Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an Alabama prisoner, brought this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action alleging long delays in his receipt of treatment for hernias and for post-surgery complications. In his pro se third amended complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against: (1) Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), a private contractor that provides health care services for Alabama inmates; (2) Kay Ivey, the Governor of Alabama; and (3) Jefferson Dunn, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections.The district court (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Wexford and (2) dismissed Roy’s complaint against Governor Ivey and Commissioner Dunn for failure to state a claim.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that only one of several statements from other inmates that Plaintiff presented satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1746 because the other statements were only presented as "affidavits" and did not mention the statement was “true and correct” and was made “under penalty of perjury." Considering Plaintiff's remaining evidence, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in entering judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Larry Roy v. Kay Ivy, et al." on Justia Law

Intervenor is a former commercial pilot who now flies a small Cessna jet for his own personal use. The intervenor landed his Cessna at the Lantana Airport. A Palm Beach County ordinance prohibits “pure turbo-jet aircraft” and cargo-carrying aircraft that weigh more than 12,500 pounds from using Lantana Airport, and Palm Beach County enforces the ordinance in a way that actually bans all jets, not just the “pure turbo” variety. The intervenor complained to the Federal Aviation Administration that the ordinance’s jet restriction violated a grant assurance the County had made to the FAA in exchange for federal airport improvement money. The FAA agreed with the Intervenor and ordered the County to rescind the restriction. The County and the City of Atlantis, which borders Lantana Airport, have petitioned us for review of the FAA’s final agency decision.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that the FAA has exclusive authority over our national navigable airspace, which means it’s responsible for “developing plans and policy . . . necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use” of that space. It “may modify or revoke an assignment of airspace when required in the public interest.” As long as any change in the FAA’s position on an airport restriction isn’t based on an impermissible bias, it has the authority to make that change. The Associate Administrator’s conclusion that Lantana Airport’s jet restriction violates Grant Assurance wasn’t arbitrary and capricious but instead was supported by substantial evidence. View "Palm Beach County, et al. v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

The controversy, in this case, is rooted in the propriety of a lawyer charging a wage earner a contingent attorney’s fee for prosecuting the wage earner’s Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims in a U.S. District Court. The wage earner paid the contingent fee and then sued his lawyer in Alabama state court to recover part of the fee. That court stayed the action so the wage earner and his lawyer could present the attorney’s fee controversy to the District Court that had presided over the FLSA case. The district court found the contingent fee excessive, ordered the lawyer to return the attorney’s fee, and dismissed the proceeding as moot.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and instructed the district court to vacate its order and deny the attorney’s and Plaintiff’s motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that had Plaintiff’s Rule 60 motion sought actual Rule 60 relief, the district court would have had jurisdiction to entertain it because the district court had jurisdiction over the underlying FLSA and employment discrimination controversy. But Plaintiff did not ask for—and the District Court did not grant—the type of relief authorized by Rule 60. Doing anything more than reopening the matter that had previously been dismissed, which is all Rule 60 allows, required an independent jurisdictional basis. The district court did not have such an independent jurisdictional basis when it litigated the state court breach of contract action as if it had been brought under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332. View "Carlos Padilla v. Redmont Properties LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (the Estate) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the named Defendants. This appeal stems from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s son's detention and death at the Charlotte County Jail.  The Estate brought a seven-count complaint against the named Defendants. The district court granted each of the summary judgment motions in full, finding that the Estate failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on any of the claims, and entered final judgment for the Defendants.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Sherriff of Charlotte County, the jail’s health care provider, and the jail’s medical personnel. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the jail’s corrections officers. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Estate failed to carry its burden of establishing a reasonable dispute of material fact regarding whether either the prison or the Sheriff advanced an unconstitutional policy or custom. Specifically, the district court found that Ireland’s Estate presented “no evidence” of an unconstitutional policy or custom and, at most, that the  Estate pointed to isolated incidents by the prison and the Sherriff.   Further, because there is no evidence in the record from which the court can infer that the officers were aware of the man’s need for medical aid at any time during the encounter before he ultimately lost consciousness, the deliberate indifference to medical treatment claims against the officers fail and summary judgment in their favor was proper. View "Thomas B. Ireland v. Bill Prummell, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer based on theories of (1) failure to accommodate in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; and (3) pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act after she was terminated following her request for an accommodation related to unspecified "child-birth complications." The district court granted summary judgment for GOSA on all three claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that as part of her initial burden to establish that a requested accommodation is reasonable under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must put her employer on notice of the disability for which she seeks an accommodation and provide enough information to allow her employer to understand how the accommodation she requests would assist her. View "Nicole Owens v. State of Georgia, Governor's Office of Student Achievement" on Justia Law

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for Georgia’s 14th Congressional District, appeals the district court’s denial of her Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. In her motion, Rep. Greene asked the district court to enjoin the state court’s application of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-5 (“Challenge Statute”) against her to prevent her from being disqualified as a candidate for Congress under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.   The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that Rep. Greene sought to enjoin the application of the Challenge Statute against her in the state proceedings to prevent her from being disqualified as a candidate for Congress under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the state proceedings under the Challenge Statute have concluded, and Rep. Greene has prevailed at each stage: the ALJ ruled in Rep. Greene’s favor, Secretary Raffensperger adopted the ALJ’s conclusions, the Superior Court of Fulton County affirmed the Secretary’s decision, and the Supreme Court of Georgia denied the Challengers’ application for discretionary review. Ultimately, Rep. Greene was not disqualified from being a candidate for Congress and is presently on the ballot for the upcoming election. Accordingly, the court no longer has the ability to accord Rep. Greene meaningful relief. Therefore the court held that the case is moot. View "Marjorie Taylor Greene v. Secretary of State for the State of Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

After Wisteria Island’s birth, Congress ceded title to all lands within three miles of the United States’s coast to the states, except for lands that were (1) “built up,” “filled in,” “or otherwise reclaimed” (2) by the United States (3) for the United States’s use. We must determine whether Wisteria Island satisfies this exception. Only the third requirement is at issue in this appeal: whether the United States created Wisteria Island for its “use.” Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee United States says that it created Wisteria Island to store dredged soil. Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant F.E.B., which claims to own the island, rejects the United States’s assertion that it built Wisteria Island for its “use.” According to F.E.B., the island arose simply as a result of the United States’s discarding of the soil it dredged from the channel.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the United States that, if it created Wisteria Island as a place to store dredged soil, then the United States built up or filled in Wisteria Island for the United States’s use. But on this record, the court found a genuine issue of material fact exists as to why the United States created the island. So after a thorough review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument, the court affirmed in part and vacate in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the United States and denial of summary judgment to F.E.B., and remanded this case for a factual determination of why the United States created Wisteria Island. View "USA v. F.E.B. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff regularly used Roundup on his lawn for about 30 years until 2016. Around 2016, Plaintiff was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma, which he believes was linked to the compound glyphosate, the main chemical ingredient in Roundup. Plaintiff filed suit against Monsanto, the manufacturer of Roundup. In his four-count complaint, Plaintiff alleged strict liability for a design defect under Georgia law (Count I); strict liability for failure to warn under Georgia law Count II); negligence under Georgia law (Count III); and breach of implied warranties under Georgia law (Count IV).   On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with deciding whether the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim was preempted under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Ac (FIFRA) because the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) had classified glyphosate as not likely to be carcinogenic to humans and approved the Roundup label. The Eleventh Circuit concluded it did and reversed the district court’s ruling. The court held that Plaintiff’s Georgia failure to warn claim is not preempted by the federal requirements under the FIFRA or the EPA actions pursuant to it. View "John D. Carson v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

Appellant was sexually assaulted by a deputy sheriff in Harris County, Georgia, who’s now serving an eight-year prison term. In the part of this civil-rights lawsuit, Appellant sued Harris County and the Sheriff of Harris County (Sheriff), alleging that the Sheriff failed in various ways to prevent the deputy from assaulting her. The district court found that the Sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity, and granted summary judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant fails the first prong of the court’s analysis because she cannot show that, in the course of supervising the deputy, the Sheriff violated her constitutional rights. The court reasoned that “It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior”. Accordingly, the court concluded that because the Sheriff had no notice of the deputy’s tendency to sexually assault civilians in his custody—he cannot be held responsible for the unpredictable acts of his subordinate View "Lynette Christmas v. Harris County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant seeks vacatur of his 71- month sentence. He contended the government breached his plea agreement by arguing at sentencing against recommendations it allegedly promised to make to support a lower sentence than Defendant received. The Eleventh Circuit subjected Defendant’s claims to plain-error review on direct review because Defendant never objected at sentencing that the government failed to live up to its bargain.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different district judge. The court explained that plain error occurred when the government breached the plea agreement and the breach prejudiced Defendant and seriously affected the integrity, fairness, and public reputation of the proceedings. The court wrote that here, the government breached its promise in the plea agreement to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range by advocating for an above-guidelines sentence. Even though the government stated at sentencing that it recommended a 66-month sentence, it then said that this was not enough and that Defendant deserved a sentence two or three times higher—an argument at war with its “recommendation.” For these reasons, the error that was plain occurred here, and the error affected Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Robert Brandon Malone" on Justia Law