Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During removal proceedings, Petitioner wrote to the Board of Immigration Appeals asking to withdraw his appeal of an immigration judge’s decision and to be deported. The Board granted his withdrawal request. He now asserts that the federal laws governing derivative citizenship are unconstitutional and seeks a declaration that he is a U.S. citizen as a judicial remedy.   The Eleventh Circuit denied his appeal. The court concluded that although it has jurisdiction to determine whether the Board erroneously withdrew Petitioner’s appeal, he does not argue the Board did. Further, the court explained that Petitioner also forfeited judicial review of his claims by withdrawing his appeal and asking to be deported. The court explained that Petitioner also moved to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on the ground that there are “genuine issue[s] of material fact” about his claim that former 8 U.S.C. Section 1432(a) unconstitutionally discriminates based on gender and race. However, the court reasoned that because it concluded that Petitioner forfeited any right to judicial review of that claim, there is no genuine issue of material fact that requires the court to transfer this case to the district court. View "Franco P. Clement v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner an Alabama prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. The district judge granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to convey to Petitioner a favorable plea offer of thirty years’ imprisonment during his capital murder trial.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state habeas court’s determinations that Petitioner would not have accepted the plea offer and that the state trial court would not have accepted an agreement between Petitioner and the District Attorney were unreasonable. The court also found that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal’s (ACCA’s) determination that Petitioner received the plea offer was unreasonable. Because the court found that the state habeas court’s factual determinations were unreasonable, it held that Petitioner has cleared the hurdle created by AEDPA. Accordingly, because Petitioner cleared the AEDPA hurdle, the court found it best for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claim. View "Brandon Washington v. Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition to have her husband classified as her immediate relative so that he would be eligible to adjust his immigration status. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security approved the petition but later revoked that approval because Plaintiff’s husband had entered a previous marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Secretary’s marriage-fraud determination. The district court dismissed her complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because it determined that Plaintiff’s complaint challenged a discretionary decision.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the Secretary and Director. The court explained that Plaintiff asserted that the Secretary reached the wrong outcome when he determined that there was good and sufficient cause to revoke the approval of her petition. The court wrote that the agency has articulated a standard to guide its evaluation of whether good and sufficient cause exists. But the court explained it cannot review Plaintiff’s complaint that the Secretary reached the wrong conclusion in her case. The sole statutory predicate for revocation is that the Secretary deem that there is good and sufficient cause. That the Secretary has, in his discretion, created additional standards to explain what constitutes good and sufficient cause and linked that determination in Plaintiff’s case to the marriage-fraud provision does not alter the bar on judicial review of the Secretary’s discretionary decision. View "Amina Bouarfa v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors and the administrator of a man shot and killed by Defendant police officers filed a lawsuit alleging claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and battery and negligence under Georgia law. And it demanded monetary damages. Both officers moved for summary judgment. They argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim of excessive force. They also argued that they are entitled to official immunity under Georgia law from the claims of battery and negligence. The district court denied the officers’ motions.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Defendants’ appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that it lacks appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified or official immunity that turns on issues of evidentiary sufficiency. The court explained that in this case, the only issues in this appeal are issues of evidentiary sufficiency. In their motions for summary judgment, the officers argued that their use of force was reasonable under the circumstances because they encountered a suspect who had brandished a gun, discharged it at least once, and ignored their commands to show his hands. The officers argued that in the light of these facts when they saw the man move, they had actual and probable cause to use deadly force on him. View "Joshua Paul English, et al v. Officer Jonathan Fowler, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff The Highland Consulting Group, Inc. (“Highland”), a consulting firm, sued Defendant for misappropriating its trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”). At trial, the jury returned a verdict of $1.2 million in favor of plaintiff Highland. The district court carefully used a special verdict form on which the jury answered questions and made specific findings on each element of plaintiff Highland’s claims. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the jury’s findings that the documents he took contained trade secrets and that he misappropriated those trade secrets. Instead, Defendant contends that (1) Plaintiff failed to prove it was an “owner” of those trade secrets, as required by the DTSA, and (2) the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively for a new trial on this ground.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff Highland, the court concluded that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff owned “any”—in other words, at least one—of the trade secrets involved here. The court wrote that the evidence, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Highland, demonstrated the plaintiff owned multiple trade secrets misappropriated by Defendant. View "The Highland Consulting Group, Inc. v. Jesus Felix Minjares Soule" on Justia Law

The Natural Gas Act authorizes private entities who have received a certificate of public convenience and necessity to acquire property “by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.” Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC, invoked this power of eminent domain to acquire easements to build a pipeline on land owned by Sunderman Groves, Inc. In the condemnation proceeding, the district court determined that the Act incorporates state eminent domain law, and it consequently applied Florida law to grant attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to Sunderman Groves. Sabal Trail appealed these awards, arguing that the district court should have applied federal law instead. A different panel decided on a nearly identical case that arose out of Sabal Trail’s use of eminent domain power to build this same pipeline.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is firmly established” that “each succeeding panel is bound by the holding of the first panel to address an issue of law, unless and until that holding is overruled en banc, or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993). The court explained that the court’s prior construction of the Natural Gas Act is now the law in the Circuit, and it conclusively resolves this appeal. View "Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Sunderman Groves, Inc" on Justia Law

In August 2019, Plaintiff filed a class action against GoDaddy. The putative class alleged that the web-hosting company embarked on an unlawful telemarketing campaign. Objector-Appellant then filed an objection and moved to reconsider the fee award. He made two arguments. First, he objected that the district court awarded fees to class counsel twenty days before the court’s purported objection deadline. Second, he claimed that the parties’ settlement was a “coupon settlement” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1712(e) of the Class Action Fairness Act because GoDaddy class members could select GoDaddy vouchers as their recompense. The question at the core of this appeal is whether the plaintiffs who received a single unwanted, illegal telemarketing text message suffered a concrete injury.   The Eleventh Circuit remanded this appeal to the panel to consider the CAFA issues raised in Appellant’s appeal. The court held that the receipt of an unwanted text message causes a concrete injury. The court explained that while an unwanted text message is insufficiently offensive to satisfy the common law’s elements, Congress has used its lawmaking powers to recognize a lower quantum of injury necessary to bring a claim under the TCPA. As a result, the plaintiffs’ harm “is smaller in degree rather than entirely absent.” View "Susan Drazen, et al v. Mr. Juan Pinto" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling sentencing Defendant to 180 months e for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). In May 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant’s PSR assigned him a base offense level of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2). Defendant appealed his 180-month sentence arguing that his sentence was erroneously enhanced because his prior conviction for aggravated assault under Florida law does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction under Fla. Stat. Section 784.021(1)(b) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA because, as our precedent in Somers III confirmed, Florida’s aggravated assault statute requires an intentional threat to use violence against another person, regardless of whether it is committed under Section 784.021(1)(a) or (b). See id. at 892, 894, 896. Therefore, Defendant has the requisite three predicate offenses under the ACCA, and the district court did not err in sentencing him as an armed career criminal. View "USA v. Larry Lynn Gary" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute about CoolSculpting, a medical device intended to minimize the appearance of fat. When Plaintiff tried CoolSculpting, he developed a rare condition called Paradoxical Adipose Hyperplasia (“PAH”), which enlarges the targeted fat tissue. Needless to say, Plaintiff was unhappy that CoolSculpting maximized the fat he wanted to minimize. So Plaintiff sued Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc., the manufacturer of the CoolSculpting system, for failure to warn and design defects under Florida law. The district court granted Zeltiq summary judgment. On failure to warn, the district court concluded that Zeltiq’s warnings about PAH were adequate as a matter of law. On design defect, the court determined that Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that the risk of CoolSculpting outweighed its utility. Plaintiff challenged both of the district court’s rulings on appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Zeltiq warned medical providers in its user manual and training sessions about the exact condition Plaintiff experienced: PAH is an increase of adipose tissue in the treatment area that may require surgery to correct. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded Zeltiq’s warnings were adequate as a matter of law. Further, the court held that it is convinced that Plaintiff’s defect claim fails under either test. View "Terrance Nelson Cates v. Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Alabama death row inmate scheduled to be executed by lethal injection on July 20, 2023. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 complaint asserting that the manner in which Alabama executes its lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he takes issue with the manner in which the execution team attempted to secure IV access in the inmates during the preceding three executions that occurred in 2022. Relatedly, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Alabama from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia. Plaintiff appealed the denial of that motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  The court focused its analysis on whether the district court clearly erred in determining that Plaintiff did not show that he faces a “substantial risk of serious harm” if executed by lethal injection. Plaintiff argued that Nance does not control and that the court should instead follow its unpublished decision in Smith. The court explained that the evidence established that since the allegedly “botched” executions, ADOC conducted a full review of its execution processes and procedures, and determined that no deficiencies existed with the protocol itself. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the intervening changes made by the ADOC “have disrupted the pattern discussed in Smith,” rendering Plaintiff’s claim that the same pattern would continue to occur purely speculative. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. View "James Edward Barber v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law