Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). In the removal proceedings, the immigration judge made an adverse credibility determination against Petitioner based on (1) inconsistencies and omissions between his hearing testimony and the documentary evidence in the record and (2) his demeanor at the hearing. The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination, finding that it was not clearly erroneous and adopting much of the immigration judge’s reasoning.   On appeal, Petitioner argued that the BIA’s affirmance of the adverse credibility determination was an error. He contends that the findings in support of that determination are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the immigration judge failed to cite examples in her analysis of his demeanor.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination against Petitioner. The court reasoned that the immigration judge and the BIA offered “specific, cogent reasons,” supported by substantial evidence in the record, for determining that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible, and this record does not compel the court to reverse that adverse credibility determination. View "Mehedi Hasan-Nayem v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant who pleaded guilty to attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute has a prior 3-point offense but does not have more than 4 criminal history points or a prior 2-point violent offense. The district court concluded that Defendant remained eligible for relief under the Act because he did not have all three characteristics.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Defendant was eligible for safety-valve relief despite his prior 3-point offense. The court further rejected the government’s arguments to the contrary. The court reasoned that because the conjunctive “and” joins together the enumerated characteristics, a defendant must have all three before he is ineligible for relief. The court explained that here Defendant’s prior 3-point offense does not disqualify him from safety-valve relief. Section 3553(f)(1) begins with a negative—“the defendant does not have”—and the three requirements that follow are joined by an “and.” View "USA v. Julian Garcon" on Justia Law

Former President Donald J. Trump brought a civil action seeking an injunction against the government after it executed a search warrant at his Mar-a-Lago residence. He argues that a court-mandated special master review process is necessary because the government’s Privilege Review Team protocols were inadequate because various seized documents are protected by the executive or attorney-client privilege because he could have declassified documents or designated them as personal rather than presidential records, and—if all that fails—because the government’s appeal was procedurally deficient. The government disagrees with each contention.   At issue on appeal is whether the district court had the power to hear the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction in this case. For that reason, the court vacated the September 5 order on appeal and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss the underlying civil action. The court explained that it cannot write a rule that allows any subject of a search warrant to block government investigations after the execution of the warrant. Nor can it write a rule that allows only former presidents to do so. Either approach would be a radical reordering of the court’s caselaw limiting the federal courts’ involvement in criminal investigations. And both would violate bedrock separation-of-powers limitations. View "Donald J. Trump v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff as pulled over by a deputy of the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office for erratic driving. During the stop, the deputy noticed an open container of beer and decided to issue a warning citation. The deputy wrote—but never delivered—the ticket. Instead, a few minutes into the stop, he ordered Plaintiff out of the truck so he could walk his drug-sniffing dog around the vehicle. Plaintiff resisted the deputy’s commands verbally and then physically. The deputy arrested him for obstruction and Plaintiff suffered minor injuries. His truck was searched, but no drugs were found. The obstruction charge was later dismissed. A couple years after this encounter, Plaintiff filed claims against the deputy and the Jackson County Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Florida common law.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated he district court’s summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim against the deputy, but only with respect to the issue of whether the deputy unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court also vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim against both the deputy and the Jackson County Sheriff, but only with respect to the issues of whether the deputy tortiously detained Plaintiff by (1) unlawfully prolonging the traffic stop and (2) arresting Plaintiff without probable cause. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in all other respects. View "Michael Baxter v. Louis Roberts, III, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendants, alleging that the title of Defendants’ series, MTV Floribama Shore, infringes on Plaintiffs’ Flora-Bama trademarks. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiffs timely appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Defendants. The court explained that the titles are not being used as trademarks to identify and distinguish the source of the artistic works. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that any of these titles to the third parties’ artistic works have any source-identifying function. Because these titles are not being used as trademarks, this is not a title-versus-title case for purposes of the Rogers footnote. Further, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that they own interests in those artistic works as trademarks for Plaintiffs’ own goods or services—the foundation of trademark rights. Indeed, nothing in the record would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the public views Plaintiffs as the source of these artistic works. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on alleged confusion with Plaintiffs’ commercial establishments, not with any artistic works purportedly owned by Plaintiffs. As Defendants note, Plaintiffs’ complaint did not claim rights in or allege any confusion relating to any artistic work, and Plaintiffs’ cease-and-desist letter did not mention any artistic works. View "MGFB Properties, Inc., et al. v. 495 Productions Holdings LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff a veteran currently imprisoned by the state of Florida, sued prison and state officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that they violated his rights under Section 5301 by taking his VA benefits from his inmate account to satisfy liens and holds stemming from medical, legal, and copying expenses he had incurred in prison. Plaintiff also sought to enjoin a Florida administrative rule requiring that inmates have their VA benefits sent directly to their inmate accounts for prison officials to honor the funds’ protected status, which Plaintiff contended violates Section 5301, thereby running afoul of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. After dismissing some of Defendants, the district court granted qualified immunity to those remaining. It also found that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge Florida’s administrative rule.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff lacks standing because he has failed to show a “real” and “immediate” threat of future injury from complying with the Florida Direct Deposit Rule, pointing only to injuries in the distant past. Although it appears that Plaintiff initially suffered concrete harm when he transitioned to keeping two addresses on file with the VA (i.e., receiving VA checks several months late in the spring of 2013), that harm occurred only in the immediate aftermath of the address change—over nine years ago. Thus the court held that because Plaintiff has not shown a “real or immediate threat” of future injury from keeping two addresses to comply with Florida’s administrative rule, he lacks standing to challenge it. View "John David Wilson, Jr. v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen and a U.S. national as that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. Section 6023(15). He claims to be the “rightful owner of an 82.5% interest in certain commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Santiago de Cuba,” identified by the Cuban government as La Marítima and Terminal Naviera. At issue on appeal is whether Plaintiff has Article III standing to assert his claims against Carnival and Royal Caribbean, and if so, whether those claims have merit.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiff has standing to assert his Title III claims, but that those claims fail on the merits. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Carnival and Royal Caribbean. The court explained that the claims fail under Section 6082(a)(4)(B) of the Act because the Cuban government confiscated La Marítima prior to March 12, 1996, and because Plaintiff acquired his interest in the property through inheritance after that date. View "Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

The Trump administration announced that it would not suspend the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (known as the “Helms-Burton Act”) for the first time since its enactment in 1996. Shortly after this announcement, the cause of action created by Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in U.S. courts. Plaintiffs in this case Title III against several entities that own and operate travel websites, including Booking.com BV and Booking Holdings, Inc. (the Booking Entities), and Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com L.P., Hotels.com GP, and Orbitz, LLC (the Expedia Entities). Plaintiffs alleged that they are U.S. nationals and living heirs to separate beach-front properties nationalized by the Cuban government after the 1959 revolution According to the complaint, the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities trafficked in those properties on their travel booking websites.   The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Title III claims without leave to amend, ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the relevant provisions of Florida’s longarm statute. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that based on the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint, the district court has specific personal jurisdiction over the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities pursuant to Fla. Stat. Section 48.193(1)(a)(2), and the exercise of such jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also have plausibly alleged Article III standing. View "Mario Del Valle, et al. v. Trivago GMBH, et al." on Justia Law

On March 26, 2020, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida suspended all grand jury sessions in response to the pandemic. On August 28, 2020, while the administrative order suspending grand jury sessions was still in effect, the government filed a sealed two-count information against B.G.G. The information charged B.G.G. with conspiring to accept kickbacks for prescribing opioids from August 2012 through August 31, 2015, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371, and with soliciting and receiving kickbacks for prescribing opioids on August 31, 20   The question in this case is whether the district court abused its limited discretion when it granted “leave” to dismiss the information against B.G.G. with prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order. The court explained that although “a dismissal under rule 48(a) does not bar a subsequent prosecution,” it also “does not impair the protection afforded by the statute of limitations.” If the grand jury later indicts B.G.G., he can still raise a statute of limitations defense. The court explained it need not pass on the statute of limitations issue and do not determine whether the sealed information was instituted within the meaning of section 3282(a). The court only concluded that the district court erred in not applying the “leave” requirements for dismissing an information under rule 48(a). The court vacated the dismissal order and remand to the district court for further proceedings. View "USA v. B.G.G." on Justia Law

In January 2020, Plaintiff sued Iberostar under the Helms-Burton Act, which grants the right to sue companies trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government. Plaintiff claims that Cuba seized her family’s hotel in 1961 and that Iberostar and the Cuban government now operate the hotel together.Iberostar successfully sought a stay of the proceedings, citing a regulation that prohibits participation in Helms-Burton suits—on pain of a fine that could reach 600,000 euros. Two years have passed since the stay, and Plaintiff sought to lift the stay. The district court denied her request.On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, vacated the stay, and remanded the case with instructions it proceed. The court noted that the stay was indefinite and that the European Union agency tasked with resolving the matter has no timeline for its decision. As a result, the court concluded that the stay is immoderate and must be vacated. View "Maria Dolores Canto Marti v. Iberostar Hoteles Y Apartamentos SL" on Justia Law