Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case relates to the admission of an investigator's testimony from a preliminary hearing in a subsequent trial. The appellant, Maurice Kent, was a member of a violent gang and was charged with RICO conspiracy and five other substantive crimes, including the attempted murder of Shadeed Muhammad. The government alleged that the gang murdered a former member, Qualeef Rhode, for cooperating with the police’s investigation into the attempted murder. The government introduced an investigator’s testimony from a preliminary hearing in a related case, which identified Rhode as cooperating with law enforcement to implicate Kent in the attempted murder. Kent argued that this testimony was hearsay and its admission violated his Confrontation Clause rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Kent's arguments and affirmed the decision of the district court. The court held that the investigator's testimony was not hearsay because it was offered for the effect it had on the listeners (other gang members) and not for the truth of the matter asserted. It was relevant because it influenced Kent and the other gang members who heard the testimony at the preliminary hearing, providing them with a motive to murder Rhode. The court also determined that the district court had sufficiently reduced the risk that the jury would improperly consider the out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted by redacting the most prejudicial portions of the testimony and instructing the jury to consider the testimony only for its effect on the listeners. Therefore, the admission of the testimony did not violate Kent's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "United States v. Kent" on Justia Law

In this case, there were three separate class action lawsuits filed against Costa Del Mar, Inc., a sunglasses manufacturer, for allegedly deceptive warranty and repair policies. Each of the named plaintiffs purchased Costa sunglasses and were charged up to $105.18 to repair their sunglasses, despite the company's lifetime warranties that they claimed required the company to repair their sunglasses either free-of-charge or for a nominal fee. The plaintiffs sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. The district court approved a settlement agreement that provided over $32 million in monetary relief and injunctive relief. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated this decision, reasoning that the named plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief because none of them alleged any threat of future injury. The court remanded the case back to the district court to reconsider its approval of the settlement agreement, taking into account that it could not consider the injunctive relief's value in its determination that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. View "Smith v. Miorelli" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Robert H. Wainberg, a tenured biology professor at Piedmont University, who filed a lawsuit against several officers and trustees of the university. He alleged that they conspired to retaliate against him for filing a prior lawsuit and to deter witnesses from participating in that lawsuit, and negligently refused to prevent that conspiracy. The district court dismissed Wainberg’s claims as time-barred, concluding that the statute of limitations ran from the first overt act Wainberg alleged as part of the conspiracy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that under its precedent, each overt act triggers its own statute of limitations. Therefore, Wainberg’s claims arising out of some overt acts were timely. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that the continuing-violation doctrine, which allows a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the statutory period, did not apply in this case because the alleged violations were not ongoing but were discrete acts, each triggering its own statute of limitations. View "Wainberg v. Mellichamp" on Justia Law

Inmate Germaine Smart alleged that prison officials Ronald England, Gary Malone, and Larry Baker violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for reporting an alleged sexual assault by England. Smart claimed that England sexually assaulted him during a pat-down search, but after an internal investigation, Smart's allegations were found to be unfounded and England charged Smart with lying. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the officials did not violate Smart's First Amendment rights. The court stated that a prisoner's violation of a prison regulation is not protected by the First Amendment, and in this case, the prison tribunal's finding that Smart lied, which was based on due process and some evidence, was conclusive. Therefore, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Smart v. England" on Justia Law

In this case, Plaintiff Jennifer Akridge, a former employee of Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, appealed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Alfa on her claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Akridge had multiple sclerosis and severe migraines, and she alleged that the company wrongfully terminated her to avoid paying for her healthcare costs. Alfa argued that it eliminated her position because her duties were automated and no longer needed, and the company wanted to cut business expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment ruling. The court found that Akridge failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA. Even if she had, her evidence failed to show that Alfa’s reason for firing her (that her position was no longer needed and it wished to cut business expenses) was pretext for disability discrimination. The court also rejected Akridge's argument that she merely needs to show that her disability was a motivating factor, rather than a but-for cause, of her termination. The court clarified that, unlike Title VII, the ADA does not incorporate the motivating-factor causation standard, and an ADA plaintiff must show that a cause was outcome determinative. Therefore, it upheld the district court’s decision that Akridge did not produce sufficient evidence to suggest that her termination was a result of discrimination based on her disability.The court also affirmed the district court's award of $1,918 in discovery sanctions against Akridge. The lower court found that Akridge's motion to compel a certain deposition was not substantially justified, and the appeals court found no error or abuse of discretion in that ruling. View "Akridge v. Alfa Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Thanquarius R. Calhoun was appealing the denial of his federal habeas petition following his conviction for felony murder and other crimes in the state of Georgia. Calhoun had led police on a high-speed chase that resulted in a passenger's death after law enforcement used a Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT) maneuver to stop his vehicle.Calhoun's appeal argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel did not present a defense or request a jury instruction on the theory that the PIT maneuver, and not his own actions, was the proximate or intervening cause of the passenger's death.Under Georgia law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, a defendant's act is not the "legal cause" of an injury or damage if some other act "intervenes." However, if the intervening act "could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrong-doer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrong-doer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act." In other words, proximate cause is not affected by a reasonably foreseeable intervening cause.The Eleventh Circuit, giving deference to the Supreme Court of Georgia's interpretation of Georgia law, found that the PIT maneuver was reasonably foreseeable given Calhoun's reckless behavior during the police chase. As a result, the use of the maneuver did not break the causal chain linking Calhoun's actions to the passenger's death. Thus, Calhoun had not carried his burden to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if his counsel had argued that the PIT maneuver was an intervening cause. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Calhoun's habeas petition. View "Calhoun v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison" on Justia Law

In a dispute that arose from a gang-related murder, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was called to examine whether the placement of two suspects (who were allegedly involved in the same crime) in a room together constituted an interrogation under Miranda rights. The case involved Jimmie Bowen, a member of the New Moneii gang, who was convicted for the murder of Pierre Roche and injuring two others. After his arrest, Bowen invoked his right to counsel, at which point the police ceased questioning him. However, they moved him to another room where Bernard Jones, another member of the gang and the alleged getaway driver, was present. The ensuing conversation between Bowen and Jones resulted in Bowen making incriminating statements, which were used in his trial. Bowen appealed, arguing that his placement in the room with Jones violated his Miranda rights. The district court agreed with Bowen, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision. The appeals court found that the Supreme Court's precedent was unclear on whether placing two suspects in a room together constitutes an interrogation under Miranda. The court held that because reasonable jurists could disagree about whether Bowen was "interrogated" in the interview room, federal courts lack the power to overturn his state criminal conviction. The appellate court further noted that the fact that Bowen incriminated himself does not necessarily mean it was "reasonably likely" that he would do so when Jones was placed in the room. The court concluded that the case fell into a gray area not clearly defined by Supreme Court precedent, and thus, Bowen's challenge did not warrant federal habeas relief. As such, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bowen v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Taquila Monroe, was a former employee of Fort Valley State University's Head Start and Early Head Start department. She sued the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (the "Board") under the False Claims Act's (FCA) anti-retaliation provision, alleging that she was terminated for reporting mismanagement and misuse of federal and state funds meant for the Head Start programs. The district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss, citing the Board's sovereign immunity. The central issue on appeal was whether the FCA's anti-retaliation provision abrogates sovereign immunity for lawsuits against states, and whether the Board is an arm of the state entitled to the same immunity.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that Congress did not unequivocally express its intent to subject states to suits under the FCA's anti-retaliation provision, and therefore did not abrogate sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Board is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. In reaching these conclusions, the court considered how Georgia law defines the Board, the degree of control the state exercises over the Board, the Board's source of funding, and who would be responsible for a judgment against the Board. The court found that all of these factors pointed to the Board being an arm of the state that is entitled to sovereign immunity. View "Monroe v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia" on Justia Law

The case in question concerns the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision on whether Ibrahim Almagarby and his company, Microcap Equity Group, LLC, violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by buying and selling securities without registering as a "dealer". Almagarby was a so-called “toxic” lender who bought the convertible debt of penny-stock companies, converted the debt into common stock at a discount, and then sold the stock in high volumes. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil action against Almagarby, alleging that his conduct constituted dealing, which required registration. The district court ruled in favor of the SEC, ordered Almagarby to disgorge all profits, and permanently enjoined him from future securities law violations and participation in penny-stock offerings.On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that Almagarby was acting as an unregistered “dealer” in violation of the Exchange Act, but found that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a penny-stock ban. The court determined that Almagarby’s high volume of transactions, quick turnaround of sales, and the fact that his entire business relied on flipping penny stocks qualified him as a dealer under the Exchange Act. However, the court ruled that the district court overstepped in enjoining Almagarby from future participation in penny-stock offerings as his actions were not egregious enough to warrant such a bar. The court also rejected Almagarby's claim that the SEC's action violated his due process rights, noting that the Commission did not rely on a novel enforcement theory that contradicted longstanding agency guidance. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding the judgment against Almagarby but striking down the penny-stock ban. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Almagarby" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed appeals from Eric Robert Rudolph, who had pled guilty to six federal arson charges and four counts of using a destructive device during a crime of violence in order to avoid the death penalty. As part of his plea deal, Rudolph had waived his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence, and to collaterally attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding. Despite this, Rudolph filed two petitions for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to vacate several of his sentences. He argued that his convictions for using an explosive during a crime of violence were unlawful in light of new Supreme Court precedent.The Eleventh Circuit found that Rudolph’s § 2255 motions were, in fact, collateral attacks on his sentences, which his plea agreements did not permit. The court held that § 2255 is a mechanism for attacking sentences, not convictions. The court also rejected Rudolph's argument that his appeal waivers were unenforceable because he hadn't known he was waiving the right to collaterally attack his convictions, pointing out that the waivers explicitly included motions under § 2255. The court further declined to adopt a so-called "miscarriage of justice" exception to the enforceability of appeal waivers, which some other courts have recognized. The court affirmed the district courts' decisions denying Rudolph’s § 2255 motions. View "Rudolph v. United States" on Justia Law