Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, the School Board of St. Johns County (the “School Board”), is responsible for providing “proper attention to health, safety, and other matters relating to the welfare of students” within the St. Johns County School District (the “School District”). Plaintiff, is a transgender boy. The case involves the practice of separating school bathrooms based on biological sex. This appeal required the court to determine whether separating the use of male and female bathrooms in public schools based on a student’s biological sex violates (1) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sections 1, and (2) Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. The district court enjoined the School Board from prohibiting Plaintiff’s use of the male bathrooms and granted Plaintiff $1,000 in compensatory damages.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s order. The court explained that commensurate with the plain and ordinary meaning of “sex” in 1972, Title IX allows schools to provide separate bathrooms on the basis of biological sex. That is exactly what the School Board has done in this case; it has provided separate bathrooms for each of the biological sexes. And to accommodate transgender students, the School Board has provided single-stall, sex-neutral bathrooms, which Title IX neither requires nor prohibits. Nothing about this bathroom policy violates Title IX. Further, the court wrote that whether Title IX should be amended to equate “gender identity” and “transgender status” with “sex” should be left to Congress—not the courts. View "Drew Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was admitted to the United States in 2002 and who became a lawful permanent resident in 2003. In February 2012, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the Georgia crime of family violence battery, for which he was sentenced to 12 months confinement that he was permitted to serve on probation.In March 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner on the theory that his Georgia family violence battery conviction was an “aggravated felony” under the INA, making him removable. Petitioner challenged this classification and claimed he was entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).First, the 11th Circuit held that Petitioner's conviction in Georgia was an "aggravated felony," finding that his probationary sentence still qualified as "incarceration." Second, pertaining to his request for CAT relief, the court held Petitioner failed to show the likelihood of government involvement or acquiescence in any torture by the Jamaican government. View "Karastan L. Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd. obtained the injunction barring the Florida Surgeon General from enforcing a prohibition against businesses requiring proof of vaccination as a condition of service. But Norwegian recently filed a suggestion of mootness stating that it no longer requires proof of vaccinations on its cruises. Yet, Norwegian’s filings make clear that it has not suspended its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. It also continues to defend its entitlement to equitable relief by asking us to leave the preliminary injunction intact.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. The court explained that it agrees with the Surgeon General that a “live dispute” exists because Norwegian has not established that it has relaxed its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. “The possibility that a party may change its mind in the future is sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness.” The court explained Norwegian has offered no evidence of its vaccine policies or its intentions for the future beyond the boilerplate statement that it is not requiring COVID-19 vaccination for now and for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Norwegian appears to concede that it has not abolished its policy forevermore.’The court saw no reason to believe that Norwegian will not seek to reinstate its policy given its continued insistence that the Florida law is unconstitutional. View "Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd, et al. v. State Surgeon General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that toxic chemicals used during the carpet manufacturing process have been allowed to seep into the rivers that supply drinking water to communities near Dalton, including Rome, Georgia and the rest of Floyd County. On behalf of himself and a proposed class of water subscribers and ratepayers, he sued Dalton Utilities, a municipal corporation that operates Dalton’s wastewater treatment system, for violating the Clean Water Act and for creating a public nuisance. His lawsuit claims that Dalton Utilities has caused the City of Rome’s domestic water supply to be contaminated with dangerously high levels of toxic chemicals.   The question before the Eleventh Circuit was whether Dalton Utilities is entitled to municipal immunity from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement (injunctive relief) claim. The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Dalton Utilities’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed district court’s order denying Dalton Utilities’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim on municipal immunity grounds. The court explained that at oral argument counsel for Dalton Utilities conceded that if Phillips is still good law, Plaintiff has properly alleged a Phillips kind of nuisance claim for personal injury. The court agreed and held that municipal immunity does not shield Dalton Utilities from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim. View "Jarrod Johnson v. Water, Light, and Sinking Fund Commission of City of Dalton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs L.E., B.B., A.Z., and C.S., are students who have respiratory disabilities (“Students”). They appealed the denial of their motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Students sued Defendants, the Superintendent of the Cobb County School District, individual members of the Cobb County School Board, and the Cobb County School District (collectively, “CCSD”), in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Students claim that CCSD’s refusal to provide reasonable accommodations for access to in-person schooling constitutes a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”).   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for analysis under the correct scope: access to the benefits provided by in-person schooling. The court held this claim presents a live controversy that survives mootness and the district court erred in its review of the Students’ discrimination claims. The Students argue that CCSD ignored those recommendations and continues to disregard CDC guidance in this respect. Therefore, this remains a live controversy. A judgment in their favor would grant the Students meaningful relief by requiring CCSD to follow the guidance on accommodating students with disabilities under the ADA and Section 504 as it is updated—a practice the Students claim CCSD refuses to do. Thus, this claim remains a live controversy. Further, the court wrote that the district court erred in holding the Students must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on a disparate treatment claim. View "L.E., et al v. Superintendent of Cobb County School District, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought federal and state claims on behalf of her late husband against the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida after her husband’s 2011 arrest. The Sheriff removed the case to federal district court based on the presence of the federal claims. But the district court later dismissed the federal claims. On appeal, the issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims after it dismissed her federal claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has encouraged district courts to remand pendent state-law claims to state courts after the federal claims are dismissed. The court wrote that the district court followed the Eleventh Circuit’s guidance and acted within its broad discretion when it remanded this case to state court. View "Marida Silas v. Sheriff of Broward County, Florida" on Justia Law

North American issued two insurance policies for the life of J.C. On November 9, 2018, it issued a policy that named an irrevocable trust managed by the trustee as beneficiary. It issued a policy that named J.C.’s wife, as beneficiary. Each contained an essentially identical clause that excluded suicide from coverage under the policy. That clause read, “SUICIDE — If the Insured commits suicide, while sane or insane, within two years from the Policy Date, Our liability is limited to an amount equal to the total premiums paid.” In a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the beneficiaries argued that “the entire lawsuit is predicated on [North American’s] erroneous position that the contract term ‘suicide’ is synonymous with the expression ‘suicide by cop,’ which is a term of art that actually refers to justifiable homicide.” The district court agreed that “[t]he plain meaning of the term ‘suicide’ encompasses the act of killing oneself—not the killing of a person by another” and granted the motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded finding that the ordinary meaning of “suicide” includes suicide-by-cop. The court explained that here, where the beneficiaries agree with the allegations in North American’s complaint due to the procedural posture of the case, no factual question exists. The ordinary meaning of “suicide” certainly covers J.C.’s specific behavior in pointing his gun at police officers to provoke them into shooting and killing him as part of his plan to end his own life. Thus, the district court erred in ruling to the contrary. View "North American Company for Life and Health Insurance v. Michelle Caldwell, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a Florida prisoner serving three death sentences. After pursuing a direct appeal and postconviction relief in the Florida state courts, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, alleging, in relevant part, that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance during the penalty phase. After the district court denied Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on one issue: “Whether the district court erred in denying Jennings’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase of his capital trial by failing to conduct further investigation into Petitioner’s childhood and background.”   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and the court affirmed on that ground. The court wrote that given the facts of this case, it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present the mitigation evidence in question during the penalty phase. As an initial matter, there is a significant probability that much of the omitted mitigation evidence, when combined with that adduced at trial, would have undermined some of the mitigating factors that the trial court found. Furthermore, there were significant aggravating factors present in this case. View "Brandy Bain Jennings v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, Sections (1) and 924(e)(1). In support of his guilty plea, the factual proffer shows that he unlawfully possessed a loaded firearm on September 26, 2017. Although Defendant conceded that he had two prior convictions that satisfy ACCA’s definition of a “violent felony,” he objected to the probation officer’s conclusion that his two cocaine-related convictions met ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition. But the district court overruled Defendant’s objection, finding that his cocaine-related convictions did qualify and sentenced Defendant to ACCA’s mandatory fifteen-year minimum. Defendant appealed his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that ACCA’s definition of a state “serious drug offense” incorporates the version of the federal controlled substances schedules in effect when Defendant was convicted of the prior state drug offense. The court explained that when possible, the court interprets the provisions of a text harmoniously. To read the definition in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) harmoniously with the rest of Section 924(e)’s subparts, the court wrote it must read that definition to incorporate the version of the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect when Defendant’s prior state convictions occurred. Thus, the court concluded that ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition encompasses a prior state offense that involved “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute” ioflupane, “for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. Finally, the court wrote that Defendant suggested no other reason why Section 893.13(1) might be categorically broader than ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense.” View "USA v. Eugene Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that the district court erroneously held that a life insurance policy issued by Plaintiff Jackson National Life Insurance Company (“Jackson”) to third-party K.C., and subsequently sold by K.C. to Defendant, was void and unenforceable under Georgia law as an illegal human life wagering contract. K.C. acquired the policy, which listed “K.C.” as the insured and named K.C.’s estate as the beneficiary in 1999. At the time, K.C. was HIV positive, and he had a relatively short life expectancy. A few months after he purchased the policy, K.C., with the assistance of a viatical insurance broker, sold the policy to Defendant and named Defendant as its primary beneficiary.   When Defendant learned about K.C.s death, he made a claim for the death benefit under the policy. Jackson declined to pay the benefit and initiated this action seeking a declaration that the policy was void ab initio under Georgia law as an illegal human life wagering contract. The district court concluded that the policy was void and unenforceable under Georgia law, and it entered judgment in favor of Jackson. Defendant appealed, arguing that K.C.’s unilateral intent to sell the policy to a third party without an insurable interest in his life was insufficient to declare the policy void under Georgia law.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and vacated the judgment entered by the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a determination as to whether Defendant’s claim to benefits under the policy is barred by laches. View "Jackson National Life Insurance Company v. Sterling Crum" on Justia Law