s mistake because it did not know the “identity” of the intended insured and could not have intended to “name” Shou & Shou as an insured. But Georgia law does not demand that degree of specificity in defining a mutual mistake. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs claim of breach of contract merges with reformation of the policy. View "Hee Lowery, et al v. AmGuard Insurance Company" on Justia Law

CSX Transportation, Inc. is a freight railroad company. General Mills, Inc. operates a cereal processing plant in Georgia near one of CSX’s rail lines. A small connecting railroad connects CSX’s main rail line to General Mills’s plant. A contract between CSX and General Mills governs the use of the sidetrack.A General Mills employee suffered severe injuries while working on the sidetrack and then sued CSX for negligence. A jury found CSX liable, and CSX sought indemnification from General Mills, citing a contractual provision providing General Mills was required to indemnify CSX—regardless of whether CSX alone was responsible. The district court dismissed one of CSX’s breach-of-contract claims and granted General Mills summary judgment on the other.The Eleventh Circuit found that, under the parties’ agreement, General Mills was not required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely negligent. However, the court disagreed with the district court that Georgia's vouchment doctrine barred CSX from litigating the issue of General Mills’s negligence. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for the district court to determine if General Mills was at least partially at fault for the injury. If so, then General Mills must indemnify CSX for at least a portion of the settlement and related expenses. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law