Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence of 20 years of imprisonment following the revocation of his probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3565. Defendant argued that, where the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 12 to 18 months of imprisonment, his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. One of his arguments is that the district court failed to give a specific reason for imposing an upward variance to the statutory maximum.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The court wrote that upon finding that a defendant violated a condition of probation, a district court may revoke the term of probation and impose a term of imprisonment as long as the court considers the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), such as the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the “seriousness of the offense” and “afford adequate deterrence,” among others. The court noted that a district court commits a “significant procedural error” in imposing a sentence if it calculates the guidelines incorrectly, fails to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or, of particular relevance here, “fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” The court explained that the record reflects that the district court did not give any reason for why it was imposing an above-guideline sentence. The court explained that the district court’s statements at the conclusion of the revocation proceeding were not sufficiently specific to allow the court to understand why the district court imposed an above-guideline sentence. View "USA v. Henry Martin Steiger" on Justia Law

Defendant is a Pasco County, Florida, Sherriff’s Office deputy. Chris Nocco, the Pasco County Sheriff, is a codefendant. Plaintiff’s initial complaint in this case consisted of twelve counts. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, the complaint at hand, contains ten counts. Count I of the amended complaint, which replicates verbatim Count I of the initial complaint, was brought against Defendant in his individual capacity and is the only count before the Eleventh Circuit in this appeal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity.   At issue on appeal is whether the Fourth Amendment precluded a law enforcement officer—who had stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation—from asking a passenger in the vehicle to identify himself unless the officer had reason to suspect that the passenger had committed, was in the process of committing, or was likely to commit a criminal offense. The second question is whether binding precedent clearly established, at the time relevant here, that an officer could not ask a passenger to identify himself absent this reasonable suspicion.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that it doubts that the Florida Supreme Court would hold that a passenger is free to resist an officer’s request for identification in the setting this case presents. At the very least, it is arguable that the court would uphold the request and find the officer had at least arguable cause to arrest the passenger for resisting an officer without violence in violation of Section 843.02. View "Marques A. Johnson v. James Dunn" on Justia Law

In this long-running property use dispute, the plaintiffs, the Thai Meditation Association of Alabama and four of its organizers (collectively, TMAA), seek to convert a property zoned for residential use into a meditation center. In Thai Meditation Association of Alabama v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2020) (TMAA I), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the outcome of a bench trial that ended in judgment for the City of Mobile on all counts. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part but remanded three counts for further consideration. The vacated and remanded claims consisted of (1) a substantial burden challenge under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); (2) a Free Exercise challenge under the First Amendment; and (3) a state law challenge under the Alabama Constitution’s Religious Freedom Amendment (ARFA). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all three counts, and this appeal followed.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. The court concluded that summary judgment was improper, for either party, on the RLUIPA claim; summary judgment was proper on the Free Exercise claim; and the City has failed to carry its burden to satisfy strict scrutiny on the ARFA claim. The court explained that the City is imposing a burden on TMAA’s religious freedom, and because it has failed to carry its burden to demonstrate a compelling government interest, TMAA is entitled to judgment on the ARFA claim. View "Thai Meditation Association of Alabama, Inc., et al. v. City of Mobile, Alabama" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Petitioner is removable as an aggravated felon and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner petitions for review, arguing that his Massachusetts conviction for armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G) and therefore is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and granted in part. The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). However, the court agreed with the parties that a remand to the BIA is nevertheless required. The Attorney General has issued an intervening decision that might impact Petitioner’s request for withholding of removal, and the BIA should have the opportunity to consider the effect of that decision. The court wrote that Petitioner was sentenced to less than five years in prison. His aggravated felony conviction, therefore, does not per se constitute a particularly serious crime with respect to withholding of removal. View "Mucktaru Kemokai v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

TASER International, Inc., obtained an injunction against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with Phazzer Electronics or its officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys” (the “2017 injunction”). The injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from distributing or causing to be distributed certain stun guns and accompanying cartridges that infringed on TASER’s intellectual property. At the time of the TASER-Phazzer Electronics litigation, Steven Abboud controlled Phazzer Electronics, and Phazzer Electronics employed, among others, Defendant. In 2018, after the district court found Abboud in contempt for violating the 2017 injunction, Abboud and Defendant went to work for other entities with “Phazzer” in their names. Based on that activity, the district court found Defendant (and others) in contempt of the 2017 injunction. At issue on appeal is whether the 2017 injunction extended broadly enough to bind Defendant and prohibit her conduct under the theories of liability that the government has pressed and the district court decided   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the record cannot sustain Defendant’s conviction.  The court explained that the district court did not make factual findings about whether Defendant was a key employee. Nor did it determine whether she so controlled Phazzer Electronics and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 injunction that it would be fair to say she had her day in court on that injunction. View "USA v. Diana Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought both a Section 1983 false arrest claim and a state law false arrest claim against two Huntsville, Alabama, police officers and the City itself. The district court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity. The court explained that, in general, when government officials are performing discretionary duties, as all parties concede they were in this case, they are entitled to qualified immunity. A plaintiff may rebut this entitlement by showing that the government officials (1) committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that this violation was “clearly established” in law at the time of the alleged misconduct.   The court explained that it has been clearly established for decades that the police are free to ask questions, and the public is free to ignore them. It has been clearly established prior to Plaintiff’s arrest that any legal obligation to speak to the police and answer their questions arises as a matter of state law. And the state statute itself, in this case, is clear and requires no additional construction: police are empowered to demand from an individual three things: “name, address and an explanation of his actions.” It was thus clearly established at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest that Defendant could not demand he produce physical identification. Thus, no reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for obstructing governmental operations. And this theory cannot support the grant of qualified immunity to the officers. View "Roland Edger v. Krista McCabe, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner was employed at Office Depot as a senior financial analyst. He was responsible for, among other things, ensuring data integrity. One of Ronnie’s principal duties was to calculate and report a metric called “Sales Lift.” Sales Lift is a metric designed to quantify the cost-reduction benefit of closing redundant retail stores. Petitioner identified two potential accounting errors that he believed signaled securities fraud related to the Sales Lift. Petitioner alleged that after he reported the issue, his relationship with his boss became strained. Eventually, Petitioner was terminated at that meeting for failing to perform the task of identifying the cause of the data discrepancy. Petitioner filed complaint with the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and OSHA dismissed his complaint. Petitioner petitioned for review of the ARB’s decision.
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Petitioner failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that a reasonable person with his training and experience would believe this conduct constituted a SOX violation, the ARB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The court wrote that Petitioner’s assertions that Office Depot intentionally manipulated sales data and that his assigned task of investigating the discrepancy was a stalling tactic are mere speculation, which alone is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact as to the objective reasonableness of Petitioner’s belief. View "Chris Ronnie v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s affirmance of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) following the Appeals Council’s remand. He argued that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred on remand by reconsidering a prior finding of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) after the prior decision had been vacated, in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate rule.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the mandate rule, which is “a specific application” of the law-of-the-case doctrine, binds a lower court to execute the mandate of the higher court without further examination or variance. The court wrote that even assuming the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate rule apply, the ALJ was free to reconsider Plaintiff’s RFC because the 2018 Decision was vacated. The court reasoned that the district court order made no findings about how the ALJ erred in his determination on Plaintiff’s disability. Instead, the district court remanded the case on a motion from the Commissioner without making specific factual findings, including whether or not the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s RFC. As a result, the Appeals Council had no factual findings in the remand order from which it could deviate. Additionally, the Appeals Council explained that Plaintiff filed a new SSI claim in 2019, and it consolidated that claim with his initial claims, which stemmed from the same disabilities. The SSA regulations allow an ALJ to consider any issues relating to the claim, whether or not they were raised in earlier administrative proceedings. View "George Weidner, III v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy proceeding underlying this case was initiated by Wilkes & McHugh, P.A. (“Wilkes”), for relief against Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc. (“FLTCI”) on behalf of the Estate of Juanita Jackson. The Jackson Estate had obtained judgments of $55 million against Trans Health, Inc. (“THI”) and Trans Health Management, Inc. (“THMI”). The trustee of the Debtor’s estate (the “Trustee”) employed Steven M. Berman and Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP (“Shumaker”) as special litigation counsel. According to Wilkes, when the Trustee employed Shumaker it was not disinterested as required by Section 327(a). On remand, the Bankruptcy Court held that Berman’s omissions did not warrant sanctions under Rule 2014. The Probate Estates appealed the District Court’s decision.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Wilkes, in representing the Probate Estates, sought huge sums in the form of damages in state court against the companies affiliated with the decedents’ nursing homes. After having received one multimillion-dollar judgment in Jackson, Wilkes realized that the powers that be in the THI corporate structure had executed a bust-out scheme to separate THMI’s liabilities from its assets and to hide those assets to avoid paying the Jackson judgment. Once the Bankruptcy Court appointed a trustee for FLTCI, Wilkes could then use the Trustee and the Trustee’s strongarm power to enhance its own discovery and pursue causes of action that it would not be able to pursue alone, attempting to get at THMI’s assets through FLTCI. The court wrote that it is clear that the idea that Shumaker had a bias against Wilkes and the Probate Estates is baseless. View "Estate of Arlene Townsend, et al v. Steven Berman, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked as detention officers for Glynn County under Sheriff Jump’s supervision. Although it is unclear from the record whether the Officers are formally deputy sheriffs, it is undisputed that they are, at minimum, direct employees of Sheriff Jump, in his official capacity, akin to deputies. The Officers brought a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action alleging that the County “illegally calculated their and other detention officers’ overtime wages.” The County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In response, the Officers amended their complaint to include Sheriff Jump in his individual capacity. The County and Sheriff Jump then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, arguing that neither defendant was the Officers’ employer under the FLSA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the district court’s denial of the Officers’ motion for leave to amend and its ultimate dismissal of the amended complaint. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the Officers’ complaint against Sheriff Jump in his individual capacity because he is not an “employer” under the FLSA. Further, the court agreed with the district court that Sheriff Jump would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when making compensation decisions for his employees. Further, the court held that Georgia “retained its Eleventh Amendment immunity” from suits in federal court for breach-of-contract claims because no statute or constitutional provision “expressly consents to suits in federal court. View "Langston Austin, et al. v. Glynn County, Georgia, et al." on Justia Law