Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2019, Plaintiff filed a class action against GoDaddy. The putative class alleged that the web-hosting company embarked on an unlawful telemarketing campaign. Objector-Appellant then filed an objection and moved to reconsider the fee award. He made two arguments. First, he objected that the district court awarded fees to class counsel twenty days before the court’s purported objection deadline. Second, he claimed that the parties’ settlement was a “coupon settlement” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1712(e) of the Class Action Fairness Act because GoDaddy class members could select GoDaddy vouchers as their recompense. The question at the core of this appeal is whether the plaintiffs who received a single unwanted, illegal telemarketing text message suffered a concrete injury.   The Eleventh Circuit remanded this appeal to the panel to consider the CAFA issues raised in Appellant’s appeal. The court held that the receipt of an unwanted text message causes a concrete injury. The court explained that while an unwanted text message is insufficiently offensive to satisfy the common law’s elements, Congress has used its lawmaking powers to recognize a lower quantum of injury necessary to bring a claim under the TCPA. As a result, the plaintiffs’ harm “is smaller in degree rather than entirely absent.” View "Susan Drazen, et al v. Mr. Juan Pinto" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling sentencing Defendant to 180 months e for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). In May 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant’s PSR assigned him a base offense level of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2). Defendant appealed his 180-month sentence arguing that his sentence was erroneously enhanced because his prior conviction for aggravated assault under Florida law does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction under Fla. Stat. Section 784.021(1)(b) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA because, as our precedent in Somers III confirmed, Florida’s aggravated assault statute requires an intentional threat to use violence against another person, regardless of whether it is committed under Section 784.021(1)(a) or (b). See id. at 892, 894, 896. Therefore, Defendant has the requisite three predicate offenses under the ACCA, and the district court did not err in sentencing him as an armed career criminal. View "USA v. Larry Lynn Gary" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute about CoolSculpting, a medical device intended to minimize the appearance of fat. When Plaintiff tried CoolSculpting, he developed a rare condition called Paradoxical Adipose Hyperplasia (“PAH”), which enlarges the targeted fat tissue. Needless to say, Plaintiff was unhappy that CoolSculpting maximized the fat he wanted to minimize. So Plaintiff sued Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc., the manufacturer of the CoolSculpting system, for failure to warn and design defects under Florida law. The district court granted Zeltiq summary judgment. On failure to warn, the district court concluded that Zeltiq’s warnings about PAH were adequate as a matter of law. On design defect, the court determined that Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that the risk of CoolSculpting outweighed its utility. Plaintiff challenged both of the district court’s rulings on appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Zeltiq warned medical providers in its user manual and training sessions about the exact condition Plaintiff experienced: PAH is an increase of adipose tissue in the treatment area that may require surgery to correct. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded Zeltiq’s warnings were adequate as a matter of law. Further, the court held that it is convinced that Plaintiff’s defect claim fails under either test. View "Terrance Nelson Cates v. Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Alabama death row inmate scheduled to be executed by lethal injection on July 20, 2023. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 complaint asserting that the manner in which Alabama executes its lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he takes issue with the manner in which the execution team attempted to secure IV access in the inmates during the preceding three executions that occurred in 2022. Relatedly, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Alabama from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia. Plaintiff appealed the denial of that motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  The court focused its analysis on whether the district court clearly erred in determining that Plaintiff did not show that he faces a “substantial risk of serious harm” if executed by lethal injection. Plaintiff argued that Nance does not control and that the court should instead follow its unpublished decision in Smith. The court explained that the evidence established that since the allegedly “botched” executions, ADOC conducted a full review of its execution processes and procedures, and determined that no deficiencies existed with the protocol itself. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the intervening changes made by the ADOC “have disrupted the pattern discussed in Smith,” rendering Plaintiff’s claim that the same pattern would continue to occur purely speculative. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. View "James Edward Barber v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner sits on death row in Georgia following his convictions for kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery. He appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court and the Eleventh Circuit granted Petitoner’s certificates of appealability on nine combined issues.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The court explained that a review of the record compels the conclusion that Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claim II of his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court explained that after reviewing the entire record, the court has more than a “grave doubt” that the Sabel error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s death sentence. At trial, the mitigation evidence centered on the argument that Petitioner’s crimes were completely out of character and that a death sentence would have an adverse impact on his family. But the expert-related evidence developed during the habeas proceeding provided different and powerful mitigation arguments. In particular, once Petitioner’s postconviction counsel no longer feared the inequities that the Sabel rule imposed, they were able to procure critical expert evidence about Petitioner’s mental-health deficiencies and present that evidence to the state habeas court. View "Demarcus Sears v. Warden GDCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff argues that former Broward County Public Defender Howard Finkelstein fired her from her position as a public defender in violation of her First Amendment rights. Finkelstein fired Plaintiff after she made public comments during her campaign to replace Finkelstein, who was not seeking reelection. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed on a political podcast that Finkelstein played golf rather than work, did not hire racial minorities or support black social justice organizations, and had used illegal drugs while practicing law earlier in his career. Based on these comments, Finkelstein terminated Plaintiff's employment after the primary election, which Plaintiff had lost to another employee of the office. The district court granted summary judgment to Finkelstein. It concluded that many of Plaintiff’s statements about Finkelstein were eligible for First Amendment protection because they were made on matters of public concern. But, balancing Plaintiff’s interests against her employer’s interests, the district court concluded that her interest in making these statements did not outweigh the government’s interest in the effective management of the public defender’s office.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s termination cannot support a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The court wrote that it is yet to consider whether and how a public employee’s political campaign to replace her supervisor impacts her interest in criticizing that supervisor. Although the court recognized that an employee seeking public office has a strong interest in criticizing the elected official currently holding that position, the court believes the employer’s interest in effective management outweighs the employee’s interest when the employee’s criticisms are likely to frustrate the employer’s mission. View "Ruby Green v. Howard Finkelstein, et al" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of attempted second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison. Defendant claimed that the jury instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter were incomplete because they lacked an explanation of “excusable homicide.” At issue is whether Defendant was prejudiced when his appellate counsel failed to make a particular argument. The district court recognized the change in the law and rejected Defendant’s Lucas-based arguments. When Defendant appealed, the Eleventh Circuit granted him a certificate of appealability on this issue. As stated by Defendant, “the determinative fact for this Court to consider is the applicability of Lockhart v. Fretwell” to his claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court explained that Fretwell establishes that the result of a defendant’s proceeding is neither unfair nor unreliable in the present when current law does not provide the right that the defendant seeks to vindicate. Further, both the Supreme Court and the court have reaffirmed Fretwell post-AEDPA with no mention of overruling or modification. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied Fretwell to this case. View "Pablo Guzman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, together with three others, conspired to rob a cocaine stash house. They did not know that the conspiracy was part of a reverse sting operation administrated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). Before Defendant and his co-conspirators could carry out the robbery, ATF apprehended them, confiscating a firearm from Garrison in the process. A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to use and use a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), among other crimes. At issue is whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s Section 2255 motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction had three possible predicate offenses—one of which is now invalid in light of Davis— he is not entitled to relief. The predicate offenses are so inextricably intertwined that the jury could not have based the Section 924(c) conviction on the invalid predicate without having also based it on the valid drug trafficking predicate offenses. In other words, the Stromberg error that occurred below was harmless, and thus Defendant is not entitled to relief. View "Sean Garrison v. USA" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in a trial that took place during the initial days of the coronavirus pandemic. Defendant appealed his conviction, raising a number of constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural challenges. Defendant argued that he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because, among other things, his lawyer, fearing coronavirus exposure, refused to visit him in jail throughout the trial. He also posits that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly questioning one of his witnesses. On top of all that, Defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion and violated his right to present a defense by making erroneous evidentiary rulings. Defendant believes the district court’s cumulative errors denied him a fundamentally fair trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no evidence on this record that Defendant’s lawyer “actually intended to confer” with his client during the overnight recess, irrespective of the pandemic concerns. For instance, Defendant’s lawyer also told the district court that he did not have time to visit the jail. The court noted that the district court went to great lengths to facilitate communication between Defendant and his lawyer. It allowed them to communicate in writing during the trial and while Defendant was incarcerated at the county jail. And nothing precluded Defendant’s lawyer from attempting to communicate electronically or via telephone with his client. Finally, the court noted that Defendant has not established a single error, let alone the aggregation of many errors. Thus, his cumulative error claim lacks merit. View "USA v. Sebastian Ahmed" on Justia Law

Continental Casualty Company and Valley Forge Insurance Company (collectively, “the insurers”) and Winder Laboratories, LLC and Steven Pressman (collectively, “the insureds”) appeal and cross-appeal from the district court’s judgment in this insurance coverage dispute. In short, the parties’ insurance agreements required the insurers to defend the insureds against certain third party lawsuits. After being sued by non-party Concordia Pharmaceuticals Inc., S.A.R.L. (“Concordia”), the insureds sought coverage under the policies. The insurers agreed to defend the insureds against Concordia, subject to a reservation of rights, including the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs incurred for claims not covered by the policies. The insurance agreements themselves, however, did not provide for reimbursement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. First, the court agreed that the insurers did not have a duty to defend the insureds in the underlying action. To supplement this analysis, the court held that the duty to defend was extinguished when the district court’s ruling was issued. Second, the court agreed that the insurers do not have a right to reimbursement because the reservation of rights letters did not create a new contract, the insurers’ unjust enrichment argument is untenable, and the court wrote that it does not believe the Supreme Court of Georgia would upend the State’s insurance law framework by establishing a right to reimbursement for an insurer who has no contractual right to recoupment. View "Continental Casualty Company, et al v. Winder Laboratories, LLC, et al" on Justia Law