Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing three firearms. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of ten years. Defendant appealed his conviction. He raised one issue. It involves the expert opinion testimony the Government presented in its case in chief over his objection to disprove his allegation that he was insane when he committed the Section 922(g)(1) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with Defendant that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection and admitting the testimony. However, the court determined that under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the error is harmless because it did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The court explained that to establish a legally sufficient Section 17 insanity defense, Defendant had to prove that on November 8, 2018, he had a severe mental disease or defect capable of causing him to possess the firearms even though he knew that he could not do so. His right to present the defense constituted his “substantial rights” under Rule 52(a). He introduced nothing to prove his defense other than his girlfriend’s testimony and his behavior. And the treating psychologist did not diagnose him with a qualifying “severe mental disease or defect” under Section 17(a). So, the erroneous admission of the psychologist’s opinions about his mental state did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Jessie James Turner, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case—Sherman Nealy and Music Specialist, Inc.—filed this copyright action seeking, among other things, damages for infringement they allege occurred more than three years before they filed this lawsuit. The defendants—Warner Chappell Music, Inc. and Artist Publishing Group, LLC—contend that Plaintiffs cannot recover damages for anything that happened more than three years before they filed suit.  The district court certified the following question for interlocutory appellate review: whether damages in this copyright action are limited to a three-year lookback period as calculated from the date of the filing of the complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit answered that question in the negative. The court wrote that given that the plain text of the Copyright Act does not support the existence of a separate damages bar for an otherwise timely copyright claim, the court held that a copyright plaintiff with a timely claim under the discovery rule may recover retrospective relief for infringement that occurred more than three years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. View "Sherman Nealy, et al. v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The assignees of two Medicare Advantage Organizations seek reimbursements from insurance companies that they allege qualify as primary payers of beneficiaries’ medical expenses. The insurance companies argued, and the district courts agreed, that the assignees’ claims are barred because both assignees failed to satisfy a procedural requirement: a contractual claims-filing deadline in one case and a statutory requirement of a pre-suit demand in the other. The assignees contend that the procedural requirements are preempted by the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Florida’s pre-suit demand requirement does not meet this relatively high bar. The statutory notice requirement and corresponding 30-day cure period are procedural requirements that may result in a brief delay. But the Florida law does not prevent or meaningfully impede the reimbursement of Medicare Advantage Organizations that Congress sought to facilitate. So, the provision does not create an unconstitutional obstacle to the purposes or operation of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. United Automobile Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced this adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida against UBS Financial Services Inc. and UBS Credit Corp. (together, “UBS”), to recover funds UBS had frozen in one of its accounts to satisfy debts owed by Plaintiffs. After the bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all of the claims but one – Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim -- UBS appealed to the district court, which affirmed. UBS appealed to the Eleventh Circuit urging it to apply a more “flexible” interpretation of finality in the bankruptcy arena.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court wrote it is bound to dismiss this appeal because the same concepts of finality apply in appeals taken from adversary proceedings as in appeals taken from standard civil actions. The bankruptcy court left Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim open and awaiting trial, so we cannot assert jurisdiction based on the finality of the bankruptcy court’s order. Further, the court wrote, it cannot find that any of the three recognized exceptions to the final judgment rule -- the collateral order doctrine, the practical finality doctrine, or the marginal finality doctrine -- allows the court to reach the merits of UBS’s appeal. While, under the doctrine of cumulative finality, the subsequent entry of final judgment may cure a premature notice of appeal, the parties’ effort to finally resolve the underlying proceeding, in this case, falls flat. View "Lorenzo Esteva, et al v. UBS Financial Services Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Cuban immigrant, sought immigration relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) as well as through and application for asylum, and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Immigration Judge denied the petitions, based on two inconsistencies with Petitioner's testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals' affirmance of the Immigration Judge's denial of Petitioner's immigration application, finding the record lacks substantial evidence that would allow the court to affirm the Immigration Judge's adverse credibility determination. The court noted that the inconsistencies were involved translated statements that more properly seen as were "approximations." Thus, the court determined that the Immigration Judge committed clear error in making an adverse credibility determination. View "Ignacio Balaez Serra v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for 27 counts of aiding and abetting the acquisition of controlled substances by deception and 102 counts of unlawfully dispensing controlled substances. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instructions were improper and his statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a), was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant argued that the district court erred because its jury instruction used “or,” instead of “and,” in setting forth the elements of Section 841(a) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and found that Section 841(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to physicians. The court reasoned that in Ruan, the defendant physicians were convicted of violating Section 841(a)(1) by “dispensing controlled substances not ‘as authorized.’” Here similarly, the jury was instructed that “whether Defendant dispensed the controlled substances ‘outside the usual course of professional practice’ is to be judged objectively.” Because this instruction allowed the jury to convict Defendant without considering whether he knowingly or intentionally issued prescriptions outside the usual course of professional practice, it was erroneous under Ruan. However, the court concluded that it is satisfied that (1) this evidence extensively proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew his prescriptions were issued outside the usual course of professional practice, and (2) a jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error. Further, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that Section 841 is unconstitutionally vague because the CSA does not define the phrases “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of professional practice.” These phrases do not require statutory or regulatory definitions. View "USA v. Dr. James Heaton" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years of sexual offender probation. The terms of that probation provided that he “qualified and shall register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a sexual offender pursuant to Section 943.0435.” Petitioner—proceeding pro se—sought federal habeas corpus relief from his conviction pursuant to Section 2254. The state moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because he was not “in custody” under Section 2254(a). The state argued that Petitioner was not in its physical custody at the time he filed his petition. Petitioner responded that his lifetime sex offender registration, “along with all the other restrictions that come with being a registered sex offender,” significantly restrained his individual liberty such that he was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2254(a). The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Section  2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that Florida’s registration and reporting requirements for sex offenders do not render those offenders “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254(a). The court reasoned that the proper inquiry here is under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and its progeny. First, he is not at the beck and call of state officials. Second, Petitioner is not required to live in a certain community or home and does not need permission to hold a job or drive a car. Third, Petitioner has to provide in-person advance notice of trips outside the state and outside the country, but the trips themselves do not require permission or approval by state officials. View "Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Under the terms of a consulting agreement between GSE Consulting, Inc. (“GSE”) and Harris Corporation (“Harris”), GSE is entitled to a payment of up to four million dollars in the event that certain intellectual property owned by Harris is “sold, merged or transferred” but did not form “the primary basis of the sale.” GSE contends that the relevant intellectual property, held by a subsidiary of one of Harris’s subsidiaries, necessarily “merged” when Harris used a different subsidiary to effectuate a comprehensive reverse triangular merger with an outside company and thus triggered Harris’s payment obligation under the parties’ agreement. L3Harris, however, maintained that Harris’s participation in the reverse triangular merger did not cause the relevant intellectual property to “merge” and has accordingly refused to make the demanded payment. The district court agreed with L3Harris and dismissed GSE’s breach of contract claim on summary judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the reverse triangular merger at issue did not “merge,” i.e., combine, the relevant intellectual property in any ordinary way. The Plan contains assurances regarding the validity, right to continued use, and maintenance of each party’s intellectual property. And, given its broad definitions of “Company Intellectual Property” and “Intellectual Property,” the Plan certainly reaches the intellectual property held by Eagle as subsidiary of one of Harris’s subsidiaries. The Plan neither blends, pools, nor otherwise combines the intellectual property held by Eagle with any other intellectual property. Therefore, the intellectual property discussed in the Consulting Agreement was not “merged” as a result of the reverse triangular merger. View "GSE Consulting, Inc. v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) made multiple determinations that Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits under her long-term disability insurance policy and her life insurance policy. Plaintiff sued LINA for breach of contract and bad-faith failure to provide insurance benefits. The district court granted summary judgment for LINA on Plaintiff’s bad-faith claim based on the multiple medical opinions that supported LINA’s determinations. The district court held that, under Alabama law, Plaintiff could not recover mental anguish damages for her breach of contract claim and excluded evidence of such damages. Finally, following a jury verdict in Plaintiff’s favor on the breach of contract claim related to the long-term disability insurance policy, the district court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to simple pre-judgment interest at a rate of 1.5 percent under the policy and simple post-judgment interest at a rate of 0.08 percent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1961. In determining that the long-term disability insurance policy provided for simple rather than compound interest, the district court struck a document produced by Plaintiff because it was not properly authenticated. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred at each of these steps.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence establishes that LINA had an arguable reason for determining that Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits under the disability policy. Further, the court wrote that the Supreme Court of Alabama has made clear that mental anguish damages are unavailable for breach of contract claims related to long-term disability insurance policies. View "Cherri Walker v. Life Insurance Company of North America" on Justia Law

Geico General Insurance Company (Geico) asserted eight claims against Glassco, Inc.: a declaratory judgment claim seeking a declaration that Glassco violated the Repair Act and that Geico had no duty to pay pending claims (count one); a federal racketeering claim (count two); a federal racketeering conspiracy claim (count three); a Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act claim (count four); a Florida racketeering claim (count five); a common law fraud claim (count six); an unjust enrichment claim (count seven); and a Repair Act claim (count eight). The district court denied summary judgment to the extent that Geico alleged that Glassco, Inc. made misrepresentations that amounted to fraud “independent of” Glassco’s violations of the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act. Geico tried to convert this nonfinal decision into a final decision by filing an amended complaint that removed the fraud allegations that were independent of the Repair Act violations.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal explaining that because the district court denied summary judgment as to these fraud allegations, there is no final decision for Geico to appeal. The court held that it can’t exercise jurisdiction over this appeal simply because the alternative—sending this case back to the district court—may be inconvenient or inefficient. The court wrote that by dismissing this appeal today, it vindicates finality as the historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure, serves the important interests of judicial efficiency, and promotes the sensible policy of avoiding piecemeal appeals. View "Government Employees Insurance Company, et al. v. Jason Wilemon, et al." on Justia Law