Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellee’s confirmed bankruptcy plan purported to modify the rights of Appellant Creditor Mortgage Corporation of the South’s (“MCS”) mortgage on Appellee’s residence. In fact, her plan purported to eradicate all remaining outstanding payments on her mortgage, beyond MCS’s claims for past-due arrearages. The bankruptcy court had confirmed Appellee’s Plan without objection and that 11 U.S.C. Section 1327 (the “finality” provision) renders confirmed plans final, the bankruptcy court granted Appellee’s motion, and the district court affirmed. On appeal, at issue was which provision wins— antimodification or finality—when the two clash in the scenario this case presents.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling holding that release of MCS’s lien before its loan had been repaid in full violates Section 1322(b)(2)’s antimodification clause. The court held that under Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, it read the antimodification provision as an ironclad “do not touch” instruction for the rights of holders of homestead mortgages. So a bankruptcy plan cannot modify the rights of a mortgage lender whose claim is secured by the debtor’s principal residence by providing for release of the homestead-mortgagee’s lien before the mortgagee has recovered the full amount it is owed. View "Mortgage Corporation of the South v. Judith Lacy Bozeman" on Justia Law

The Florida Legislature passed the Combatting Violence, Disorder, and Looting, and Law Enforcement Protection Act, also known as House Bill 1 (“HB 1”), 2021 Fla. Leg. Sess. Laws Serv. ch. 2021-6. HB 1 redefined the crime of “riot.” After HB 1’s passage, Dream Defenders and other organizations that lead protests for racial justice challenged the new definition as unconstitutional, alleging that it infringed their members’ First Amendment right to engage in peaceful protest. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the new statutory definition was vague and overbroad and, therefore likely to chill or deter their members’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. The court entered a preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants, Governor DeSantis and three sheriffs, from taking any steps to enforce the law using the new definition.   The Eleventh Circuit deferred its decision as to the preliminary injunction in this case until the Florida Supreme Court has had the opportunity to consider the following certified question:What meaning is to be given to the provision of Florida Stat. § 870.01(2) making it unlawful to “willfully participate[] in a violent public disturbance involving an assembly of three or persons, acting with a common intent to assist each other in violent and disorderly conduct, resulting in . . . [i]njury to another person; . . . [d]amage to property; . . . or [i]mminent danger of injury to another person or damage to property”? View "Dream Defenders, et al v. Governor of the State of Florida, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen and a U.S. national, as that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. Section 6023(15). He claims to be the “rightful owner of an 82.5% interest in certain commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Santiago de Cuba,” identified by the Cuban government as La Marítima and Terminal Naviera. According to the complaints, the knowing and intentional conduct of Carnival and Royal Caribbean constitutes trafficking under Section 6023(13)(A). As a result, Plaintiff—who provided the cruise lines with written notice by certified mail of his intent to commence an action under Title III—claims that he is entitled to damages under Section 6082.   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and vacated our prior opinion. The court held that Plaintiff has standing to assert his Title III claims, but that those claims fail on the merits. The court explained that the Cuban government confiscated La Marítima prior to March 12, 1996, and because Plaintiff acquired his interest in the property through inheritance after that date, his claims failed. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Carnival and Royal Caribbean. View "Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff enrolled in a Doctor of Education degree program at Grand Canyon University. Plaintiff claims that he did not complete his degree because, despite representing that students can finish the program in 60 credit hours, Grand Canyon makes that goal impossible with the aim of requiring students to take and pay for additional courses. Plaintiff also claims that he was not provided with the faculty support promised by Grand Canyon. According to Plaintiff Grand Canyon’s failure to provide dissertation support is designed to require students to take and pay for additional courses that would allow them to complete the dissertation. Plaintiff filed claims alleging breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. He also asserted claims under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the ACFA, intentional misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The court reversed in part the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court explained that though Grand Canyon did not contractually promise Plaintiff that he would earn a doctoral degree within 60 credit hours, he has plausibly alleged that it did agree to provide him with the faculty resources and guidance he needed to complete his dissertation. Insofar as he asserts that Grand Canyon promised and failed to meaningfully provide him with the faculty support necessary to complete his dissertation, he has sufficiently alleged breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Donrich Young v. Grand Canyon University, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant challenges his convictions of healthcare fraud, illegal kickbacks, and money laundering and the related restitution award and forfeiture judgment. After Defendant filed this appeal, President Trump commuted his sentence of imprisonment and rendered any challenge to it moot. In his remaining challenges, Defendant argued that his indictment should have been dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct, that the district court erroneously admitted expert opinion testimony against him, that the admissible evidence against him was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the restitution award and forfeiture judgment should be vacated.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that that the presidential commutation renders Defendant’s appeal of his prison sentence moot but does not otherwise affect his appeal. Second, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to dismiss the indictment or to disqualify the prosecutors due to misconduct. Third, the court affirmed the admission of the expert-opinion testimony. Fourth, the court affirmed the restitution amount as not clearly erroneous. And fifth, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Defendant of money laundering and that the forfeiture judgment based on money laundering was lawfully calculated. View "USA v. Philip Esformes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography in violation, respectively, of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(5)(b). On appeal, Defendant claimed raised three grounds of error, 1.) the government failed to trigger federal jurisdiction; 2.) the district court erred when it discharged an impaneled-but-not-yet sworn jury in his absence, and 3.) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that by transferring content from his phone to a hard drive that was manufactured overseas, federal jurisdiction was triggered. The court noted that Defendant's counsel consented to the jury not being sworn and that doing so outside of his presence didn't raise constitutional concerns. Finally, the court found the evidence presented by the government to be sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. View "USA v. Clark Downs" on Justia Law

Just before the Chapter 11 reorganization plans of Caribevision Holdings, Inc. and Caribevision TV Network, LLC was set to be confirmed, the debtors filed an emergency motion to modify the plans under 11 U.S.C. Section 1127(a). The initial plans called for equity in the reorganized companies to be split between four shareholders: R.D.B., Pegaso Television Corp., E.B., and Vasallo TV Group. The modification, after being approved by the bankruptcy court, stripped the first three of their equity and allocated full ownership to the fourth—a company controlled by the debtors’ Chief Executive Officer. the three ousted shareholders, who collectively call themselves the Pegaso Equity Holders, now challenge the bankruptcy court’s order granting the debtors’ emergency motion to modify the reorganization plans. They contend that they were entitled to a revised disclosure statement and a second opportunity to vote on the plans under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3019(a)—a procedural protection the bankruptcy court did not provide them.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the order granting the debtor’s emergency motion to modify the reorganization plans, reversed in part the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the reorganization plans to the extent that it adopts the modification, and remanded to the bankruptcy court to fashion an equitable remedy. The court held that the bankruptcy court erred in granting the debtor’s modification without first requiring that the debtor provide the Pegaso Equity Holders with a revised disclosure statement and a second opportunity to cast a ballot. View "Emilio Braun, et al. v. America-CV Station Group, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court. Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022) (Ruan II), the Eleventh Circuit ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the mens rea jury instruction used in this case was error and whether any such error was harmless. Among other things, Defendants challenged the jury instructions used for their substantive drug convictions under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a), which prohibits the “knowing or intentional” dispensing of controlled substances “except as authorized.” The relevant drugs in this case are only “authorized” to be dispensed pursuant to a prescription, and an effective prescription must be made for a “legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.” Defendants requested that the jury be instructed that their good faith be a defense to an allegation that they acted outside the “usual course of professional practice.”   The Eleventh Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part Defendants’ convictions. The court explained that here, the district court did not adequately instruct the jury that Defendants must have “knowingly or intentionally” prescribed outside the usual course of their professional practices. At a minimum without the limiting qualification that only subjective good faith was sufficient for conviction, the jury was authorized to convict under the sort of objective good faith or honest effort standard rejected by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the court vacated Defendants’ substantive drug convictions under Section 841(a). The court vacated Defendants’ sentence for all counts and remanded for resentencing on the surviving counts. View "USA v. Xiulu Ruan, et al." on Justia Law

An insured fell from a roof and became paralyzed from the waist down, never to walk again. Within months, his medical bills climbed past $400,000, and future costs were projected into the millions. Three insurance companies potentially provided coverage for the insured. This appeal is a battle between the two of them. The primary insurer was Southern Owners Insurance Company. At the time of the accident, the insured was performing subcontracting work for Beck Construction, which had a policy with American Builders Insurance Company and an excess policy with Evanston Insurance Company. American Builders investigated the accident, assessed Beck Construction’s liability, and evaluated the claim. Southern-Owners did little to nothing for months. American Builders then sued Southern-Owners for common law bad faith under Florida’s doctrine of equitable subrogation. Southern-Owners moved for summary judgment, but the district court denied the motion. A federal trial jury heard the case and found in favor of American Builders. After the entry of final judgment, Southern-Owners sought judgment matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. On appeal, Southern-Owners challenges the denials of its summary judgment and post-trial motions.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that taking the evidence in the light most favorable to American Builders, a reasonable jury could have found (as it did) both that Southern-Owners acted in bad faith and that its bad faith caused American Builders to pay its policy. Moreover, American Builders did not breach Southern-Owners’ contract and relieve Southern-Owners of its good-faith duties. The district court did not err in denying Southern-Owners’ Rule 50(b) motion. View "American Builders Insurance Company v. Southern-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This appeal arises out of an insurance dispute involving a yacht, the Serendipity, that was destroyed by Hurricane Dorian, a Category 5 storm, that slammed into Great Abaco Island in the Bahamas. Serendipity at Sea, LLC (“Serendipity, LLC”), a holding company created by M.S. and J.E. (“the Managers”) to manage the Serendipity, sued Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing to Policy Number 187581 (“Lloyd’s”) for breach of contract after Lloyd’s denied the the Managers insurance claim for the damage Hurricane Dorian caused to the Serendipity. In denying that it had breached the contract, Lloyd’s argued that it was not liable because Serendipity, LLC did not employ a full-time licensed captain in violation of the policy’s Captain Warranty, and that the breach increased the hazard to the yacht because a licensed captain would have operated the vessel back to Florida when Hurricane Dorian formed and was forecast to hit the Bahamas.   The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lloyd’s. It found that the Captain Warranty was unambiguous; that Serendipity, LLC breached the agreement by failing to hire a full-time licensed captain; and that the breach increased the hazard posed to the Serendipity based on the purportedly undisputed testimony of an expert hired by Lloyd’s. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Lloyd’s and remanded. The court explained that while it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Serendipity, LLC breached the Captain Warranty, a disputed question of material fact remains about whether the breach increased the hazard posed to the vessel. View "Serendipity at Sea, LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London Subscribing to Policy Number 187581" on Justia Law