Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Horn, a former registered stockbroker, was convicted by a jury in April 2022 of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced him to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of $1,469,702. Horn appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging cumulative error. He also raised objections regarding the calculation of his loss, restitution, and offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. The jury found Horn guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him accordingly. Horn's co-defendant, Omar Leon Plummer, was also convicted and sentenced. Horn's appeal followed, raising several issues related to the trial and sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Horn's convictions. The court held that Horn acted with the requisite intent to defraud, as evidenced by his distribution of materially false information to investors and his role in the fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected Horn's arguments regarding cumulative error, finding no merit in his claims.Regarding sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found no clear error in the district court's determination that Horn was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity, justifying a four-level enhancement. The court also affirmed the use of intended loss rather than actual loss for sentencing purposes, consistent with the Guidelines and relevant case law. The court concluded that the district court's loss calculation and restitution order were supported by reliable and specific evidence. View "USA v. Horn" on Justia Law

James Wilson III used earplugs manufactured by Hearos, LLC at a shooting range and subsequently suffered significant hearing loss. He filed a lawsuit against Hearos in state court, alleging various tort claims. Protective Industrial Products, Inc. (PIP), a non-party, removed the case to federal court. The district court noted the unusual removal by a non-party but proceeded as neither Wilson nor Hearos objected to the court's jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Wilson's claims as time-barred under Georgia law.The district court for the Southern District of Georgia found that Wilson filed his complaint three days before the statute of limitations expired but did not serve Hearos until 117 days after the limitations period ended. The court concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate the required diligence in serving Hearos, leading to the dismissal of his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that removal by a non-party is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and must be objected to within 30 days under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Since Wilson did not object within this period, he waived his right to challenge the removal. The court also affirmed that Georgia's service-and-diligence rule, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), applied to determine if Wilson's claims were time-barred. The court concluded that Wilson did not act with the required diligence to serve Hearos, affirming the district court's dismissal of his claims. View "Wilson v. Hearos, LLC" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Antonio Lemus and Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar, were convicted of cocaine-related charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Lemus was apprehended on December 30, 2021, when U.S. Coast Guard officers intercepted a vessel north of Panama, found cocaine, and determined the vessel was without nationality after Colombia could not confirm its registration. Canario-Vilomar was arrested on December 6, 2021, when a similar vessel was intercepted north of Colombia, and the Dominican Republic could not confirm its registration. Both defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.In the Southern District of Florida, Lemus pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 87 months in prison. In the Middle District of Florida, Canario-Vilomar pled guilty to conspiracy, and his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the MDLEA exceeded Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution and that their vessels were not stateless under international law. Canario-Vilomar also argued that his offense occurred in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which he claimed was beyond Congress's regulatory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause is not limited by international law, affirming that the MDLEA's definition of a "vessel without nationality" and the inclusion of the EEZ within the "high seas" were constitutional. The court also rejected Canario-Vilomar's due process argument, citing precedent that the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants. View "USA v. Canario-Vilomar" on Justia Law

The case involves the appeals of Rolando Williamson, Hendarius Archie, Ishmywel Gregory, and Adrien Taylor, who were convicted of various drug distribution and conspiracy charges. Williamson argued that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence obtained from warrants to search his house and apartment, claiming the use of pole cameras violated the Fourth Amendment. Archie contended that the district court allowed improper opinion testimony from a case agent. Gregory challenged the district court’s findings on the type and amount of drugs attributable to him at sentencing. All defendants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their conspiracy convictions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama convicted the defendants on multiple counts. Williamson was sentenced to life imprisonment for several counts, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Taylor was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and using a communication facility to commit a drug trafficking crime. Gregory was convicted of distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Archie was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of pole cameras did not violate Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights as they surveilled areas exposed to the public. The court found that the case agent’s opinion testimony did not affect Archie’s substantial rights. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support each defendant’s conspiracy conviction. However, Williamson’s conspiracy conviction was vacated as it was a lesser-included offense of his continuing criminal enterprise conviction. Gregory’s sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing as it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Michael Horton, an Alabama prisoner, filed a pro se lawsuit against two correctional officers, alleging that they subjected him to an unconstitutional body-cavity search. Horton claimed that during an institution-wide search, he was ordered to strip and undergo a body-cavity search in the presence of female officers, which violated his religious beliefs. Horton's complaint included claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama required the officers to provide documents and evidence, and Horton was given an opportunity to respond. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers and dismissed Horton’s lawsuit with prejudice. Horton argued that the district court erred by not allowing him to amend his complaint to include new factual allegations before granting summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the rule requiring a pro se plaintiff to be given an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal with prejudice applies only in the context of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, not summary judgment. The court found that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment without sua sponte allowing Horton to amend his complaint. The court also noted that Horton had been given sufficient notice and opportunity to respond to the summary judgment motion but failed to provide a signed declaration with new facts.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Horton was not entitled to amend his complaint sua sponte before the summary judgment was granted. View "Horton v. Captain Gilchrist" on Justia Law

Tim Daniels, a commercial fisherman in Florida, challenged the constitutionality of regulations by Florida’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) that restrict where and how Florida-registered vessels can harvest Florida pompano in federal waters. Daniels argued that federal law preempts state regulations affecting fishing in federal waters and that Florida’s regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by only restricting Florida-registered vessels.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for the FWC, concluding that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court also determined that Daniels lacked standing to sue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Daniels has standing to sue because he faces a credible threat of prosecution under Florida’s regulations, which affects his commercial fishing activities. The court found that Daniels’s injury is directly traceable to Florida’s regulations and can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act does not preempt Florida’s regulations. The court reasoned that the Act allows states to regulate fishing vessels registered under their laws in federal waters when there is no federal fishery management plan or regulations in place. The court also held that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving and managing pompano stock, and the regulations only apply to Florida-registered vessels, which are within the state’s jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, upholding Florida’s pompano regulations. View "Daniels v. Executive Director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Jose Rosado, a Hispanic male of Colombian origin, who worked as an Information Technology (IT) Specialist for the United States Navy. Rosado alleged that he was denied promotions on five occasions between 2014 and 2018 due to race, national origin, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for his prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity. The promotions in question were for various IT Specialist positions within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast (NAVFAC SE).In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy. The court concluded that Rosado failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation for any of the promotion decisions. Specifically, the court found that Rosado did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he was equally or more qualified than the individuals who were selected for the positions or that the Navy's decisions were influenced by discriminatory or retaliatory motives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Rosado did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show that the selected candidates were similarly situated in all material respects or that unlawful discrimination played any part in the Navy's decision-making process. Additionally, the court found that Rosado did not present sufficient evidence to support his retaliation claims, as there was no indication that retaliatory animus influenced the Navy's actions.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy, concluding that Rosado did not provide enough evidence to support his claims of discrimination and retaliation. View "Rosado v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Sheryl Glover and Cathy Booze, plaintiffs, argued that Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by charging optional fees for expedited mortgage payments online or by phone. Ocwen offered borrowers the option to make expedited payments for an additional fee, while mailed payments incurred no fee. Glover and Booze paid these fees multiple times, but their mortgage agreements did not mention such fees.The Southern District of Florida held that Ocwen was acting as a debt collector when it charged the fees, that the fees were incidental to the principal obligation, and that they were not permitted by law nor authorized by the debt agreements. The district court awarded actual damages to Glover and Booze. Ocwen appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Ocwen, as a debt collector, violated the FDCPA by charging an amount not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. The court emphasized that the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from collecting any amount unless it is expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law. The court found that the convenience fees were not permitted by law, as neither the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) nor the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) substantively authorized such fees. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Glover and Booze. View "Glover v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Rhonda Fleming, an inmate at Federal Correctional Institution Tallahassee (FCIT), filed a pro se lawsuit against Warden Erica Strong and the United States, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to her exposure to mold, asbestos, and COVID-19, which she claimed caused severe health issues. Fleming sought injunctive relief and damages under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). She alleged that despite her complaints, the prison officials, including Warden Strong, failed to address the hazardous conditions, leading to her contracting COVID-19 twice and requiring hospitalization.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing most of Fleming's claims, including all claims against Strong, citing that Bivens did not provide a remedy for her Eighth Amendment claim. However, the district court disagreed, finding that Fleming's Eighth Amendment claim was similar to a previously recognized Bivens claim and allowed it to proceed. The district court did not address the issue of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court's order recognizing a Bivens cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit joined four other circuits in holding that the collateral-order doctrine does not extend to Bivens-extension orders that do not address qualified immunity. The court emphasized that qualified immunity adequately protects government officials from the burdens of litigation and that separation-of-powers concerns with Bivens extensions do not justify immediate appeal. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fleming v. FCI Tallahassee Warden" on Justia Law

Kristie Williams, a former employee of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her daughter, who was allegedly sexually assaulted while serving in the Marine Corps. The University approved her leave, but Williams claimed she continued to receive work-related communications and criticism from her supervisors during her leave. This led to her resignation, and she subsequently sued the University, alleging interference with her FMLA rights and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the University’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the suit was barred by state sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that Williams might have been seeking family-care leave under the FMLA, for which the Supreme Court had previously held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Williams’s suit could proceed regardless of whether she sought family-care leave, active-duty leave, or servicemember-family leave. For family-care leave, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hibbs confirmed that Congress had abrogated state sovereign immunity. For active-duty and servicemember-family leave, the court concluded that Alabama waived its sovereign immunity under the plan-of-the-Convention doctrine when it joined the Union, as these provisions were enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional authority to raise and support the military. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the University’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama" on Justia Law