Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is not exempt from the rules of discovery. Nonetheless, the CFPB tried to bring a wide-ranging civil lawsuit against 18 defendants without ever being deposed. When the district court ordered the CFPB to sit for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, the CFPB doubled down by engaging in dramatic abuse of the discovery process. The district court imposed sanctions for this misconduct. On appeal, the CFPB maintains that it behaved properly.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that violating the district court’s clear orders and derailing multiple depositions is nowhere near proper conduct. The court explained that the CFPB was determined to avoid 30(b)(6) depositions. To realize its goal, the CFPB employed tactics that the district court repeatedly forbade. As such, the CFPB clearly violated Rule 37(b), and severe sanctions were warranted. The court, therefore, held that the district court’s sanctions order dismissing the CFPB’s claims against the five appellees was not an abuse of discretion. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Check & Credit Recovery, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (collectively, the Officers) worked as police officers for the City of Hoover, Alabama. They also served as military reservists. Over a two-decade span, the Officers were summoned to active-duty service a combined thirteen times. While away, Hoover did not provide the Officers the same holiday pay and accrued benefits that it gave employees on paid administrative leave. This disparate treatment prompted the Officers to sue Hoover under USERRA. And it led the district court to grant summary judgment for the Officers. On appeal, Hoover argued that the Officers are not similar to employees placed on paid administrative leave. Second, Hoover asserted that military leave is not comparable to paid administrative leave.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Hoover violated Section 4316(b)(1)(B) by not providing the Officers the same benefits on military leave that it afforded similar employees on paid administrative leave. The court concluded that the DOL’s interpretation of Section 4316(b)(1)(B) deserves deference. Thus, to the extent Congress spoke to the meaning of “status” and “pay,” the legislative history suggests that it did so in a way that defeats Hoover’s interpretation. Further, the court reasoned that had the Officers been placed on paid administrative leave instead of military leave, they would have received holiday pay and accrued benefits for each period of service, including those shorter than sixteen months. So, the district court should have found the two forms of leave comparable in duration. However, the court affirmed because the district court reached the correct conclusion. View "Thaddaeus Myrick, et al v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employee opened, in Plaintiff’s name, a credit card with Chase and ran up tens of thousands of dollars in debt. The employee also illegally accessed Plaintiff’s bank accounts and used them to partially pay off the monthly statements. When she discovered the scheme, Plaintiff reported the fraud to Chase, but Chase refused to characterize the charges as illegitimate. Plaintiff sued Chase under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for not conducting a reasonable investigation into her dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase because it concluded that Chase’s investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute was “reasonable,” as the Act requires.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff hasn’t shown a genuine dispute of fact whether Chase’s conclusion was unreasonable as a matter of law. The court explained that Chase didn’t need to keep investigating. Nor has Plaintiff explained what Chase should have done differently: whom it should have talked to or what documents it should have considered that might have affected its apparent-authority analysis. That omission dooms Plaintiff’s claim because “a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a reasonable investigation would have resulted in the furnisher concluding that the information was inaccurate or incomplete without identifying some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish that the reported information was, in fact, inaccurate or incomplete.” View "Shelly Milgram v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) stopped providing “Rapid Delivery”1 to Amazon Prime (“Prime”) subscribers. Because Prime subscribers were not notified of the suspension and continued to pay full price for their memberships, Plaintiff and others brought a putative class action against Amazon alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”), and unjust enrichment. The district court granted Amazon’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim with prejudice because it found that Amazon did not have a duty to provide unqualified Rapid Delivery to Prime subscribers.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court first wrote that it is allowed to use its “experience and common sense” to acknowledge the COVID-19 pandemic even though it was not included as a factual allegation in the First Amended Complaint. The court dispensed with this argument because Amazon’s prioritization of essential goods during the COVID-19 pandemic obviously did not harm the public interest. Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs specifically incorporated the terms of their contract with Amazon as part of their unjust enrichment count. So, while Plaintiffs may plead breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative, they have not done so. Instead, Plaintiffs pleaded a contractual relationship as part of their unjust enrichment claim, and that contractual relationship defeats their unjust enrichment claim under Washington law. View "Andrez Marquez, et al v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the tragic death of a man who died while in custody. Appellants appealed the district court’s orders dismissing their claims against the Sheriff and granting summary judgment to the Fulton County Sheriff’s Department Officers, NaphCare, and a NaphCare employee.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff and its grant of summary judgment to both the Officers and the employee. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment in favor of NaphCare. The court explained that in Appellants’ response to NaphCare’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants relied mainly on the medical report and deposition of Dr. Timothy Hughes but also referred to the report and deposition of two other witnesses, as required by O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-9.1. Dr. Hughes’s report concluded the failure of NaphCare medical staff to properly screen, examine, and treat the decedent was the proximate cause of his death. This testimony is supported by the other witnesses. The court agreed with Appellants that, based on Dr. Hughes’s testimony, there is enough of a genuine issue of material fact for NaphCare’s liability to reach a jury. Dr. Hughes did not solely rest his argument on NaphCare’s failure to sedate the decedent. It was the failure of the staff to follow through with the decedent at all that was the problem. While this included the need for sedation, it also included immediate classification to suicide watch and observation. View "April Myrick, et al v. Fulton County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an Alabama prisoner serving a death sentence following his jury convictions on four counts of capital murder. After pursuing a direct appeal and post-conviction relief in the Alabama state courts, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his federal habeas petition, arguing that the district court did not apply the proper standard for intellectual disability as required by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and erred in finding Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. He also contends that the state court’s determination that his counsel was not ineffective during the pretrial and penalty phases was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. The court also found that the ACCA’s determination that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The court explained that the trial judge “was well aware of the mitigation evidence presented at trial” yet found that the circumstances of Petitioner’s childhood did not amount to a mitigating factor given his age, marriage, and employment. In light of the trial court’s determination, the court explained it cannot find the ACCA unreasonably applied Strickland by concluding that Petitioner did not provide enough evidence to undermine the ACCA’s confidence in the trial judge’s decision to override the jury’s recommendation of life. View "Thomas Dale Ferguson v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his drug- and firearm-related convictions as well as his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Defendant argued that insufficient evidence supports two of his convictions and that he is entitled to a new trial based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The court explained that sufficient evidence supports Defendant’s convictions. He has also not established that it is reasonably probable that a new trial would result in a different outcome as required by Brady, nor has he provided any evidence of perjured testimony as required by Giglio. Finally, Defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the district court erroneously sentenced him because his earlier cocaine conviction under Florida law does not constitute a serious drug offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Further, Defendant identified no precedent that would make it “‘obvious’ or ‘clear under current law’” that the Florida definition of cocaine is overbroad. Thus, the court held that the district court did not plainly err in sentencing him. View "USA v. Clifford Laines, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a company later acquired by the Paradies Shops. He, like many employees, entrusted his employer with sensitive, personally identifiable information (PII). In October 2020, Paradies suffered a ransomware attack on its administrative systems in which cybercriminals obtained the Social Security numbers of Plaintiff and other current and former employees. Shortly after learning of the data breach, Plaintiff brought claims for negligence and breach of implied contract on behalf of himself and those affected by the data breach, arguing Paradies should have protected the PII. He now appeals from the district court’s order granting Paradies’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. He contends the district court demanded too much at the pleadings stage.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the breach of implied contract claim and reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that, as the Georgia Supreme Court has noted, “traditional tort law is a rather blunt instrument for resolving all of the complex tradeoffs at issue in a case such as this, tradeoffs that may well be better resolved by the legislative process.” Nevertheless, having applied Georgia’s traditional tort principles, the court concluded Plaintiff has pled facts giving rise to a duty of care on the part of Paradies. Getting past summary judgment may prove a tougher challenge, but Plaintiff has pled enough for his negligence claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Carlos Ramirez v. The Paradies Shops, LLC" on Justia Law

AM Grand Court Lakes LLC and AM 280 Sierra Drive LLC (collectively “AM Grand”) owned a group of buildings that were operated as an assisted living facility. AM Grand submitted a claim to its insurer, Rockhill Insurance Company, for damage caused by Hurricane Irma. Rockhill denied the claim because it determined that the hurricane caused only minor damage to the property. AM Grand sued Rockhill for breach of the policy. The case went to trial, where a jury found that Rockhill had breached the terms of the insurance policy and that AM Grand’s covered losses amounted to $9,280,000. Based on the jury’s findings, the district court entered judgment in AM Grand’s favor. After the district court entered judgment, Rockhill filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the jury’s damages award was excessive. The district court denied the motion. Rockhill argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying its motion for a new trial because there was no evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that AM Grand sustained a loss of $9,280,000.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. The court held that Rockhill is correct that the amount of damages depended on the extent to which AM Grand’s buildings were damaged in Hurricane Irma. But the court disagreed that the jury’s options were as limited as Rockhill describes. Instead, the court concluded—based on the evidence presented at trial—that the verdict was within the range of damages that a jury reasonably could have awarded. View "AM Grand Court Lakes LLC, et al. v. Rockhill Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Georgia prisoner sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contends that the Georgia courts unreasonably adjudicated his objection that the prosecutor exercised discriminatory strikes during jury selection, unreasonably concluded that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel in the investigation and presentation of his mental health and mitigation evidence, and unreasonably rejected his challenge to the procedure for establishing intellectual disability in capital cases. Petitioner also argued that the district court erred when it ruled that he forfeited any further claim based on his alleged intellectual disability.   The Eleventh Circuit denied his petition. The court held that the state court did not apply the wrong standard. Counsel’s investigation before trial “need not be exhaustive” but only “adequate.” Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 997. So “to determine whether trial counsel should have done something more in their investigation, we first look at what the lawyers did in fact.” The superior court correctly considered Petitioner’s criticisms of his counsel’s performance in the light of counsel’s actions and not based on Petitioner’s suggestions of an ideal trial strategy. Further, the court held that contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the superior court did not reach its conclusion based on an unreasonable categorical rule against affidavit evidence. The court weighed those affidavits against the live testimony of Petitioner’s counsel that they could not have secured further mitigation or mental-illness witnesses and chose to give trial counsel’s testimony greater weight. View "Warren King v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law