Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for a company later acquired by the Paradies Shops. He, like many employees, entrusted his employer with sensitive, personally identifiable information (PII). In October 2020, Paradies suffered a ransomware attack on its administrative systems in which cybercriminals obtained the Social Security numbers of Plaintiff and other current and former employees. Shortly after learning of the data breach, Plaintiff brought claims for negligence and breach of implied contract on behalf of himself and those affected by the data breach, arguing Paradies should have protected the PII. He now appeals from the district court’s order granting Paradies’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. He contends the district court demanded too much at the pleadings stage.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the breach of implied contract claim and reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that, as the Georgia Supreme Court has noted, “traditional tort law is a rather blunt instrument for resolving all of the complex tradeoffs at issue in a case such as this, tradeoffs that may well be better resolved by the legislative process.” Nevertheless, having applied Georgia’s traditional tort principles, the court concluded Plaintiff has pled facts giving rise to a duty of care on the part of Paradies. Getting past summary judgment may prove a tougher challenge, but Plaintiff has pled enough for his negligence claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Carlos Ramirez v. The Paradies Shops, LLC" on Justia Law

AM Grand Court Lakes LLC and AM 280 Sierra Drive LLC (collectively “AM Grand”) owned a group of buildings that were operated as an assisted living facility. AM Grand submitted a claim to its insurer, Rockhill Insurance Company, for damage caused by Hurricane Irma. Rockhill denied the claim because it determined that the hurricane caused only minor damage to the property. AM Grand sued Rockhill for breach of the policy. The case went to trial, where a jury found that Rockhill had breached the terms of the insurance policy and that AM Grand’s covered losses amounted to $9,280,000. Based on the jury’s findings, the district court entered judgment in AM Grand’s favor. After the district court entered judgment, Rockhill filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the jury’s damages award was excessive. The district court denied the motion. Rockhill argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying its motion for a new trial because there was no evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that AM Grand sustained a loss of $9,280,000.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. The court held that Rockhill is correct that the amount of damages depended on the extent to which AM Grand’s buildings were damaged in Hurricane Irma. But the court disagreed that the jury’s options were as limited as Rockhill describes. Instead, the court concluded—based on the evidence presented at trial—that the verdict was within the range of damages that a jury reasonably could have awarded. View "AM Grand Court Lakes LLC, et al. v. Rockhill Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Georgia prisoner sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contends that the Georgia courts unreasonably adjudicated his objection that the prosecutor exercised discriminatory strikes during jury selection, unreasonably concluded that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel in the investigation and presentation of his mental health and mitigation evidence, and unreasonably rejected his challenge to the procedure for establishing intellectual disability in capital cases. Petitioner also argued that the district court erred when it ruled that he forfeited any further claim based on his alleged intellectual disability.   The Eleventh Circuit denied his petition. The court held that the state court did not apply the wrong standard. Counsel’s investigation before trial “need not be exhaustive” but only “adequate.” Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 997. So “to determine whether trial counsel should have done something more in their investigation, we first look at what the lawyers did in fact.” The superior court correctly considered Petitioner’s criticisms of his counsel’s performance in the light of counsel’s actions and not based on Petitioner’s suggestions of an ideal trial strategy. Further, the court held that contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the superior court did not reach its conclusion based on an unreasonable categorical rule against affidavit evidence. The court weighed those affidavits against the live testimony of Petitioner’s counsel that they could not have secured further mitigation or mental-illness witnesses and chose to give trial counsel’s testimony greater weight. View "Warren King v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of thirteen counts of Hobbs Act robbery and associated firearm offenses for his involvement in robbing nine establishments in the greater Atlanta area: three spas, four massage parlors, a nail salon, and a restaurant. He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant presented three challenges to his conviction and one to his sentence: that the district court erred (1) by not holding a formal Daubert hearing; (2) by admitting lay identification testimony by two FBI case agents; (3) by instructing the jury on flight and concealment; and (4) by applying the bodily restraint sentencing enhancement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both his convictions and sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a formal Daubert hearing before allowing the Government’s fingerprint expert to testify, in admitting the agents lay identification testimony, or in instructing the jury on flight or concealment. The court also held that the district court did not err in applying the physical restraint sentencing enhancement to the Lush Nails & Spa, Royal Massage, and BD Spa robberies. The court wrote that it has found the physical restraint enhancement to apply where a defendant “creates circumstances allowing [his victims] no alternative but compliance.” The court noted that at the BD Spa and Wellness Massage robbery, Defendant forced an employee down the hall of the establishment at gunpoint. Just as Defendant tying the victim up and carrying her down the hallway would have constituted restraint, so does his forcing her down the hallway with the point of his gun. View "USA v. Dravion Sanchez Ware" on Justia Law

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“GDNR”) sued DeKalb County for violating the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). To resolve this suit, the parties agreed to a consent decree in 2011. Eight years later, South River Watershed Alliance, Inc. (“South River”) and J.E. sued DeKalb County for failing to follow the decree and violating the CWA. The CWA authorizes citizen suits for enforcement purposes, but such suits are not allowed when an “administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action . . . to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order.” Thus, this case turned on whether the 2011 consent decree—along with the ongoing efforts of the EPA and GDNR to require compliance—constitutes diligent prosecution. The district court determined that South River’s suit was barred by the diligent prosecution bar. On appeal, South River argued for the opposite result and requests injunctive relief to ensure DeKalb County’s compliance.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that South River wants the current consent decree discarded in favor of a more muscular alternative. The fact that South River disagrees with the prosecution strategy undertaken by the EPA and GDNR, however, is not enough to prove that the EPA and GDNR have failed to diligently prosecute DeKalb County’s CWA violations. To the contrary, the record shows that the EPA and GDNR have been diligent, which means that South River’s suit is barred under 33 U.S.C. Section 1365(b)(1)(B). View "South River Watershed Alliance, et al. v. DeKalb County, Georgia" on Justia Law

Empire Indemnity Insurance Company issued an insurance policy (the “Policy”) to Positano Place at Naples I Condominium Association, Inc., for coverage of five buildings that Positano owns in Naples, Florida. Following Hurricane Irma, Positano filed a first-party claim for property insurance benefits under the Policy, claiming that Hurricane Irma damaged its property and that the damage was covered by the Policy. Empire determined that there was coverage to only three of the five buildings covered by the Policy but disagreed as to the amount of the loss. Positano sought to invoke appraisal based on the Policy’s appraisal provision. Positano then sued Empire in Florida state court, and Empire removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Positano moved to compel appraisal and to stay the case pending the resolution of the appraisal proceedings, which Empire opposed. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court grant Positano’s motion, and, over Empire’s objection, the district court ordered the parties to appraisal and stayed the proceedings pending appraisal. Empire timely appealed the district court’s order.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court’s order compelling appraisal and staying the proceedings pending appraisal is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1). The court also concluded that the order compelling appraisal and staying the action pending appraisal is not immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). View "Positano Place at Naples I Condominium Association, Inc. v. Empire Indemnity Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“Department”). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave. Plaintiff also raised a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. The court wrote that Plaintiff has forfeited any arguments as to the district court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of these grounds in his opening brief. Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant consideration because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. View "Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant, a physician assistant, evaluated patients and prescribed their physical therapy. The clinics where Defendant worked then billed the patients' health insurance both for the evaluations and for the subsequent physical therapy. The problem—for Defendant and for the health-insurance company—was that the “patients” didn’t really need the physical therapy and didn’t actually receive any treatment. When the health insurance company grew suspicious of the abnormally high rate of physical-therapy prescriptions from the clinics, it cooperated with an FBI investigation into the clinics. That investigation led a grand jury to indict Defendant on eight healthcare fraud-related charges. After a trial, a jury convicted Defendant on three counts. On appeal, Defendant raised several challenges to his conviction—sufficiency, evidentiary, and instructional—and to his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that sufficient evidence allowed the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew the bills were fraudulent. Moreover, the court wrote that the minimal leading questions Defendant points to here do not allow Defendant to overcome the overwhelming evidence of his guilt at trial. Moreover, the court reasoned that here, the district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months— below his Guidelines range of 51–63 months. Given that Defendant had previously participated in very similar schemes, been investigated by the Florida regulatory board for similar conduct, and had attempted to defraud the victim of millions of dollars, the court could not say that the 48-month sentence the district court imposed—slightly below the Guidelines range—was an abuse of discretion. View "USA v. Carlos Alfredo Verdeza" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor cited and fined Chewy, Inc., for inadequately protecting its warehouse employees from “under-rides,” a kind of forklift accident. The Secretary found that no specific standard covered the under-ride hazard and that Chewy had a general duty to protect its workers from that hazard. An administrative law judge upheld the citation and ruled that the standard Chewy cited, 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.178, did not cover the under-ride hazard.   The Eleventh Circuit granted Chewy’s petition for review, set aside the Commission’s order, and vacated the citation. The court held that Chewy complied with the safety standard that specifically addresses under-rides. Accordingly, the Secretary cannot cite Chewy for failing to protect its workers from that hazard. The court explained that the Secretary’s distinction between a standard that prevents the under-ride hazard and a standard that addresses the hazards that arise in the event of an under-ride, if accepted and extended to other cases, would upend the regulatory scheme. Further, the court wrote that the administrative law judge’s interpretation of section 1910.5(f ) is also unreasonable because it requires that compliance with the specific standard eliminate the hazard for preemption to occur. View "Chewy, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Petitioners chartered their yacht, Lady Leila, in 2014 and 2015. They did not conduct the chartering activity for profit—it was a hobby. Though the hobby generated income, it also incurred sizeable expenses each year. Petitioners deducted some of those expenses under Section 183(b)(2) and placed them “above the line” to reduce their gross income. After an audit, the Commissioner determined that the Section 183(b)(2) deductions were miscellaneous itemized deductions under Section 67, meaning that they belonged “below the line” and reduced adjusted gross income, not gross income. Moreover, because Petitioners had earned tens of millions of dollars in 2014 and 2015 and, at that time, the Code allowed miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent that they exceeded two percent of adjusted gross income, the Commissioner disallowed the Section 183(b)(2) deductions altogether. Facing deficiencies and penalties, Petitioners petitioned the Tax Court, which granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. They sought appellate review.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court and denied the petition for review. The court explained that because Sections 63 and 67 also omit Section 183, hobby expenses deducted under Section 183(b)(2) are miscellaneous itemized deductions. During the relevant time period, these deductions were subject to a two-percent floor on adjusted gross income. The result is that Section 183(b)(2) gave Petitioners a deduction for their expenses from operating Lady Leila, but Section 67 did not allow them to take that deduction because they could not meet the two-percent threshold for miscellaneous itemized deductions. View "Carl L. Gregory, et al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law