Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, Petitioner sought state post-conviction relief. As relevant here, he asserted that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him about the risks of not following through with his plea agreement and by not doing enough to persuade him to testify against his co-defendant. The Alabama courts rejected this ineffectiveness claim, ruling in part that Petitioner could not show prejudice resulting from his attorneys’ conduct. The district court denied Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition, concluding that the decision of the Alabama courts was not an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would have refused to testify against a co-Defendant, no matter what more his attorneys did, stands. Based on that finding, their ultimate conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance—which constitutes a ruling on a mixed question of law and fact—is not unreasonable under Section 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the court concluded that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would not have changed his mind no matter what more his attorneys might have done is entitled to a presumption of correctness. And that presumption has not been overcome by clear and convincing evidence. View "Robert Shawn Ingram v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner pleaded guilty to murdering his grandmother and stepgrandfather. He was sentenced to death. After exhausting his direct appeals, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court agreed with Alabama and summarily dismissed Petitioner's petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal.Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C 2254, which was dismissed on abandonment grounds. As an alternate holding, the district court found that Petitioner's claims were too conclusory to get around AEDPA.The Eleventh Circuit granted a COA on three issues, ultimately rejecting each on the basis that his claim were insufficient to overcome AEPDA deference to state court decisions. View "Ellis Louis Mashburn, Jr. v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Employer provides security for NASA and employs approximately 40 security officers. Employee was hired as a security officer in 2018. After learning that his pay did not increase as promised after completing his training, Employee and a co-worker who was in a similar position sought reimbursement of unpaid wages. Employee wired both employees their missing wages, but Employee was not paid for other reimbursements he believed he was entitled to.After Employee and several co-workers were caught using their personal cell phones, Employee was suspended pending an investigation. The other co-workers received less severe disciplinary sanctions, if any.After review, the NLRB found that Employee engaged in protected concerted activity on several occasions and that Employer violated Section 8(a)(1)5 of the NLRA. Employer filed a petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit.The Eleventh Circuit denied Employer's petition for review of an NLRB decision finding that Employer unlawfully terminated Employee for engaging in activity protected under the National Labor Relations Act. View "Security Walls, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old girl took her own life after a classmate repeatedly delivered racist insults to her. The girl's mother and grandmother sought to hold the school system and several school officials accountable for her death. The family filed a lawsuit asserting claims arising under federal and state law against the school system and the school officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the school system and its officials, concluding that the family failed to satisfy various elements of their federal statutory claims and that qualified immunity barred at least one of the claims. The court concluded that the state law claims failed on immunity grounds. The family appealed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Although the response of the school system and its officials was "truly discouraging," the standard for relief in cases of student-on-student harassment was not met. The court explained that a reasonable jury could not find that DCS acted with deliberate indifference, that it intentionally discriminated against the girl, or that Defendants' actions were arbitrary or conscience-shocking. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the family's Title IX, Title VI, equal protection, and substantive due process claims. View "Jasmine Adams, et al v. Demopolis City Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued The Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. (“SCAD”) for race discrimination and retaliation after he was fired from his job as Head Fishing Coach. As part of his employment onboarding, however, Plaintiff signed a document agreeing to arbitrate—not litigate—all legal disputes that arose between him and SCAD. Accordingly, SCAD moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court, approving and adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”), granted SCAD’s motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by ignoring that his agreement with SCAD was unconscionable and that SCAD waived its right to arbitrate. He also argued that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his early discovery request.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting SCAD’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s arbitration agreement is neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. Further, the court found that SCAD did not waive its right to enforce arbitration and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiff’s request for early discovery. In short, the court concluded that Plaintiff is bound by his agreement to arbitrate his legal claims against SCAD. View "Isaac Payne v. Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted of tampering with a witness. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense in three respects: (1) the alleged threat of physical force only related to a criminal investigation, not an “official proceeding”; (2) the evidence failed to establish that he intended to prevent his girlfriend from testifying in an official proceeding; and (3) the evidence failed to establish that he was the person who threatened his girlfriend.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it was not persuaded by any of Defendant’s arguments. The court wrote that Defendant’s girlfriend was preparing to testify as a witness in an upcoming grand jury proceedings and possible trial against her crack supplier. The evidence in the record can reasonably support the conclusion that Defendant threatened his girlfriend in relation to those upcoming proceedings and that Defendant possessed the requisite intent to obstruct an official proceeding. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Defendant was the caller who threatened his girlfriend. View "USA v. William Raymond Beach" on Justia Law

Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Jared Wheat, and Stephen Smith appealed the district court’s denial of their request for relief from contempt sanctions. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued them for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, alleging they had misrepresented their weight-loss products to consumers. The agency sought equitable monetary remedies and an injunction against future unlawful trade practices. The district court granted injunctive relief and ordered them to pay $16 million in equitable monetary relief. Years later, the district court found that they had violated the injunction, held them in civil contempt, and ordered them to pay an additional $40 million in contempt sanctions. Before the $40 million contempt judgment was collected, the United States Supreme Court decided AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission. Invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Defendants returned to the district court to request relief from the contempt judgment, arguing that continued enforcement of the judgment was no longer equitable after AMG. The district court denied the motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(5). The court explained that because AMG did not address the district court’s inherent authority to sanction contempt, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendants’ request for relief under Rule 60(b)(5). Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The court reasoned that Defendants have failed to show extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Federal Trade Commission v. National Urological Group, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He made three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion by striking a juror for cause because of her religious beliefs, (2) the district court plainly erred by allowing law enforcement officers to identify Defendant in surveillance footage, and (3) his convictions for using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence should be vacated because aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the attempted Hobbs Act is not a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The court explained that the Supreme Court distinguished between the completed offense and an attempt to complete that offense. To obtain a conviction for completed Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove “that the defendant engaged in the ‘unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.’” By contrast, to obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government need only show that the defendant intended to complete the offense and performed a “substantial step” toward that end. The court wrote Taylor did not disturb the court’s holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting a completed Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). View "USA v. Tyvonne Wiley" on Justia Law

During a domestic dispute, Plaintiff shot his unarmed twenty-two-year-old son, killing him. He was arrested and prosecuted for murder but was acquitted after a jury trial. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the City of Apopka, Florida and some of its police officers. He asserted a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim that he was arrested without probable cause, a Florida state law claim for false arrest based on the same contention, and a Section 1983 claim that the officers’ search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial that based on the failure to give a municipal liability jury instruction that he requested. On remand, the district court followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. It determined that there was actual probable cause to support Plaintiff’s arrest and that even in light of Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff contended, among other things, that he was arrested without probable cause.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Plaintiff’s requested instruction because the issue of custom or practice liability was not, as the court pointed out, properly before the jury. The court explained that the district court, as it was required to do, followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate when it determined that the issue of custom or practice municipal liability was not properly before the jury. View "Timothy Davis, Sr. v. City of Apopka" on Justia Law

Defendant, who has long struggled with serious mental-health issues—has a pattern of threatening judges. This case arises out of a threat that he recently made against a federal magistrate judge in his hometown of Fort Pierce, Florida. Defendant was convicted in federal court of (1) mailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 876(c) and (2) threatening a federal official. For his crimes, he was sentenced to 60 months in prison. Defendant now challenged his convictions and sentence on five grounds.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the judge expressly considered two other factors when making his sentencing decision, both of which he cited as bases for an upward departure: (1) Defendant’s history of making threats; and (2) the evidence of racial animus. Further, even if the district judge’s reference to his own religious experience was improper, it didn’t “substantially affect his selection of Defendant’s sentence”—and, therefore, was harmless. View "USA v. Lawrence F. Curtin" on Justia Law