Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of appealability (“COA”) with respect to: “Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when at the penalty phase of trial, it failed to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation and failed to uncover and present mitigation evidence.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was exhausted in state court. The court explained that Petitioner’s claim in state court did not contain any factual allegations in support of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present “substantial evidence” of mitigation. His allegations remained largely unchanged in his briefing to the Alabama Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Alabama.   Further, the court held that Petitioner failed to make any argument that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ denial of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court.   Moreover, the court agreed with the district court’s determination under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) that Petitioner has not demonstrated the Alabama courts’ denial of his Strickland claims were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” View "David Freeman v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections." on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review concerning whether it was arbitrary and capricious for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Administration) to issue marketing denial orders to six tobacco companies for their electronic nicotine-delivery systems without considering the companies’ marketing and sales-access-restriction plans designed to minimize youth exposure and access. The Administration refused to consider the marketing and sales-access-restriction plans.   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petitions for review, set aside the orders of the Administration, and remanded to the Administration. The court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Administration to ignore the relevant marketing and sales-access restriction plans do not mandate a different result on remand. The court acknowledged the evidence in the record cataloged by the dissent of the serious risk to youth, and it may be that the Administration will conclude on remand that the marketing and sales-access restriction plans submitted in the tobacco companies’ applications do not outweigh those risks. The court wrote that it decides only that the Administration must at least consider the relevant evidence before it, which includes the companies’ marketing and sales-access-restriction plans. View "Bidi Vapor LLC v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, et al" on Justia Law

The relevant consolidated appeals constitute the latest chapter of a long-running legal battle over attempts to satisfy a 2010 default judgment of $318 million under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2333, against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) for murder and kidnapping.   In the first appeal (Case No. 20-11736), Appellant appealed the district court’s orders directing certain garnishees to liquidate and/or distribute their assets to Plaintiffs who obtained the $318 million judgment. In the second appeal(Case No. 20-12467) Appellant appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the sale of real property located at 325 Leucadendra Drive in Coral Gables, Florida. In the third appeal(Case No. 20-12545) Appellant’s wife appealed the district court’s denial of her motion to intervene in the proceedings concerning the sale of real property located at 325 Leucadendra Drive (and owned by Leucadendra 325, one of the Appellants in Case Nos. 20-11736 and 20-12467).   In Case No. 20-11736, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a jury must decide whether Appellant and his companies qualify as agencies or instrumentalities of the FARC such that their assets can be garnished by Plaintiffs to satisfy their $318 million judgment. The court, therefore, reversed and remanded that appeal. In Case No. 20-12467, the court dismissed the appeal as moot because 325 Leucadendra has been sold and the court lacks the ability to grant the requested relief. In Case No. 20- 12545, the court affirmed the district court’s order denying Appellant’s wife’s motion to intervene as untimely and therefore dismiss the appeal. View "Keith Stansell, et al v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Following proceedings in district court, the trial court t entered a final judgment, finding Defendant liable, ordering him to disgorge over $4,000,000 in funds, and placing two of his entities under receivership in order to sell and reorganize assets to repay investors. Later, a federal grand jury sitting in Miami returned a superseding indictment that described consistent with the district court’s findings of fact.   After an extradition request was filed by the United States, the Supreme Court of Brazil allowed him to be extradited. He returned to the United States, and on the eve of trial, following over a year of pretrial proceedings, Defendant entered into a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to one count of mail fraud. The district court later sentenced Defendant to 220 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $169,177,338 in restitution.   On appeal, Defendant broadly argues: (1) that the custodial sentence imposed and the order of restitution violate the extradition treaty; and (2) that his guilty plea was not made freely and voluntarily. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court fully satisfied the core concerns of Rule 11, and the court could discern no reason to conclude that the district court plainly erred in finding that Defendant’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court explained that in this case, the record fully reflects that Defendant agreed to be sentenced subject to a 20-year maximum term, and his 220-month sentence is near the low end of his agreed-upon 210-to-240-month range. View "USA v. John J. Utsick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a middle school student, was brought to school by his mother. He was wearing a hoodie over his head because he was embarrassed of his haircut. When Plaintiff’s mother told him to pull down the hoodie, Plaintiff got upset and a school employee called Defendant, the school resource officer. Defendant spoke with Plaintiff for two minutes before pushing him to the ground, pinning him down, and then pushing him in the back as he walked away. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a criminal battery charge.In this civil case, the district court entered summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on each of Plaintiff’s claims, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity. However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed as to the excessive force and battery claims, finding that the force used by Defendant was excessive and that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted maliciously. View "Trellus Richmond v. Mario J. Badia" on Justia Law

The appeal involves the tax consequences of Petitioners' participation in a complex tax avoidance scheme. Petitioners expected to realize an $80.9 million capital gain as a result of selling a portion of his company. The scheme, which involved a set of tiered partnerships, allowed Petitioners to claim a $77.6 million artificial loss to offset his legitimate capital gains. A federal district court found the scheme to be an abusive tax shelter and upheld the IRS’s disallowance of the benefits of the shelter in a partnership-level proceeding, and a prior panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. As a result of the partnership-level proceeding, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to Petitioners disallowing the $77.6 million loss deduction they reported on their joint tax return. Petitioners sought review in the U.S. Tax Court, which rejected their various challenges.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”), the governing scheme in effect during the relevant period, established uniform audit and litigation procedures for the resolution of partnership tax items. The filing of the final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA), the timeliness of which Petitioners do not contest, suspended the limitations period for assessment of tax attributable to affected items until January 11, 2017. The 2016 notice asserts a deficiency that is attributable to an affected item. Accordingly, the statute of limitations had not expired when the IRS issued the September 9, 2016 notice of deficiency, as the Tax Court correctly found. View "Raghunathan Sarma, et al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

A federal district court decision in a declaratory judgment action that an insurance policy issued by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (“Underwriters”) covered certain negligent actions undertaken by the former directors and officers of Omni National Bank (“Omni”) during the 2008 banking crisis. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), acting in Omni’s name as Omni’s receiver, demanded payment and prejudgment interest from Underwriters under the insurance policy for a stipulated judgment previously entered against three of Omni’s former directors and officers for $10 million, the limit of Underwriters’ insurance policy. Underwriters paid the $10 million once the Supreme Court denied certiorari for its appeal from the declaratory judgment but refused to pay prejudgment interest, causing the FDIC to institute this action.   On appeal, the FDIC argues that demands for prejudgment interest are timely under Georgia law so long as they are made before the entry of a coercive final judgment, which declaratory judgments are not. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, concluding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for Underwriters. Accordingly, the court remanded for the determination of when prejudgment interest began to run.   The court explained that Underwriters’ argument that it lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of prejudgment interest, as Section 9–11–54(c)(1) requires, is false on its face. This entire lawsuit has been dedicated to extensively litigating prejudgment interest. Further, the court held that FDIC’s claim is not barred. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Colombian native, was arrested in Colombia on drug trafficking charges and ultimately convicted in federal court. Petitioner now appeals the denial of both his amended 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his convictions and sentence and his subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. He claims that one of his pre-extradition attorneys was ineffective due to a conflict of interest. According to Petitioner, his attorney tried to convince him to pay a thirty-million-dollar bribe or kickback as part of a plea agreement, which would redound to the benefit of one of Petitioner’s other clients. But Petitioner was represented by other attorneys, and he does not allege that they were conflicted or otherwise deficient in pursuing legitimate plea agreements on Petitioner’s behalf. The district court held that the allegations in Petitioner’s motion would not establish a Sixth Amendment violation even if true.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming a conflict of interest existed, Petitioner’s claim ultimately fails because he does not sufficiently allege that the “conflict adversely affected his representation.” Although Petitioner criticizes his attorney, he does not allege that his other attorneys suffered under a conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to effective assistance of “an attorney.” The Sixth Amendment does not include the right to receive good advice from every lawyer a criminal defendant consults about his case. Further, the court wrote, that because it concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits, it cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Fabio Ochoa v. USA" on Justia Law

The former Speaker of the House of the Alabama Legislature was the target of a grand jury investigation in Lee County, Alabama. He was accused of misusing his office for personal gain, including by funneling money into his printing business. Plaintiff was a state representative at the time of the investigation into Speaker Hubbard. Plaintiff believed that he had evidence undermining the accusations against the speaker and contacted the defense team to help them.   Plaintiff sued the Attorney General of Alabama in federal court. His complaint brought First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The relevant issues on appeal are: Does Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury, and if so, does the secrecy law violate the First Amendment? And does the Alabama grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness disclosing grand jury information he learned “only by virtue of being made a witness” violate his First Amendment free speech rights?   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed, in part, and remanded. The court concluded that Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law, unlike the Florida law in Butterworth, cannot reasonably be read to prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury. The court also concluded that the grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness’s disclosure of grand jury information that he learned only by virtue of being made a witness does not violate the Free Speech Clause. View "William E. Henry v. Attorney General, State of Alabama" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. After receiving a notice to appear that initiated his removal proceedings and advised him of his obligation to keep his address up-to-date with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Petitioner moved and did not send the agency his new address. The immigration court later sent Petitioner a notice informing him of the time and place of his removal hearing. Since he had moved, Petitioner did not receive that notice. He then failed to show up at his removal hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. Petitioner asserts that he was improperly ordered removed in absentia because he did not receive the notice of his removal hearing the agency was required to provide under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that once he received a notice to appear warning him of his obligation to update the agency when he changed addresses, Petitioner was on the hook to follow through with that instruction. Because he failed to keep DHS apprised of his whereabouts, the INA allowed for Petitioner’s removal in absentia even though he never received the later notice informing him of his removal hearing’s time and place. Thus, the court wrote that Petitioner’s removal order complied with the statute’s requirements. View "Andrei Dragomirescu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law